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Introduction 
 
But you say you are conservative - eminently conservative - while we are 
revolutionary, destructive, or something of the sort. What is 
conservatism? Is it not adherence to the old and tried, against the new 
and untried? We stick to, contend for, the identical old policy on the 
point in controversy which was adopted by "our fathers who framed the 
Government under which we live;" while you with one accord reject, and 
scout, and spit upon that old policy, and insist upon substituting 
something new… Not one of all your various plans can show a precedent 
or an advocate in the century within which our Government originated. 
Consider, then, whether your claim of conservatism for yourselves, and 
your charge or destructiveness against us, are based on the most clear 
and stable foundations.  
- Abraham Lincoln, The Cooper Union Address 
February 27, 1860 
                                                                                                                                      
 
For a century and a half, Abraham Lincoln has been symbolic of the greatest and best of 
American ideals. He is the leader whose generosity, solemn wisdom, and courage of spirit 
continue to capture the imaginations of those who read his writings or study his acts. 
Although not a member of the sublime Founding generation, Lincoln’s authority and 
recognition almost supersedes that of the Founders. Just as Secretary of War, Edwin M. 
Stanton, pronounced when the president succumbed to wounds, Lincoln truly belongs to the 
ages now. In the world of politics, immortality has meant that Lincoln’s name and image 
became, almost at the moment his shocking death was announced, a tool to add lustre to 
earthly causes, right and left, progressive and conservative.  
In part, the power of the Lincoln image might be attributed to the circumstances of his death. 
A Good Friday martyr, Lincoln has become the last victim of that bitter, filial war.  He is, in 
ways, an American Christ-figure: dying so that the more perfect Union might tear, but not 
sever; to repair bonds of friendship; to remind all of the better angels of our nature. But a 
4 
public death alone is not sufficient to cement a legacy. Lincoln’s leadership in the greatest 
crisis in American history demonstrated, undoubtedly, that he ranks among the nation’s 
heroes. In the massive upheavals of war, he drafted and signed the Emancipation 
Proclamation, perhaps his supreme accomplishment. When coupled with the monumental 
achievements of saving the Union and emancipating the slaves, Lincoln’s life-story further 
broadens his appeal. Is there a better example of the American dream than the rise from log 
cabin to White House?  
His legacy is greater still: Lincoln’s bequeathment of words, as much as his deeds, is a 
mighty one. While the Emancipation Proclamation may be derided for its legalistic tone, the 
Gettysburg Address, the Second Inaugural, the Cooper Union, and the House Divided Speech 
– along with his many collected writings – contain some of the most beautiful and frequently 
quoted phrases in the national idiom. By the majesty of his decorous and often conciliatory 
words, Lincoln stands as one of – perhaps the – greatest statesman in United States history.  
In light of the immense Lincolnian legacy, those that seek to place themselves within the 
topography of American political life inevitably run across the question of Lincoln. The 
leaders of newly emergent movements or ideologies in America must, in some way, respond 
to, interpret, or use the symbol of Lincoln. The impulse to “get right with Lincoln”, as 
historian David Donald has suggested, is a strong one. “No reputable political organisation 
could omit a reference to the Great Emancipator, nor could the disreputable ones”.1 Beyond 
name recognition and historic achievements, the source of Lincoln’s continued popularity, 
Donald suggested, lay in his “essential ambiguity”. Lincoln can and has been appropriated by 
all sides in the political realm.
2
 We see in President Barack Obama, for instance, the 
deliberate cultivation of a public connection to his fellow Illinoisan legislator. “Lincoln saw 
beyond the bloodshed and division”, Obama writes, “[h]e saw us not only as we were, but as 
we might be. And he calls on us through the ages to commit ourselves to the unfinished work 
he so nobly advanced—the work of perfecting our Union”.3 In these phrases, Lincoln 
becomes the esteemed forerunner of the progressive project of the modern Democratic Party. 
1
 David Donald, "Getting Right with Lincoln," in Lincoln Reconsidered: Essays on the Civil War Era (New 
York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, 1972), pp. 3-18. The line originally came from Rep. Everett Dirksen, the 
Republican congressman from Illinois and later Senator for Wisconsin. He “assured his Republican colleagues 
that these days the first task of a politician is ‘to get right with… Lincoln”, p. 17. 
2
 Ibid., p. 18.
3
 Barack Obama, "Perfecting Our Union," The Atlantic (2011), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/02/perfecting-our-union/308832/ . See also Barack Obama, 
The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream (Melbourne, Australia: Text Publishing 
Company, 2007), pp. 97-8, 122-3. 
5 
Traditionally, however, the Lincoln image was the domain of the Republican Party, although 
William Taft and Theodore Roosevelt sparred over Lincoln during the Progressive split from 
the GOP in 1912.
4
 It was Franklin Roosevelt that drew on Lincoln as a Father of the New 
Deal and, from the 1948 election onward, Lincoln was “everybody’s grandfather”, to be 
interpreted and appropriated as necessary.
5
  
In spite of their strong associations with the Republican Party, the new conservatives were at 
times extremely uncomfortable with their supposed Lincolnian patrimony. How Lincoln – 
and the Lincoln image – was interpreted and reinterpreted, used, abused, debated, and 
deployed by conservative intellectuals is the focus of this thesis.  
The term “conservative” is by definition anchored to historical location. A thinker considered 
conservative in 1960 would, no doubt, have held views deemed entirely progressive in 1860. 
Conversely, a progressive in 1860, by virtue of historical location, might arrive in the 
twentieth century a stark conservative. The immediate issue, then, is establishing who or what 
is meant by “conservative” in a discussion of American conservatives after the Second World 
War. Conservative might imply the maintenance or preservation of a status quo but, as Kevin 
Mattson argues, the conservatives of the post-war period were in many cases rebelling 
against the establishment.
6
  If not a defence of prevailing society, was the conservatism of the 
twentieth century then a straightforward right-wing political doctrine or ideology? It is true 
that most of the conservative intellectuals shared political outlooks and voting patterns in 
practical terms. Beyond electoral politics, however, the thought of the conservative 
coalition’s intellectual leadership was far from homogenous. The movement encompassed, 
among others, the borderline authoritarianism of Richard Weaver, the traditionalism of 
Russell Kirk, the libertarianism of Frank Meyer, and the majoritarianism of Willmoore 
Kendall. United as they were by both anti-liberalism and anti-communism, the so-called 
conservative movement was thoroughly divided on a philosophical level.  
One could craft a definition of “conservative” and parse out historic thinkers as authentic or 
inauthentic examples, but that is not the intention here. Instead the varied approaches taken in 
assessing Abraham Lincoln give a useful insight into the fissures within the conservative 
movement at a tectonic level. To that end, a practical definition has been adopted. Those that 
4
 Donald, "Getting Right with Lincoln," pp. 12-3. It was in Lincoln’s name that Roosevelt urged Progressives to 
re-join the Republican Party. 
5
 Ibid., p. 16. 
6
 Kevin Mattson, Rebels All! A Short History of the Conservative Mind in Post-War America (New Brunswick, 
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2008), pp. 21-61. 
6 
were considered as conservative by their allies and opponents, those whose thought was 
published in conservative journals and magazines, are taken at face value and assessed as 
conservative. In the early post-war period through until the mid-1960s this was a relatively 
small circle whose quirks, doctrinal and personal, were known to one another and some 
doctrinal disciplining did occur historically. Those addressed here all remained within the 
broad confines of post-war conservatism. 
As self-conscious conservatives – the first movement in American history to adopt the term – 
the conservative intellectuals were fundamentally interested in America’s history – their 
history. By selecting and judging the American past, they were making an act of self-
definition. Their interpretations of Lincoln entailed serious claims about themselves and the 
nation. By including Lincoln as a part of the conservative tradition and congruent –even 
definitive – of American conservatism, or by rejecting him, they made unequivocal 
statements about America and equality, freedom, virtue, and order. The clash over Lincoln 
and the Lincoln legacy was often a proxy, but one with larger cultural-historical implications. 
The various responses indicate deep divisions within the right over political doctrine. In the 
struggle between the right’s rejection or adoption of the state, the status of universal rights 
against a majority opinion, and the relationship between freedom and equality, the Lincoln 
image was drawn into the debate.  
There was a second element of self-definition in the debates over Lincoln as the conservative 
movement sought to establish its authenticity as an American political and cultural 
persuasion. The conservative intellectuals struggled to establish the meaning of conservatism 
in a nation founded in revolution. In interpreting their history, the conservatives attempted to 
answer whether conservatism meant embodying the principles of Lincoln, or rejecting them 
as counterfeit. Should authentic conservatives look to the Founders, or to Lincoln, or, indeed, 
to both, as their antecedents? Implicit is the question of the conservative movement’s 
relationship with the cultural and political mainstream. In a political framework in which 
Lincoln is “everybody’s grandfather”, the rejection of Lincoln is a blunt rejection of the 
political mainstream. Those seeking to accommodate or convince the mainstream may 
struggle to win converts if they straight-facedly denigrate the immensely popular Lincoln. In 
settling, or at least putting forth, their arguments over Lincoln, the post-war conservatives 
were gesturing toward the larger problems of their existence. Political doctrine, authenticity, 
history, and status: each notion is bound up in the right’s argument over Honest Abe. 
7 
Finally, as suggested, the conservatives, and especially the American conservatives, have a 
close, often reverential, connection with their history. History becomes a source of identity, 
guidance, and pride. The following analysis might serve as an interesting case study into an 
instance of the conservative movement’s engagement with a contested part of the past in 
search of a history usable in their own present. 
This thesis is intended as a work of intellectual history. In it the thinkers, their ideas in the 
written form, and the use of those ideas is the subject.
7
 As such, this is not a political or social 
history, but ideas do not form in a vacuum. The social and political contexts within which 
these intellectuals wrote are essential for understanding their biases, motives, and intentions. 
In interpreting the emergence of the conservative movement and, by extension, the place of 
Lincoln within it, George H. Nash’s The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America 
Since 1945 remains the benchmark text of the post-war right.
8
 Patrick Allitt’s The 
Conservatives is a valuable and brisk overview.
9
 Kevin Mattson’s Rebels All! is another 
useful intellectual history, framing conservatism as a radical reaction against a staid 
establishment.
10
 Finally, Jeffrey Hart’s insider history of the movement and, especially, 
National Review is an excellent and fascinating survey of the movement’s primary thinkers 
and popularisers from a close proximity.
11
 Because the conservative intellectuals’ thought on 
the first Republican president is so historically located, they are addressed in an essentially 
chronological order with some thematic unity to each section. Some figures recur, as they 
themselves recurred in the on-going debate. 
It is worth noting that the subject under discussion inhabits the intellectual realm. How 
Lincoln was interpreted by conservatives is addressed as the debate occurred among the 
progenitors of the ideas rather than the acceptance these ideas by a wider population. Instead 
of the view taken of Lincoln among “average” conservatives, the focus is on those men 
whose work was in the production and dissemination of knowledge and opinion. Those 
analysed are largely academics, columnists, and public intellectuals. All were published in 
7
 Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," History and Theory vol. 8, no. 1 
(1969), pp. 3-53. 
8
 George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in American since 1945, Thirtieth-Anniversary ed. 
(Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2006), passim. 
9
 Patrick Allitt, The Conservatives: Ideas and Personalities Throughout American History (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2009), passim. 
10
 Mattson, Rebels All!, passim. 
11
 Jeffrey Hart, The Making of the Conservative Mind: National Review and Its Times (Wilmington, DE: ISI 
Books, 2005), passim.
8 
National Review, the primary organ of intellectual conservatism, and many in Modern Age, 
its more literary cousin.  
Speaking at Cooper Union, Lincoln made his own claims about the nature of American 
conservatism. Like many of the post-war conservatives, he too located the foundation of 
America’s conservative tradition in “our fathers who framed the Government under which we 
live". As Lincoln understood it, authentic American conservatism must emerge from the 
Founders’ legacy and be in line with the policies and spirit of that first generation. The 
twentieth-century intellectuals that claimed conservatism for themselves set about judging 
Lincoln by this very criterion. Their answers, and their broader views of Lincoln, rested on 
their ultimate conclusions about his claims of fidelity to the Founders as the movement 
decided whether it needed to get right with Lincoln, or do away with him entirely. 
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1 
Gestures Toward a Conservative Lincoln 
 
In the immediate years following the Second World War, the climate for conservatism, the 
“thankless persuasion”, appeared arid and its political prospects nil. Yet, the post-war era saw 
the birth of America’s first successful and self-consciously conservative movement.12 As the 
United States emerged from the war as the preeminent Western power and into a booming 
economy, the moral horror of the war had not left the American psyche unscathed. Many 
questioned how supposedly civilised, modern nations could degenerate into industrial-scale 
barbarism.
13
 Stalin’s Russia prevailed and Europe was brought under the long shadow of its 
nuclear arsenal, meanwhile the Chinese Revolution and Korean War struck home the 
prospect of international communism.
14
 Domestically, the expansion of the federal 
government in the New Deal had been compounded by war measures and its opponents were 
dismayed that Eisenhower and the brief Republican majority had tacitly endorsed rather than 
repealed the New Deal’s core programmes.15  
The new conservatism emerged from three distinct but overlapping schools of post-war 
critics. A libertarian sentiment of strictly limited government and individual liberty swelled in 
defence of free-market capitalism. Traditionalists decried the loss or neglect of traditional 
social structures and principles with a belief that liberal society had failed to prevent the evils 
and tyrannies of the war years. The libertarian and traditionalist impulses were bound 
together by muscular anti-communism. A departure from the isolationism of the “Old Right”, 
the new conservatives rejected containment for an unflinching policy of liberation. The three 
branches of conservatism came together in the person of William F. Buckley, a young 
Catholic with libertarian leanings. “I believe”, Buckley wrote in the preface of his break-
through book, “that the duel between Christianity and atheism is the most important in the 
12
 Clinton Lawrence Rossiter, Conservatism in America: The Thankless Persuasion, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: 
Knopf, 1962), see subtitle. 
13
 Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in American since 1945, pp. 2, 52. 
14
 Allitt, The Conservatives, p. 162. 
15
 Ibid., p. 175. 
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world. I further believe that the struggle between individualism and collectivism is the same 
struggle produced on another level”.16  
Critics of the new conservatism espoused by Buckley argued that it had no place in America. 
The liberal historian and commentator Arthur Schlesinger dismissed the validity of the 
movement. Conservatives, he argued, attempt to “unite the feudal traditions of British 
conservatism with the laissez-faire policies of American business. The offspring is a hybrid 
that retains little contact with the realities of either nation… the New Conservatism is thus 
severed from the American reality… it is essentially the politics of nostalgia. Its emotions are 
honourable, generous – and irrelevant”.17 Less than a decade after Schlesinger published his 
remarks, however, the Republican Party nominated a strict conservative as its candidate in 
the presidential election. 
 
Richard M. Weaver: The Idealist Lincoln 
As isolating as the early post-war years were for conservatives, they were pierced by rays of 
intellectual light. The first such flare was the jeremiad of an obscure academic. Richard M. 
Weaver’s Ideas Have Consequences (1948) diagnosed a cultural malaise and proposed the 
beginnings of a plan for reformation. The book generated considerable controversy and has 
since been recognised as arguably the first word of the nascent post-war conservatism.
18
  
As an intellectual, Weaver (b. 1910) was rigorous and idiosyncratic. Conservatives cite 
Weaver as one of the earliest voices of traditionalist conservatism, but this is an over-
simplification. Likewise, although Southern by birth and associated with members of the 
Fugitive Agrarian group, it is overenthusiastic to identify him too closely with that circle 
either. Weaver was a writer on Southern Agrarianism rather than a Southern Agrarian writer. 
His thought on Abraham Lincoln is an example of his independence of thought; it bears out 
the peculiarities of his philosophy in ways that have been both accepted and ignored by those 
that followed Weaver’s first critical report. 
16
William F. Buckley, Jr, God and Man at Yale: The Superstitions of "Academic Freedom" (Chicago, IL: Henry 
Regnery Co., 1951), pp. xii-iii.
17
 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr, "The New Conservatism: Politics of Nostalgia," The Reporter, 6 June 1955, pp. 11-2. 
18
John M. Pafford, Russell Kirk, ed. John Meadowcroft, Major Conservative and Libertarian Thinkers (New 
York, NY: Continuum International Publishing, 2010), p. 101. 
11 
Weaver’s principal contributions to conservatism were produced between 1944 and his death 
in 1963, during his tenure at the University of Chicago. Earning his doctorate at Louisiana 
State University, Weaver joined the English department at Chicago on the strength of his 
unpublished dissertation and a recommendation from literary critic Cleanth Brooks.
19
 
Primarily a rhetorician, Weaver suggested that the revival of “noble rhetoric” was essential to 
reverse the decline of the West.
20
 Rhetoric, correctly understood, is the marriage of right with 
persuasion, he argued; “truth plus its artful presentation”.21 Its subject was the whole of man. 
Following Plato, Weaver claimed that noble rhetoric’s purpose was the “perfect[ing of] men 
by showing them better versions of themselves, links in that chain extending up to the 
ideal”.22 Dialecticians alone were dangerously revolutionary, since they represented truth 
without considering society. A noble, that is, honest, rhetorician, however, bridges the divide 
between the society and the ideal by understanding the world and using their knowledge to 
persuade listeners to accept the truth. In short, noble rhetoric was the uniting of truth with 
prudence.  
Lincoln, Weaver claimed, was the consummate noble rhetorician of the American 
experience.
23
 Moreover, Lincoln was a conservative. The interpretation of Lincoln as 
principled conservative was put in service of his regenerative mission. Because Lincoln was 
more than simply a pragmatist he represented a sure light for guidance: the model that 
conservative leaders and the wider Republican Party ought to follow.
24
  
Weaver’s conclusion rests on his insight that a speaker’s favoured form of argument revealed 
an underlying pattern of thought. “A much surer index to a man’s political philosophy is his 
characteristic way of thinking, inevitably expressed in the type of argument he chooses”.25  
The four primary methods of argumentation each implied radically different perspectives of 
the world and Lincoln was paradigmatic of the argument from definition – the conservative 
argument. The argument from definition encompassed “all arguments from the nature of the 
thing… the postulate that there exists classes which are determinate and therefore 
19
 Joseph Scotchie, Barbarians in the Saddle: An  Intellectual Biography of Richard M. Weaver (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997), pp. 12-14. 
20
 Fred Douglas Young, Richard M. Weaver, 1910-1963: A Life of the Mind (Columbia, MO: University of 
Missouri Press, 1995), p. 127. 
21
 Richard M. Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery Company, 1953), p. 15. 
22
 Ibid., p. 25. 
23
 Richard M. Weaver, "The Cultural Role of Rhetoric," in Language Is Sermonic: Richard M. Weaver on the 
Nature of Rhetoric, ed. Richard L. Johannesen, Rennard Strickland, and Ralph T. Eubanks (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1970), p. 182. 
24
 Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 86. 
25
 Ibid. p. 112. 
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predictable”.26 Definitional arguments show that the speaker’s ontological outlook was 
founded on a belief in timeless essences. “[T]hose who believe in the validity of the argument 
from [definition] are idealists, roughly, if not very philosophically, defined”.27 Lincoln was 
such a thinker. 
In the Ethics of Rhetoric, Weaver outlined the argument from definition and demonstrated, 
with Lincoln as his archetype, its centrality to conservatism.
28
 In Lincoln’s speeches he found 
a marked preference for the argument from definition as Lincoln derived propositions from 
the existence and predictable behaviour of categories. Not just influenced by ideals, Lincoln 
was idealistic in his very nature: “it characterises his thinking from an early age”.29 “The true 
conservative”, Weaver suggested, “is one who sees the universe as a paradigm of essences, of 
which the phenomenology of the world is a sort of continuing approximation”.30 Since a 
metaphysics of ideals is the necessary component of conservatism, Lincoln’s clear belief in 
ideal categories made him, in Weaver’s eyes, a model of conservatism.  
The ideal category central to Lincoln’s thought was “man” and the unchanging nature of 
humanity. Lincoln’s anthropology was unsentimental: fixed, knowable, and, predictable. In 
debating the national bank Lincoln argued from human nature that duty and self-interest must 
necessarily coincide.
31
 By this framework and anthropology, Lincoln’s arguments were the 
most “fundamental” since the realist framers of the Constitution. “[N]ot since the Federalist 
Papers of James Madison had there been in American political life such candid recourse to 
this term”.32 His moral clarity let him see more clearly than the “intellectual Jefferson” and 
the “academic Wilson”.33 Lincoln was a true intellectual and historical giant to be revered 
and emulated above the Founders. “He is the father of the nation even more convincingly 
than Washington”.34 
Throughout the 1850s, Lincoln’s habit of reasoning from the nature of man meant he was 
“ideally equipped” to argue the issue of slavery.35 It was his nature to reduce the subject to 
the only relevant question: the humanity of the slaves. By holding that slaves were indeed 
26
 Ibid., pp. 86-7. 
27
 Ibid., p. 87. 
28
 Ibid., pp. 87-110. 
29
 Ibid., p. 87. 
30
 Ibid., p. 112. 
31
 Ibid., pp. 88-9. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Ibid., p. 86. 
35
 Ibid. 
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men, Weaver argued, Lincoln held the intellectual high-ground from which he skewered his 
opponents. Southern defenders of slavery, forced to argue from circumstance, were 
particularly vulnerable. Where Dred Scott reduced slaves to chattel property, Southern laws, 
slaves’ capacity for human understanding, and simple procreation showed clearly 
contradicted this contention. Slaves were people.
36
  
Lincoln’s mastery of this fact is on display at Peoria. To the argument that justice requires 
that, as Northerners may bring their property in the form of hogs into the territories, so 
Southerners must be allowed to bring their property in the form of slaves into the same 
territories, Lincoln responded “I admit that this is perfectly logical, if there is no difference 
between hogs and Negroes. But while you thus require me to deny the humanity of the 
Negro, I wish to ask whether you of the South, yourselves, have ever been willing to do as 
much”.37 The humanity of slaves had never been systematically denied and Lincoln took 
advantage of Southern cognitive dissonance. The debate, he said, turned on man and self-
government. “When the white man governs himself, that is self-government; but when he 
governs himself and also governs another man, that is more than self-government – that is 
despotism”.38 As early as 1854, Weaver noted, Lincoln was explicitly using the timeless 
ideals of the Declaration of Independence to expose the injustice of slavery. Weaver found 
this moral clarity and logical rigour immensely admirable and humane.
39
 By working 
prudentially to bring the Union toward a closer approximation of the essence of man, Lincoln 
had revealed himself as a great and conservative statesman. 
Lacking the authority of ideal categories, the defenders of slavery and slavery agnostics 
resorted to the weak argument from circumstance. Men like Douglas and Calhoun shifted the 
issue from a matter of “moral right” into one of “existing legal rights” and “necessity”.40 In 
Weaver’s taxonomy the argument from circumstance is both myopic and circular. Its 
persuasive power is deceptive. Lincoln did not deny the necessity of deference to 
circumstance. Instead, he viewed it as an obstacle to the ideal: a “retarding” rather than 
deciding factor.
41
 The danger of the argument from circumstance, especially when it prevails, 
is the debasement of public opinion that leads to societal blindness toward the ideal. Lincoln 
spoke repeatedly about the “gradual and steady debauching of public opinion”, evidence that 
36
 Ibid., p. 91. 
37
 Ibid., p. 92. 
38
 Ibid., p. 93. 
39
 Ibid., p. 111. 
40
 Ibid., p. 94. 
41
 Ibid. 
14 
his intellectual and moral integrity led him to stand for ideals.
42
 Weaver saw in Lincoln a 
reflection of his own view that the ills of society are due to a public that has, through the 
prevalence of the argument from circumstance among other reasons, become blind to the 
world of ideals. 
There is much unusual about Weaver’s thought compared with that of his contemporaries. 
The most immediate example is his disappointment with Edmund Burke. Weaver was 
frequently critical of “know-nothing” conservatism and in The Ethics of Rhetoric Burke, 
symbolic of the conservative preservation of the status quo, is juxtaposed with Lincoln.
43
 
During the writing of The Ethics of Rhetoric, Weaver was possibly aware that Russell Kirk’s 
soon to be published The Conservative Mind built an entire conservative tradition on Burkean 
principles, but even so, he was genuinely surprised by the esteem conservatives afforded 
Burke. Burke, he suggested, was reliant on the argument from circumstance, the argument 
inherent to liberalism.
44
  
By contrast, Weaver was candid about his own conservatism’s basis in abstract ideals. 
“[T]his type of conservative is sometimes found fighting briskly for change; but if there is 
one thing by which he is distinguished, it is trust in the methods of the law”.45 Abstract truth 
is identifiable; once identified it must be fought for. Lincoln understood the timelessness of 
the nature of man and this made him conservative. His belief in essences made him a self-
disciplined and objective war leader, something readily apparent in his powerful Second 
Inaugural address.
46
 Yet, Lincoln did not ignore temporal realities either. It was his prudential 
manoeuvring toward the ideal on the question of slavery, “the necessity of walking a line 
between the moral imperative and the law”, which explains his steps that appear 
compromising or racist to modern sensibilities. 
True conservatism and, by extension, the Republican Party, Weaver concluded, must return 
to ideals. It was fitting that Lincoln founded the “greatest American conservative party” but 
tragic that its foundation was so quickly debauched.
47
 In 1858 Lincoln told Republicans that 
42
 Ibid., p. 95. 
43
 Young, Richard M. Weaver, 1910-1963: A Life of the Mind, pp. 139-44. 
44
 Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 112. 
45
 Ibid., p. 113. 
46
 Ibid., pp. 110-1. 
47
 Ibid., pp. 112-3. 
15 
they must “fight this battle upon principle and upon principle alone”.48 In 1953 Weaver, using 
Lincoln as a model, was repeating the message.     
Southerners, traditionalists, and paleoconservatives view Weaver as one of their own, but, as 
Willmoore Kendall sagely warned: “every body [sic] appears to be hard put to ‘classify’ 
Richard Weaver, or to say what he was up to without, pretty soon, sticking his foot in his 
mouth”.49As conservative statements many aspects of Weaver’s thought on Lincoln appear 
odd. His admiration for Lincoln’s abstract thought and willingness to upset the status quo, his 
denouncement of Burke, and his defence of ideals over tradition run counter to the views of 
some of his fellow conservatives. Even his simple respect for Lincoln is notable for a 
Southern traditionalist, but these arguments were consistent with Weaver’s wider thought. 
Although he demurred from calling his work philosophy, the philosophical underpinnings of 
Weaver’s “intuition of a situation” are clear.50 He identified with “those thinkers in the 
Platonic-Christian tradition” who affirm “that form is prior to substance, and that ideas are 
determinants”.51 Several of Weaver’s basic assumptions echo Platonic idealism but he was 
not in all things a Platonist. While not an obviously orthodox Christian, his work suggests a 
deep reservoir of Christian thought. His conception of human nature was predicated on 
Original Sin, a notion he believed to be a profound insight into humanity; an “allegoric” 
expression of man’s “tendency to do the wrong thing when he knows the right”.52 The main 
subject of his work was the conservation of Western civilisation, the inheritance of which 
includes both Platonic and Christian thought – often in tandem. As such, Weaver 
incorporated both strands of the Western tradition, sitting somewhere between Plato and St. 
Paul.
53
  
48
 Ibid., p. 114. 
49
 Willmoore Kendall, "How to Read Richard Weaver: Philosopher of 'We the (Virtuous) People'," 
Intercollegiate Review vol. 2, no. 1 (1965), p. 81. 
50
 Young, Richard M. Weaver, 1910-1963: A Life of the Mind, p. 107. 
51
 Richard M. Weaver, "Letter," New York Times Book Review, March 21 1948., p. 29., cited in Richard L. 
Johannesen, "A Reconsideration of Richard M. Weaver's Platonic Idealism," Rhetoric Society Quarterly vol. 21, 
no. 2 (1991), p. 1. 
52
 Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 25. 
53
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Weaver’s conservatism stemmed from a deep disenchantment with modernity and its 
attendant liberalism. An intellectual biographer has suggested that he modelled himself on 
John Crowe Ransom, a founding member of the Fugitive group and contributor to the 
Agrarian manifesto I’ll Take My Stand. Ransom supervised Weaver’s Master’s work at 
Vanderbilt, the centre of the Agrarian movement, and his last completed book, Visions of 
Order, was dedicated to his old supervisor.
54
 In it he articulated the concept of the “doctor of 
culture”, a role he envisioned for himself and his teacher.55 As part of a society, the doctor of 
culture had the detachment to observe society’s ills and resilience to suggest painful but 
necessary remedies. Weaver believed he had uncovered the root of Western civilisation’s 
ailment and was steadily producing a programme of remedies. In this programme, Lincoln 
was a tonic; a pure and prominent model to be emulated. 
The problems of modernity were traceable to the triumph of philosophical nominalism. 
Dating back to the fourteenth century Scholastic William of Occam, nominalism has had a 
deleterious effect on not only Western civilisation but the human psyche itself. Until the 
twentieth century, the West had lived on the intellectual and moral capital of the pre-
nominalist tradition. Now society was suffering the inevitable effects of the long supremacy 
of nominalism. The consequences were varied and disastrous. Objective truth was rejected as 
man became the measure of all things. Original Sin was abandoned for a conception of 
humanity as un-fallen and therefore good. “Why” was rejected in favour of “how” and the 
worship of science and its compulsion to control nature. Nominalism, Weaver claimed, led to 
a solipsism where the mind is the arbiter of right and wrong and the relations between God 
and Man and Man and Man are atomised.
56
  
The civilizational sickness of the West demanded urgent attention. The remedy must be the 
wholesale rejection of nominalism and the re-acquaintance with philosophical and linguistic 
absolutes. A clear distinction between right and wrong must be made so that “eyes bleary 
from looking at particulars could be refocused on universals”.57 Weaver believed the 
rhetorician could encourage these fundamental changes, but the discipline of rhetoric had 
itself suffered the ravages of nominalism. The fourteenth century debate between the aim of 
rhetoric was truthful speaking or eloquent speaking had been decided in favour of eloquence 
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as philosophers became doubtful of “Essential forms”. In turn, the standard purpose of 
rhetoric deteriorated from eloquence to mere utility and function as rhetoric became simply 
modern sophistry.
58
  
The first order for Weaver, then, was the return of rhetoric to its true calling: teaching the 
speaking of truth and the clear definition of words. “It is often thoughtlessly said that the 
restoration of our broken world lies largely in the hands of the teachers”.59 This is true, but 
not understood. Disorder cannot be overcome through the teaching of more disorder. In this 
instance where disorder has been wrought by relativism, the teacher’s responsibility is to 
“stand guard against relativism” and apply the standard of truth.60 Rhetoricians must be 
restored to their classical role and rhetoric must be not mere persuasion, but persuasion of 
truth. 
Weaver occupied himself with imbuing his students, conservatives, and the public with a 
sense of moral truth and the compositional eloquence to foster a return to the “paradigm of 
essences”. With their understanding of the human condition, noble rhetoricians, like Lincoln 
in the nineteenth century, would gently but powerfully convince society of the truth of ideals. 
Despite the grimness of his worldview, Weaver was ultimately optimistic about the success 
of this task. 
Lincoln was Weaver’s model of a noble rhetorician. Here was a great American statesman 
who stood for each of the elements necessary for Western civilisation’s renewal. Lincoln had 
a belief in ideals, an understanding of human nature, a rhetorical eloquence built on truth, 
moral clarity, and a prudential but not deferential approach to circumstance. He was unafraid 
to define. By expounding on Lincoln, Weaver hoped for a new birth of Lincolnian thought. 
It does not stretch the historical record to attribute these characteristics to Lincoln but 
additional factors made the president a compelling model for Weaver’s project. Where the 
classical figures of rhetoric like Plato and Cicero were distant and staid, Lincoln was relevant 
and accessible to the twentieth century American mind. The Lincoln image is powerful 
because he is an authentic and profoundly American symbol: iconic and admired. Gallup 
found in 1951 that 45 % of respondents named Lincoln as the greatest president, more than 
twice as many as the second-ranked Washington. A second survey in 1956, found that 62 % 
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of respondents ranked Lincoln among the three greatest presidents.
61
 His reputation as 
“Honest Abe” further leant itself to Weaver’s mission of establishing truth as the primary 
concern of rhetoric. Indeed, Weaver argued that Lincoln was almost unique in his nation’s 
past for his adherence to the argument from definition. He was the obvious choice as an 
American model of noble rhetoric.  
As a political exercise, Weaver was using Lincoln as a goad for the Republican Party. A “hill 
country Republican” and supporter of the conservative senator Robert Taft, Weaver’s 
primary audience was conservatives and Republicans.
62
 The Grand Old Party did have a 
conservative and free-market component, but its leadership was dominated by the moderate 
to liberal “Eastern Establishment” and its presidential candidates tended toward a style of 
managerial pragmatism. The emerging conservatives were a minority within the party and to 
conservatives the Eisenhower administration epitomised the laxity of the party. Eisenhower 
had made no serious attempt to roll back the New Deal and appeared to accept a policy of 
containment toward communism. The administration’s failure to intervene in Hungary was a 
blow for conservatives. The moderate “Eisenhower Republicans”, lacking political principle, 
failed to offer an alternative to liberalism. As William Buckley editorialised: “I prefer Ike”.63  
 In his Lincoln essay, Weaver called explicitly for the Republican Party and conservatives 
generally to adopt Lincoln’s model. He urged Republicans to base their arguments and 
positions on principle, eschewing the pragmatism of “Me-Too” Republicanism. A return to 
principle, he thought, would be both persuasive rhetorically and electorally. Moreover, it was 
a moral imperative. So returned to the world of ideals, conservatives could rehabilitate 
society at large. Again the Lincoln image was well suited for this use. As the first Republican 
president he was iconic for the Party – Surveys in 1945 and 1956 asking Americans to list the 
nation’s three greatest presidents found that 70% of Republicans named Lincoln, compared 
with only 54 % of Democrats – a difference not solely attributable to Southern Democrats.64  
By promoting Lincoln, Weaver was appealing to Northern and Western Republicans who 
61
 Barry Schwartz, Abraham Lincoln in the Post-Heroic Era: History and Memory in Late Twentieth-Century 
America (Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press, 2009), p. 93. Franklin Roosevelt was also chosen by a 
similar proportion and just under half of those surveyed placed Washington among the greatest. 
62
 Johannesen, "A Reconsideration of Richard M. Weaver's Platonic Idealism," pp. 3-6., Scotchie, Barbarians in 
the Saddle, p. 71. 
63
 Allitt, The Conservatives, pp. 176-7. Gillian Peele, "American Conservatism in Historical Perspective," in 
Crisis of Conservatism: The Republican Party, the Conservative Movement, & American Politics after Bush, ed. 
Joel D. Aberbach and Gillian Peele (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 21. 
64
 Schwartz, Abraham Lincoln in the Post-Heroic Era, p. 101. There was remarkable consistency over the ten 
year period. In 1945 the partisan breakdown was Republicans: 70%, Democrats: 53%. In 1956 it was 
Republicans: 71%, Democrats: 55%. 
19 
strongly associated with the president.
65
  In Lincoln he had a powerful example of noble 
rhetoric that was both American and widely admired by his prospective conservative and 
Republican audience.  
Weaver’s championing of Lincoln was a in a way contrary to his otherwise very Southern 
scholarship. His earliest work had been an apologia for antebellum Southern society yet 
Weaver wrote that “[Lincoln’s] name is now immune against partisan rancour, and he has 
long ceased to be a mere sectional hero”.66 Weaver thought Lincoln’s national legacy was a 
testament to his greatness, but he overestimated Southern reconciliation with Lincoln. While 
the Agrarians had been broadly neutral toward Lincoln, later Southern conservatives, M. E. 
Bradford most notably, excoriated Lincoln for his perceived role in the destruction of the 
agrarian South.
67
   
Southern identity was a part of Weaver’s essence, but he lived out of the South for most his 
working career – returning annually to family land in Weaverville, NC. Like his relationship 
with the Agrarians, Weaver was of but not in the Southern milieu.
68
 The Old South, he 
claimed, was “the last non-materialist civilisation in the Western World”.69 Obviously 
Lincoln had been integral to the end of American slavery. The Southern feudal system was 
undermined entirely when its labour system was shattered. Weaver painted a relatively 
benign view of the practice of slavery in The Southern Tradition at Bay and his writings on 
the civil rights movement were sceptical of integration, endorsing the segregationist 
position.
70
 Yet, in his affirmation that Lincoln was right in his abhorrence of slavery, Weaver 
was unequivocal that slavery is immoral and unjustifiable. He did not let the particulars or 
circumstance of the Old South distort moral vision and this allowed him to see Lincoln as a 
great man. Elements of the South had a timeless value that had been lost, but the ghost of the 
South haunted the nation. Weaver yearned for a return to a non-materialistic world, but could 
not council the resurgence of an idealised antebellum South. The South was not a foundation, 
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nor, because of slavery, an example. Instead, like the Agrarians, Weaver believed the South 
was a challenge to the materialist, nominalist world he lived in.
71
  
That Richard Weaver was influential in the emergence of the conservative intellectual 
movement is certain. His political views, however, did not take root in the movement’s 
thought. Weaver was primarily a cultural critic rather than political theorist and though 
Willmoore Kendall argued that there was an important element of political theory in 
Weaver’s thought, it was his cultural critique that was remembered.72 There was also an 
elusiveness in tone and highness of style in Weaver’s writing that let others to read their own 
philosophy into his work. Weaver remarked that “many people have written to me to say that 
they found their own thoughts expressed in the book”.73 Kendall believed Weaver to be a 
philosopher of the virtuous people, to Frank Meyer he held a position between tradition and 
liberty, and to Kirk he valued hierarchy and tradition.
74
 William F. Buckley “punished” 
inquirers that pressed him for a brief definition of conservatism with Weaver’s definition of a 
“paradigm of essences toward which the phenomenology of the world is a continuing 
approximation”.75 In spite of the regard in which he was held by the intellectuals that 
followed him, traditionalist thinker M.E. Bradford suggested that Weaver remained 
“something of a puzzle” to “establishment conservatives”, especially in his more 
authoritarian positions.
76
 A similar phenomenon exists among Weaver’s Southern successors, 
several professed a great debt to his life’s work while rejecting his thought on Lincoln and 
allegiance to idealism.  
Weaver’s Lincoln interpretation was not wholly adopted by those conservatives that 
immediately followed him. In part the disparate nature of the movement, geographically and 
intellectually, prevented an early orthodoxy on any subject emerging swiftly, least of all on 
Lincoln. To argue, though, that Weaver’s ideas were ignored because they were not heard 
above the din of the young movement is insufficient. He was well-regarded by conservatives 
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– he contributed regularly to National Review and Modern Age and was the author of several 
popular books. He was a noted speaker at several conservative events. Weaver spent time 
with Russell Kirk at his home in Michigan, and maintained friendships with many others, 
including Frank Meyer and Mel Bradford, both of whom visited him to challenge his views 
on Lincoln.
77
  
Conservatism’s lack of cohesion was an important factor. The movement Weaver helped 
spark was still in its nascence and lacked a coherent political and cultural philosophy. It was 
broadly for Western Civilisation and against liberalism, but in the burgeoning movement 
these tendencies manifested themselves in a variety of ways. When Kendall designated 
Weaver “captain of the anti-liberal team” he identified the coalition as anti-liberal rather than 
coherently conservative. Weaver was one voice – a useful and important one – but only one 
in an increasingly loud opposition movement to the liberal consensus. 
Further, despite Buckley’s ironical use of Weaver’s definition of conservatism, his was a 
unique interpretation, at odds with other prominent competing conservative philosophies. It is 
no mistake that Weaver selected Lincoln as his model while a great many other 
conservatives, notably, but not exclusively, Kirk, chose Edmund Burke. Weaver’s insistence 
on absolutes appeared dangerously close to the abstract ideologies conservatives detested: 
that Weaver’s conservatives could be “found fighting quite briskly for change” is revealing.78 
The modern conservative critics of Lincoln each acknowledged moral absolutes but they 
were reluctant to allow them into the sphere of political theory, emphasising instead 
gradualism and circumstance. Because of the tone and targets of Weaver’s famous works, his 
reputation was as a cultural critic not political theorist. Other conservatives may have been 
willing to acknowledge Lincoln as a symbol of moral certitude, but were anxious about 
politics that were ostensibly based on abstract ideology. Weaver’s concern for ideals is shared 
by the Straussian school, a force emergent in conservatism from the late 1950s, and his 
admiration for Lincoln was extended along similar lines by the Straussian political 
philosopher Harry Jaffa.  
The intra-conservative doctrinal debates were cut-and-thrust affairs and the Lincoln question 
was no exception. The major criticisms of Lincoln from conservative intellectuals appeared 
after Weaver’s death. Had his career not ended so abruptly, perhaps Weaver might have had a 
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right of reply, a conservative defence of Lincoln. Harry Jaffa fulfilled the role of Lincoln’s 
conservative defender, but it is a loss that Weaver was not able to extend the case himself. 
 
Russell Kirk: The Burkean Lincoln 
In the ferment of early conservatism Weaver’s friend and contemporary Russell Kirk (b. 
1918) was of particular importance. A mid-western academic-cum-reclusive writer and 
intellectual, Kirk articulated a deeply traditional conservative philosophy that extolled 
Western cultural achievement and traditional mores against the industrialisation of modern 
life. His The Conservative Mind (1953), the product of his doctoral research at St. Andrew’s 
in Scotland, was an “eloquent, defiant, impassioned cri de coeur” that catalysed the new 
conservatism.
79
 Tracing an Anglo-American conservative tradition from Edmund Burke to 
the twentieth-century United States, Kirk’s intention was not historical inquiry alone. Instead 
he sought build an intellectual foundation and tradition of American conservatism in defiance 
of the entrenched liberalism.
80
 It was his hope that the American element in his genealogy of 
Anglophone conservatism would serve as a useable, alternate heritage and corrective to 
society. 
As an historian Kirk tended to read conservatism into his subjects. Arthur Schlesinger 
suggested that he was motivated by a romantic nostalgia for European aristocratic society. 
His attempt to express a conservative tradition was a scattershot collection of intellectuals 
with no abiding connection: “an unconvincing and thoroughly artificial genealogy”.81 Those 
sympathetic to Kirk’s aims also questioned the extent to which his narrative was a true 
reflection of history. William Schlamm, while taking a largely positive view of the book, 
argued that Kirk’s attempt to portray America as historically conservative weakened its thesis 
since “no amount of skilful eloquence can alter… manifest fact”.82 The Conservative Mind is 
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not a history, wrote a sympathetic obituarist, “it is a work of literature meant to achieve 
political ends”.83 Such interpretive foibles notwithstanding, The Conservative Mind was well 
reviewed and exceeded all expectations as a surprise bestseller.
84
 
In his search for a coherent conservative history Kirk ignored or downplayed major figures, 
including Abraham Lincoln. He praised several of the Founders – namely Washington, 
Hamilton, and Adams – but was notably silent on Jefferson. After John Quincy Adams, none 
of Kirk’s American subjects were politicians. Disillusioned with America’s later political 
leadership, Kirk held that the conservative tradition was instead transmitted through 
intellectuals and cultural critics.  
Lincoln appears in The Conservative Mind three times:  twice for a turn of phrase and once in 
a discussion of Boston Brahmin James Russell Lowell.
85
 Despite his defence of the Union, 
Kirk found no place for Lincoln in the conservative canon. Instead he heaped praise on John 
C. Calhoun, as a principled thinker whose intellectual development arrived at a commanding 
defence of hierarchy and tradition against “optimism, equalitarianism, meliorism, and 
Jeffersonian democracy”.86  
Kirk’s project was a delicate one. He needed to fashion a coherent conservatism while 
maintaining his principled rejection of “ideology”. The Conservative Mind established a set 
of principles that a conservative would assent to. He emphasised order, tradition, and heritage 
over uniformity, equality, progressivism; belief in property and liberty; a prejudice for reform 
over revolution; and a fundamental belief in a “divine intent” that governs society and binds 
humanity.
87
 Kirk’s conservative philosophy was bound up with his reading of Edmund 
Burke. “Burke’s is the true school of conservative principle”. “Every conservative thinker 
discussed… even the Federalists… felt the influence of the great Whig, although sometimes 
the ideas of Burke penetrated to them only through a species of intellectual filter”.88 A 
conservative, according to Kirk, is someone whose temperament is Burkean and whose 
thought and action corresponds with the conservative canons. 
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Lincoln failed to meet these criteria. Kirk did not hold Lincoln accountable for presiding over 
the upheavals of the Civil War, but he struggled to see him as anything like a conservative 
statesman. “Abraham Lincoln’s election to the presidency of the United States is the great 
line of demarcation in the history of America”. “American moral and political conservatism 
has not yet recovered, and perhaps never can”.89 That Lincoln drafted and signed the 
Emancipation Proclamation – the antithesis of gradualism – at least partially disqualified him 
as a conservative. Richard Weaver emphasised timeless ideals and brought Lincoln into the 
conservative fold as a champion of moral absolutes. Kirk also emphasised ideals, but in 
conjunction with tests of fidelity to slow and judicious reform. Lincoln’s recourse to the 
language of equality in his most important speeches skirted too close to Jacobinism for Kirk 
to endorse. The Gettysburg Address, in particular, may be read as a radical statement in 
favour of economic and political levelling. If the historical Lincoln was not a radical, there 
was enough in his language and legacy for Kirk to hesitate in co-opting him for the 
conservative counter-history.  
In the conservative milieu, Kirk knew Richard Weaver well; Weaver wrote the inaugural 
essay for Kirk’s quarterly Modern Age in 1957.90 He held Weaver in high regard as a thinker 
and later traced the genesis of the conservative movement back to the North Carolinian. Ideas 
Have Consequences is cited in The Conservative Mind but Kirk’s manifesto was printed 
before Weaver’s essay on Lincoln was published.91 Driven by Weaver’s promotion of 
Lincoln, Kirk made a reassessment of the president. He was eager to agree with Weaver, “one 
of the most courageous men in America”, but struggled with his friend’s attack on Burke. 92  
By contrasting Edmund Burke with Abraham Lincoln, Weaver was attempting to steer the 
conservative movement toward the politics of principle. Broadly supportive of this aim, Kirk 
found several missteps in his approach. “Mr. Weaver’s illustrations of his thesis are bold and 
closely reasoned but some of them are needlessly hazardous to his thesis – especially his 
comparison of Burke’s rhetoric with Lincoln’s”.93 Weaver’s familiarity with Burke was 
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admirable but his praise for Lincoln’s principles resembled “the demon of the absolute”.94 
Even so, in a qualified manner, Kirk agreed with Weaver’s point.  
“Mr. Weaver’s ‘true conservative’ is really what Mr. Weaver (and this writer, so far as my 
opinion is of any consequence) would like conservatives to be”.95 With some abstraction 
Lincoln may be acceptable on conservative terms. Kirk’s first principle of conservatism was 
the belief in a divine order and if Lincoln championed the timeless then he may have been 
conservative. Even so, Kirk remained uncomfortable with Weaver’s definition since it 
precluded Burke. Instead, Kirk argued that there was an historical definition of conservative – 
from conservatif, a term first used in Restoration France that meant adherence to Burke’s 
thought articulated in Reflections.
96
 If this is the a priori definition of conservative it is 
absurd to reject Burke. Believing that definitions emerging organically out of history were 
surer guides than abstract theorising, Kirk was extremely wary of ideal thought detached 
from history. However, Kirk held that Weaver need not jettison Burke under his own terms. 
Although contemptuous of “abstraction”, Burke had an abiding love of “principle”. 
“[W]ithout principles, all reasonings in politics, as in everything else, would only be a 
confused jumble of particular facts and details, without the means of drawing out any… 
conclusion”.97 Burke, like Kirk, forewent abstraction but never abandoned principle. 
If Kirk believed that Weaver was unduly critical of Burke, he thought his friend overly 
complimentary toward Lincoln. He deferred to Weaver in conceding that Lincoln favoured 
the argument from principle over circumstance, but questioned the extent to which he acted 
on those principles. Lincoln, Kirk argued, was inconsistent. The Emancipation Proclamation 
may have been a wise decision but it was a “radical departure from the principles Lincoln had 
expounded before the war and during”. Neither did Kirk accept that a pattern of thought 
constituted conservatism – the test remained practice. In all things Edmund Burke remained 
the better example of consistent, principled thought and action.
98
 
Indeed, Weaver’s argument could be rendered as an absurdity. “An adversary might say, 
‘very well: a conservative is a man who argues from definition of a priori assumptions. 
Lincoln is a better conservative than Burke, because Lincoln frequently referred to abstract 
assumptions; and Robespierre is a better conservative than even Lincoln, because 
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Robespierre always guided himself by reference to abstract definition, with a fine 
indifference to particular circumstances”. Kirk recognized that this was an unfair 
characterization of Weaver’s argument but was unequivocal that Weaver had left himself 
open to the bizarre conclusion that “Robespierre is a better rhetorician and a sounder ethical 
thinker than Burke or Lincoln”.99 A more complete understanding of Weaver’s position 
recognised that noble rhetoric married timeless truth with an understanding of society and the 
human condition. The result was prudential governance guided always by the ideal. Kirk had 
criticised the distorted argument without addressing its deeper meaning.  
Despite professing agreement with Weaver, Kirk remained ambivalent on Lincoln. In part he 
was motivated by Lincoln’s use as a critique of Burke. In defending Burke, Kirk had 
delegitimised Lincoln and retained his earlier judgement that Lincoln did not meet the 
conservative criteria. Even so, Weaver stimulated Kirk to make a further investigation of 
Lincoln.
100
 
The Measure of Abraham Lincoln (1954) occupies an unusual place in Kirk’s writing. It 
appeared within a year of both Kirk’s The Conservative Mind and Weaver’s The Ethics of 
Rhetoric. Influenced by Weaver, it also drew liberally from Stanley Pargellis’s examination 
of Lincoln’s political philosophy and Benjamin Thomas’s biography of Lincoln.101 The essay 
itself reads like errata for The Conservative Mind informed by Weaver’s arguments but was 
only published in an English Jesuit magazine and was not collected any later anthologies of 
Kirk’s essays. It does, however, feature prominently on the website for the Russell Kirk 
Center and is cited frequently in conservatives’ debates over Lincoln. It represents Kirk’s 
growing comfort with Lincoln’s role in American history: in The Measure of Abraham 
Lincoln the reappraised Lincoln passes muster in his historical role, his aims, and his 
nature.
102
 
Through Weaver, Thomas, and Pargellis, Kirk discovered a conservative Lincoln, one that 
showed conservative leadership in the great moment of crisis. While Andrew Johnson lacked 
the mind and temper to protect the South from the excesses of Reconstruction despite doing 
“all he could to realise the wise and moderate policies which Lincoln had outlined”, his 
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implementation of Lincoln’s judicious policies saved the South from total debasement. 103 
Kirk distinguished Lincoln from the “Radical Republicans” – men like Charles Sumner and 
Thaddeus Stevens that Kirk viewed as dangerous idealogues. Far from utopian, Lincoln’s 
moderation and caution meant “the Radical Republicans detest[ed] him as much as the 
Southern zealots did”. In his new portrait, Kirk’s Lincoln is a man of wisdom and 
prudence.
104
  
While both Weaver and Pargellis concluded that Lincoln was conservative, their reasoning 
differed greatly. Stanley Pargellis was essential in convincing Kirk of Lincoln’s 
conservatism. He argued that Lincoln’s philosophy was founded upon belief in prudence, the 
organic nation, guiding principles as distinct from abstract theories, and the direction of 
divine Providence – a set of principles remarkably close to Kirk’s later conservative canons. 
Lincoln shared the philosophical framework of conservative greats Churchill, Coleridge, and 
Burke.
105
 The distinguishing feature of Lincoln’s conservatism was that it had equality as its 
guiding principle; the methods he employed to enact equality, however, illustrated his 
conservative mind. Pargellis’s argument was far closer and more amenable to Kirk’s thought, 
although it prefigured Weaver’s emphasis on guidance by principle. Kirk, prompted by 
Weaver’s advocacy of Lincoln, was only truly convinced by Pargellis.  
Lincoln became, for Kirk, a statesman in the Burkean mould without having read the Anglo-
Irish orator. Not a doctrinaire statesman, Kirk’s Lincoln had a clear-eyed vision tempered by 
a love of prudence. He was not compelled by the “abstractions of modern revolutionaries”.106 
Although he hated slavery, Lincoln was no abolitionist: his support of the Emancipation 
Proclamation hinged on military necessity, rather than “moral judgement”. “Lincoln… 
perceived distinctly the complexity of this problem… while Senator Sumner… eminent 
among New England illuminate, remained oblivious to all the gargoyle faces that huddled 
slyly behind fanatic abolition. For a long time, Lincoln resisted the importunities of the 
Radicals in favour of Negro emancipation; he yielded at length, out of the desperate 
necessities of the Union cause”. Lincoln was a model of temperance and moderation, not as 
myopic devotion to the middle-path “but because he held by the principle that the unity and 
security of the United States transcended any fanatic scheme of unity”. “In this, for the most 
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part, as in much else, Abraham Lincoln was a conservative statesman of a high order”.107 In 
his admiration for statesmen that united just principles with the wise leadership, Kirk came to 
see Lincoln as one of these great men, gaining an appreciation for the president where 
previously there had been little. 
Like Weaver, Kirk stressed Lincoln’s moral probity. His “greatness came from his 
recognition of enduring moral principle”. The Founders had established “a standard maxim 
for a free society” to be constantly approximated, if not achieved. “To this ideal of liberty 
under law, Lincoln added his own example, which has worked incalculable good in, the 
altered America which has followed 1865”.  
In his concern for society’s morality Kirk saw a function for social religion and appreciated 
Lincoln’s example. Although he later affirmed orthodox Catholicism, at the time of writing 
Kirk endorsed a broadly Judeo-Christian faith that delineated right and wrong. He understood 
Lincoln as a Christian in only the loosest sense, if at all, but a man shaped by the language 
and doctrine of Christianity. “Solitary reading of the Bible gave majesty to his mind and his 
style, but never brought him any faith less cloudy and austere than a solemn theism”. 
Nevertheless, “there have been few Americans more thoroughly graced with the theological 
virtues, charity most of all. The New Testament shines out from his acts of mercy, and the 
Old from his direction of war”. That Lincoln used the language of God and Providence 
prominently in his public and private writings, particularly later in his presidency, indicated 
to Kirk Lincoln’s keen awareness of society’s “divine intent”. Lincoln’s religiosity was very 
like his own. Kirk quoted with favour Lincoln’s judgement that “in the present civil war, it is 
quite possible that God’s purpose is something different from the purpose of either party… 
The will of God prevails”. Lincoln “knew what moved him was a power from without 
himself; and, having served God’s will according to the light that was given him, he received 
the reward of the last full measure of devotion”.108  
On a principled, religious, and prudential level, Kirk’s Lincoln was more a part of the 
conservative tradition than he had initially allowed, but he remained reluctant praise him too 
forthrightly. Twenty years later Kirk addressed Lincoln again, briefly praising him in his 
survey of the War for Independence. Lincoln, he wrote, was noteworthy not for his political 
achievements but his noble character. He became a straightforwardly conservative champion: 
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in Lincoln for “the first time we see a man from the common clay as a defender of order”. 109  
He was “misunderstood in life… [and] misinterpreted since his death… The maintaining of 
order, as expressed in Declaration and Constitution, was his steady aim”.110 His election was 
still the demarcation line in American history, but Kirk’s Lincoln, a lover of prescription, 
now explicitly prevented the victory of disorder.  
The primary conceit of this portrait, however, was Lincoln as a model of classical virtue. The 
Founders had, with the Roman Republic in mind, hoped for American statesmen endowed 
with virtue. Washington embodied this ideal with the “unbought grace of Life” and Lincoln 
“has come to stand as Washington’s equal in republican virtue”.111 Though rough-hewn, the 
war brought forth greatness from Lincoln. He was a leader who combined gravitas (“the 
sense of heavy responsibility”) with comitas (the wry humour that tempers gravitas). In 
office, Lincoln acquired pietas (submission to the divine and country) and officium (duty and 
service). He: 
[w]as struck down at the height of his powers, having confronted the agony of the Civil 
War with firmness of purpose – which the Romans had called constantia. He fulfilled his 
office with disciplina, or steadiness of character; with industria, or hard labour; with 
clementia, or forgoing his own rights; with frugalitas, or austere abstinence; with virtus, 
or energetic manliness. He died at the moment when his hopes were rewarded and his 
acts justified… He left to the Republic something better than military or political victory: 
the example of strong probity.
112
 
Most importantly, in his task Lincoln had exhibited the charioteer of the virtues: prudentia.  
Thus Kirk’s Lincoln was vaulted from a president all but ignored in his history of the 
conservative mind, to a heroic standard of conservative virtue. He was personally heroic and 
historically great, but as the preserver of Union and order, not as emancipator of slaves. Kirk 
downplayed Lincoln’s role in the end of slavery and was silent on his promotion of equality 
as the “ancient faith” of America. The Gettysburg Address was cited for piety, not dedication 
to equality.  
As late as 1983 Kirk wrote that the Declaration “really is not conspicuously American in its 
ideas or phrases, and not even characteristically Jeffersonian... the Declaration was meant to 
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persuade the Court of France and the philosophes of Paris that the Americans were 
sufficiently un-English to deserve military assistance. Jefferson's Declaration is a successful 
instrument of diplomacy …not a work of political philosophy or an instrument of 
government, and Jefferson himself said little about it after 1776”.113 Kirk’s residual distrust 
of equality motivated such a blunt dismissal of the Declaration. As one of the great 
interpreters of the Declaration in American history, Lincoln’s support for this abstraction is 
part of the reason that he, with Jefferson, was omitted from the history of The Conservative 
Mind. By modulating Lincoln’s allegiance to Jeffersonian equality and emphasising his 
preservation of the Union and sublime personal virtue, Kirk fashioned a conservative Lincoln 
that he could admire and present for emulation. 
The Lincoln of Kirk’s thought is an example of the traditionalist, ordered conservatism. 
Neither an egalitarian, nor a radical, Kirk’s Lincoln was a respecter of tradition and 
prudential governor. He was mindful of Providence and in possession of an ontology 
reflective of Kirk’s own. This Lincoln was elevated to Kirk’s pantheon of American 
conservatives. “[I]n his great conservative end, the preservation of the Union, [Lincoln] 
succeeded”. Moreover, “he might have succeeded in a conservative labour equally vast, the 
restoration of order and honesty, had not Booth’s pistol put an end to the charity and fortitude 
of this uncouth, homely, melancholy, lovable man”.114  
Nevertheless, Lincoln was never as central to Kirk’s conservative imagination as he was for 
others. For a thinker whose intention was to form a useable conservative history, Lincoln was  
far from prominent, appearing only intermittently and often peripherally in Kirk’s huge body 
of work. Kirk’s initial reaction to Lincoln was as a progressive and egalitarian. Though he 
went beyond this interpretation, the general paucity of Kirk’s references to Lincoln suggest 
he that retained reservations about Lincoln. Kirk never placed him centrally as others before 
and after him did. Despite Lincoln’s prominence in the national consciousness, in Kirk’s 
retinue of conservative icons there was almost always a more authentic figure to present. 
When he did address Lincoln it was overwhelmingly to extol his character and Burke-like 
traits, never an in depth analysis of Lincoln’s achievements. For Kirk, Lincoln could be a 
good model of a virtuous man but, unlike Weaver and, later, Harry Jaffa, Kirk’s framework 
of conservatism prevented him from developing an American conservatism built on Lincoln. 
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Despite his personal virtues, Lincoln’s historical record was simply too progressive and too 
bound up with equality for Kirk to embrace him tightly. 
 
Harry V. Jaffa: The Ancient Lincoln 
Where Kirk’s and Weaver’s assessments of Lincoln were relatively minor facets of their 
intellectual output, the third significant interpretation of Lincoln in the 1950s to impact the 
right was a far more extensive analysis of the president. Political philosopher Harry Jaffa (b. 
1918) placed Lincoln at the centre of his philosophical universe with the publication of Crisis 
of the House Divided: An Interpretation of the Lincoln-Douglas Debates (1959). Unlike 
Richard Weaver and Russell Kirk, when Jaffa began writing on Lincoln it was not from an 
explicitly conservative outlook. Having previously voted for Adlai Stevenson and John F. 
Kennedy, Jaffa shifted rightward after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, an episode he believed betrayed 
anti-communists.
115
 Although, like Reagan, Jaffa approved of the New Deal, he supported 
Goldwater in 1964 and became a frequent contributor to National Review and Modern Age. 
He developed a rigorous and morally charged philosophy around Lincoln; one that differed 
from that of both Kirk and the emerging National Review position, but was prefigured 
somewhat in Richard Weaver’s thought.116 Jaffa’s longevity and pugnacity in defending 
Lincoln’s status within conservative circles makes him tremendously influential for the 
conservative movement’s relationship with the Great Emancipator.117 
Having studied English Literature at Yale, Jaffa entered the graduate programme at the New 
School for Social Research where he was one of German-Jewish émigré political philosopher 
Leo Strauss’s earliest doctoral students. Although over his lifetime Jaffa’s thought deviated in 
some ways from his mentor’s, his time with Strauss and the thirty year friendship that 
followed was essential to the tenor of his conservatism and his extended engagement with 
Abraham Lincoln.
118
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Much has been made of the enigmatic Strauss and his philosophy.
119
 Raised in an orthodox 
Jewish family in turn of the century Germany, Strauss’s intellectual formation was 
thoroughly grounded in the trends of the era, working with Cassirer, Husserl, and Heidegger. 
He left Germany for Paris in 1932, before immigrating to England and then, in 1938, the 
United States. He taught at the New School for a decade before taking his most influential 
appointment at the University of Chicago in 1949. Congruent with his philosophy, many of 
Strauss’s published works were commentaries on Classical texts.120  
The collapse of the Weimar Republic into the Third Reich left an indelible mark on Strauss. 
The apparent failure of liberalism and liberal political regimes in the face of tyranny indicated 
a “crisis of modernity”. “The crisis… consists in the fact… that modern western man no 
longer knows what he wants – that he no longer believes that he can know what is good and 
bad, what is right and wrong”.121 Modern society is unable to affirm or believe anything as 
true and such moral and philosophical paralysis prevents human excellence and virtue as it 
paves the way to nihilism and tyranny. 
Modernity must be understood in contrast to the thought of the Ancients and the confluence 
of Athens and Jerusalem. The classical thought of Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle provided a 
sure defence against nihilism while revealed religion, particularly Judaism, had a similar 
capacity. Both understood that there existed a hierarchy of goods, a place for human 
excellence, and personal and societal virtue. In a similar way to Richard Weaver, Strauss 
argued that there had been a point of severance between the Ancients and the Moderns with 
catastrophic effects for humanity. For Strauss it was Machiavelli that made the decisive break 
by undermining Platonic political philosophy. By lowering the threshold of “good” 
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governance, Machiavelli eliminated the role of fortune in the emergence of good regimes. 
Thomas Hobbes subsequently elevated the basest human need, that of preservation, to be the 
paramount consideration of politics. The cultivation of virtue was disregarded for mere 
survival and natural law replaced by basic rights. Rousseau engendered the notion of a 
developing human nature and, with it, historicist ethics. Finally, Nietzsche reached the 
ultimate conclusion of modernity: that power is the final arbiter, not truth, good, or virtue.
122
  
Strauss held that a return to ancient thought, or aspects of it, was necessary to overcome the 
failings of modernity. To that end the ancient philosophers ought to be read with the utmost 
seriousness. In classical thought, the best life is lived in accordance with nature. If the 
defining aspect of man’s nature is reason, the ideal life is one of philosophic reflection. In 
practice, constitutional democracy is the political arrangement most amenable to philosophy, 
but democracy is only sustainable when the body politic possesses a strong moral basis. To 
foster virtue, and thereby allow for philosophy, Strauss advocated both religious and liberal 
education and the need for “gentlemen-statesmen” to inculcate the masses with moral 
propriety. To uncover the transcendent moral hierarchy, Strauss argued that political 
philosophy was the most fertile ground for its discovery.
123
  
While working with Strauss, Jaffa imbibed the bifurcation of ancient and modern, the 
overwhelming preference for the former, and a methodology of subjecting texts to extremely 
close readings. He also absorbed Strauss’s qualified praise for constitutional democracy and 
the United States, and his reverence for “magnanimous” statesmen. Crucially, Strauss’s belief 
in a universally applicable hierarchy of goods and repugnance toward “relativism” and 
“nihilism” confirmed and strengthened Jaffa’s own convictions. Jaffa’s intention became to 
develop “a political science of natural right” and in doing so he brought Straussian methods 
and prejudices to the study of Lincoln and the Civil War.
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In Lincoln Jaffa discovered the great American and quintessential Straussian statesman. 
Lincoln became the centre of his intellectual career: the Founders, Locke, and America were 
each interpreted and reinterpreted through a Lincolnian lens. Within the conservative 
movement he had success using the president to articulate his own Straussian-Jaffaite 
philosophy of strident moral purpose. The gulf between Jaffa’s morally charged conservatism 
and the thought of his conservative allies created tension within the movement. Jaffa’s 
disputatious nature led him to debate virtually every variety of conservative thinker over his 
half century in the movement.
125
 In these debates, Lincoln almost always featured 
prominently and several turned on the man himself. 
Jaffa’s long engagement with Lincoln began with Crisis of the House Divided, the influential 
study of the Lincoln-Douglas debates and perhaps the most highly-regarded product of 
Strauss’s first wave of students’ initial output.126 Jaffa sought to rebut the revisionist 
interpretation of the Civil War that saw it as a needless conflict. The revisionists faulted 
Lincoln for inflaming the supposedly repressible tension between the North and South.
127
 
Jaffa’s analysis broke ground by taking Lincoln and Douglas seriously as thinkers and 
approaching their arguments as principled, rather than motivated by political expediency. He 
distinguished Lincoln from Douglas to explain why Lincoln, the divisive figure, should have 
defeated the nationally palatable Douglas. At its heart, Jaffa claimed, the Lincoln-Douglas 
debate was a difference of moral epistemologies. The exchanges, he observed, mirrored 
almost exactly those of Socrates and Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic. Lincoln affirmed a 
transcendent notion of justice while Douglas agnostically favoured a solution that equated 
justice with the popular will. By his close reading of the debates, Jaffa suggested a 
philosophical sophistication in both Lincoln and Douglas that had previously been 
overlooked. 
Lincoln emerges in Jaffa’s work as a morally and intellectually serious philosopher-statesman 
prepared to lead the nation in dedicating itself to justice. In explicitly Straussian terms, Jaffa’s 
Lincoln was needed by America to imbue the nation with classical truth to overcome the 
grave moral failures of its modernity. 
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Governed by justice, Lincoln was firmly grounded in natural right. He viewed Douglas’s 
doctrine of popular sovereignty over slavery in the territories as a moral disaster.
128
 Lincoln 
interpreted the moral vacuity of popular sovereignty as a burning example of the crisis of 
modernity. At Peoria he declared:  
I can not but hate. I hate it because of the monstrous injustice of slavery itself. I hate it 
because it deprives our republican example of its just influence in the world – enables the 
enemies of free institutions, with plausibility, to taunt us as hypocrites – causes the real 
friends of freedom to doubt our sincerity, and especially because it forces so many really 
good men amongst ourselves into open war with the very fundamental principles of civil 
liberty – Criticizing the Declaration of Independence, and insisting that there is no right 
principle of action but self-interest.
129
    
Reduced to its most basic elements the debate was a matter of positivism against the natural 
moral order. Jaffa’s Lincoln stood for the universality of the Declaration of Independence. 
“For Lincoln”, Jaffa wrote, “there was indeed ‘only one issue’, but that issue was whether or 
not the American people should believe that ‘all men are created equal’ in the full extent and 
true significance of that proposition”.130 “True significance” meant that “all men created 
equal” was the central proposition of America; the proposition from which all other 
principles spring forth.
131
  
The inalienable right of equality stemmed from the Founders’ Lockean inheritance. In his 
reading of Locke, Jaffa followed Strauss’s controversial interpretation that construed the 
philosopher as a veiled Hobbes. The explicit or exoteric Locke was a thinker reconciled with 
Aristotelian and Christian thought. Beneath this false exterior, Strauss suggested, laid an 
atheistic Hobbesian philosophy.
132
 By the Founders’ employment of the esoteric Hobbesian-
Locke, the Founding had been an event steeped in modernity. The equality promised by the 
Declaration was a negative and foundational right based on the state of nature to be moved 
away from as civil society developed. Jaffa argued that Lincoln affirmed this understanding 
of equality and added a powerful normative dimension. “Lincoln’s interpretation of human 
equality… is that every man had an equal right to be treated justly, that just treatment is a 
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matter of intrinsic worth”.133  Lincoln established that the test of a government’s legitimacy 
was no longer whether a regime was despotic or not, but whether it was good and just; “a 
government which may be loved and revered” because it augments “the happiness and value 
of life to all people of all colours everywhere”. He supplanted the modern errors of the 
United States by entrenching an interpretation of “all men created equal” that “transform[ed] 
that proposition from a pre-political, negative, minimal, and merely revolutionary norm, a 
norm which prescribes what civil society ought not to be, into a transcendental affirmation of 
what it ought to be”.134 In effect, Lincoln partially overturned the modernity of the American 
regime. 
Jaffa came to view Lincoln as a great statesman of the Straussian mould. Strauss prized 
moderation as the supreme political virtue and Jaffa’s Lincoln was a beacon of moderation.135 
He stood, firmly, for the natural good of equality on a philosophic and public level, while 
remaining a model of prudent and restrained leadership. At every turn he sought to uphold the 
Constitution despite its enshrinement of the inherently unjust slavery. He was troubled by 
ideological abolitionism – since it meant the overthrow of the Constitution – and disavowed 
the fanaticism of John Browne. He was critical of utopianism in both the temperance and 
abolition movements, “impatient at the imperfections of man’s states”.136 Instead of 
utopianism, Lincoln sought to impart clear morals to the public and secure them in a civic 
religion. This moral programme reached its apogee in the Gettysburg Address, the 
centrepiece of the Second Founding, where Lincoln affirmed that the nation was “dedicated 
to the proposition that all men are created equal”. This wise, prudent, constitutionally minded 
statesman, bestowed with abiding moral consistency, was every bit the magnanimous 
statesman of America.  
Furthermore, Lincoln understood the crisis of modernity and sought to surmount it. By 
transforming the Declaration of Independence and consecrating its new meaning in the public 
imagination through the sacrifice of the Civil War, Lincoln became the saviour of not only 
the Union, but America itself. He was the ultimate statesman-philosopher, succeeding in 
instilling the ancient thought of the transfigured Declaration of Independence in the modern 
regime of America. No mere renewal of dedication to the Declaration, Lincoln’s move was 
sheer transcendence. 
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The Lincoln Jaffa presented is an appealing figure: wise and gentle, dedicated to the equality 
of man. Strauss “knew that the perfect political order was not now possible; but the great-
souled man was not only possible but actual” and Jaffa believed Lincoln to be an Aristotelian 
great-souled aristocrat.
137
  Lincoln “is a man of few but great actions”; he “seems to have 
concentrated his whole inner life upon preparing for the crisis foretold in the Lyceum 
speech”.138 His genius was to unite aristocratic magnanimity with the “cause of the people”. 
“The work of the Founding Fathers was excellent and noble, but it was incomplete”.139 By 
sacramentalising the war as a form of ritual atonement Lincoln, established a political 
religion based on the truth of equality. He saved the Union from being rent by secession and 
liberated the nation from the unintended philosophical failings of the inescapably modern 
Founders. In supplanting the Hobbesian-Lockean understanding of equality and natural rights 
with a proscriptive version, Lincoln brought virtue to the American regime and, in doing so, 
surpassed in greatness even the magnificent Founding Fathers. Lincoln did not overturn the 
modernism of the regime, but imbued the nation with enough ancient virtue to make it viable, 
even good. 
In a strange interlude Jaffa also argues that Lincoln endorsed equality as politically, if not 
literally, true. The so-called Aristotelian justification of equality is in contrast to the more 
prominent version of equality Jaffa used in Crisis that held equality as transcendent truth with 
an attendant Kantianesque imperative. In their analysis of Jaffa’s thought, Catherine and 
Michael Zuckert note, rightly, that he introduced and then passed over this theme. They argue 
Jaffa presents an exceptionally attractive Lincoln, but one both historically implausible and 
philosophically problematic. In justifying the need for Aristotle’s thought in contemporary 
America, Jaffa needed to emphasise the Aristotelian conception of equality. His concurrent 
aim of demonstrating the moral degeneracy of modernity, exemplified by Popular 
Sovereignty, required him to emphasise the universality of the Declaration’s equality clause 
and effectively avoid discussion that undermined the clause’s transcendence. The result, as 
the Zuckerts put it, is “Lincoln’s vacillating and momentary Lockeanism, Kantianism, and 
Aristotelianism”.140 Jaffa essentially had two different meanings of equality in Crisis. Which 
of these he used depended on the philosophical and rhetorical situation at hand. 
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The Zuckerts raise several other questions about Crisis. Their most germane criticisms 
address Jaffa’s fidelity, or lack thereof, to Aristotle and Locke. They argue that his 
supposedly Aristotelian arguments on honour and magnanimity diverge significantly from 
Aristotle’s positions. Jaffa suggests that the magnanimous aristocrat rejects honour, yet 
Aristotle taught that magnanimity meant the correct ordering of virtue and honour. Rather 
than reject honour, Aristotle’s magnanimous man recognises it as his reward for great virtue. 
As Jaffa’s student and prominent figure in the Jaffaite “West Coast Straussian” school, 
Charles Kesler, has argued, Jaffa’s is not an unadulterated Aristotelian aristocrat but rather 
one interpreted through Christianity.
141
 In his presentation of Locke, Jaffa argues that his 
conception of equality was a basic foundation for civil society with no attendant duties. The 
Zuckerts respond that neither Locke nor the Founders understood natural rights as having no 
correlative duties; the equality of the state of nature retains significant value in civil 
society.
142
 The distortions in Crisis are in large part due to the difficulty Jaffa had in 
reconciling aspects of his project with his devotion to Strauss and his methods. As a naturally 
patriotic and conservative thinker, Jaffa’s Americanism led him to view America and 
American history, often through the interpretive lens of Abraham Lincoln, as more laudable 
than Strauss or other Straussians had been willing to do. 
Jaffa placed Lincoln at the centre of his political thought and his interpretation developed 
significantly from Crisis. The course of this evolution is addressed in succeeding chapters but 
the basis of his use of Lincoln is clear from his earliest work. Lincoln is the hero, the central 
figure, in the grand sweep of American history. He is its saviour and restorer; an aristocratic 
statesman-philosopher who brought classical thought to America, and who stands for equality 
and right moral ordering. Lincoln is Jaffa’s ideal and idealised statesman. A conservative 
leader: magnanimous and prudential yet ready to defend natural right against the 
encroachment of nihilism. Jaffa’s admiration and love of Lincoln shines through his writing 
with a ringing moral earnestness. He represents the belief in transcendent truths and readiness 
to stand for the true instead of the convenient.  
In his written work, Lincoln is Jaffa’s sword and shield; an inbuilt example of his thought 
and, by default, the foremost spokesperson of his philosophy. Jaffa frequently quotes Lincoln 
to illustrate or defend his arguments. As he understands it, his political philosophy is one and 
the same with Lincoln’s and his career has been deepening his understanding of Lincoln’s 
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thought and actions in light of the Founding. Jaffa did not believe he was arguing the case for 
Lincoln but rather re-presenting Lincoln’s own powerfully true arguments to the modern 
audience.
143
 
Jaffa’s advocacy of Lincoln amongst conservatives is the fulfilment of the mission he 
believes Strauss entrusted to him: the return of “natural right” to civic life. In a candid 
distillation of his aims Jaffa wrote: “I believe that Strauss believed that my restoration of 
Lincoln was the most apt way to restore the… authority [of the self-evident truths of the 
Declaration], and that this was the form in which the statesmanship of classical political 
philosophy might become authoritative in our world. While Strauss articulated the connection 
between Plato, biblical religion, and medieval political philosophy, to discover the presence 
of classical principles in the post-classical world, he propelled my articulation of the 
connection between Plato, biblical religion, Shakespeare, and Lincoln”.144 In a similar but far 
more comprehensive way to Richard Weaver, Lincoln was Jaffa’s tool to illustrate the 
necessity of natural right to the modern political world. 
Observers of the Straussian project, both sympathetic and otherwise, have been critical of 
Jaffa’s deviations from Strauss’s thought. A major criticism had been of his conflation, 
through Lincoln, of the Declaration of Independence and Nichomachean Ethics.
145
 Crisis of 
the House Divided did not break with Strauss per se, but Jaffa’s patriotism led him to push 
back against Strauss’s designation of the United States as a modern regime. Jaffa concluded 
that the enshrinement of natural right in the public imagination by Lincoln mitigated or 
extenuated the modernity of the United States. This belief or an extension of it became the 
backbone of “West Coast Straussianism”, an influential school dedicated to guiding 
conservatism in line with the “[F]ounders' statesmanship, our citizens' loyalty to the 
Declaration and Constitution, and the scenes, both tender and proud, of our national 
history”.146 Strauss was an admirer, with qualification, of America. Jaffa’s marriage of 
Straussian thought and methodology with overwhelming patriotism has had a considerable 
impact on the intellectual framework of the conservative movement. Moreover, their 
propagation of Lincoln as the hero of American history has done much to ensure his place in 
the modern conservative pantheon, though not without challenge. 
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Crisis of the House Divided was well received, if not widely read. It introduced a more 
complex analysis of the Lincoln-Douglas debates than had previously been attempted. Along 
with Don Fehrenbacher’s Prelude to Greatness it has been credited with beginning an 
appreciation of Lincoln as a serious thinker. Although not written with a political agenda or 
from a consciously conservative perspective, Crisis was well regarded in conservative circles 
and found an appreciative audience.
147
 Willmoore Kendall, one of National Review’s first 
senior editors, became, late in his career, enamoured with Strauss’s thought. He was critical 
but laudatory of Jaffa’s book.148 Kendall’s imprimatur gave Jaffa cache among the National 
Review crowd and he became the journal’s on-call expert for Civil War history and Lincoln 
scholarship. In drawing forth Lincoln’s principles of “human equality, liberty, and natural-
rights-based constitutionalism”, Crisis’s appeal to conservatives was two-fold, suggests 
Kesler. First, these principles were the founding principles of the Republican Party, the party 
conservative overwhelmingly identified with. Secondly, Lincoln’s principles, so clearly 
articulated by Jaffa, were extraordinarily pertinent to the Cold War zeitgeist. Lincoln exposed 
the moral and political bankruptcy of acquiescing to a world permanently half-slave and half-
free”.149 Lincoln, the principled anti-slavery statesman, could be easily transposed as Lincoln, 
the principled Cold Warrior. 
Although previously a liberal Democrat, from the early ‘60s onward Jaffa’s conservative 
bona fides were indisputable. His work appeared in conservative books and the major 
journals and he had a friendship and working relationship with William F. Buckley.
150
 Many 
of Jaffa’s students have been prominent on the right – the Claremont Institute and Claremont 
Review of Books, both heavily influenced by Jaffa, are self-consciously conservative. It was 
rumoured, correctly, that Jaffa had ghost-written Barry Goldwater’s infamous “extremism in 
defence of liberty” speech.151 But in spite of his storied position and his undoubted influence, 
Jaffa remains somewhat controversial on the right. His vigorous conception of conservatism 
and desire for the movement to “be right for the right reasons” earned him many critics. 
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Frequently Lincoln – often as a proxy for the nature of conservatism – was the subject of his 
surprisingly acrimonious exchanges with fellow conservatives.  
In practical politics Jaffa broadly endorsed the conservative Republican platform that 
included a muscular foreign policy in the face of communism, support for free market 
policies, and opposition to the expansion of the federal government.
152
 On social issues he 
was an “embattled moralist”. Politically orthodox, the ideas Jaffa espoused and the idiom in 
which he expressed his philosophy –“his reasons for being right” – nevertheless appeared 
problematic, even contradictory, to the prevailing conservative outlook. In reviewing two of 
Jaffa’s works of political philosophy, Modern Age suggested that he “seems to be a liberal 
democrat” who has “associated himself with Republicans and conservatives”.153 He diverged 
from the developing conservative consensus on universal principles in politics, the role of the 
government, and the place of equality in America.  
Following Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France many post-war conservatives 
were troubled by the application of abstract theories to the complexities of the human 
condition. The excesses of the French and Russian Revolutions were blamed squarely on the 
ideological fundamentalism of the Jacobins and communists.
154
 Russell Kirk taught that 
conservatism was the very negation of ideology. Jaffa’s embrace of the universal principles 
of the Declaration of Independence as reified by Lincoln placed him against Kirkian 
conservatism. Kirk never rejected moral realism but he and his followers favoured 
prescription and prudence over and against the implementation of “rational” programmes 
intended to progress toward a perfect society. Conservatism ought to be principled, and even 
transcendent, but never composed of policies developed in abstraction.  
“Prescription, by itself,” Jaffa argued “can never serve as a foundation for political right. 
Prescriptive right--tradition--can be authoritative only insofar as prescription is seen as 
embodying some form of transcendent right.”155 Conservatism must be founded, first and 
foremost, on transcendent truth. Jaffa was sharply critical of numerous conservative 
luminaries including Kirk, Antonin Scalia, Robert Bork, and Irving Kristol, for failing to 
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understand the centrality of the Declaration and the principles it enshrines to America.
156
 In 
turn he has been criticised for advocating right-wing moralist abstractions and a crusading 
utopianism.
157
 
The second, related, divergence concerns Jaffa’s arguments about the role of the government. 
Influenced by libertarian thought and the American tradition of liberty, the emerging 
conservative movement insisted on the importance of freedom from the state. Government 
was necessary to secure natural rights but no more. Considerable enthusiasm for 
conservatism had developed in response to the New Deal’s expansions of the federal 
government.
158
 Jaffa argued that lowering the aims of politics is part of the failed state of 
modernity; good regimes cultivated virtue, not just secured survival. A government cannot be 
indifferent to good and evil. “Lincoln is the great prophet of our tradition. He is at once the 
greatest of our true liberals, and the greatest of our conservatives. It was he, more than 
anyone, who said clearly that just government must be controlled by moral purpose, and that 
no counting of heads can turn right into wrong”.159 The central thesis of Crisis of the House 
Divided was that the horror of slavery and the moral failure of Stephen Douglas justified the 
rise of Lincoln and, by extension, war.
160
 By his use of this language, conservative critics 
concluded that Jaffa endorsed the kind of activist government and imperial presidencies that 
conservatives loathed. A reading of Jaffa as endorsing vigorous state action, even war-
making, in pursuit of its moral ideals could be, and was, made.
161
  
In exalting equality, Jaffa created a third point of tension between his thought and that of his 
contemporaries. In Crisis Jaffa held that Lincoln established United States’ dedication to 
equality as a universal principle, applicable at all times and in all places: the “‘central idea’ 
from which all its minor thoughts radiate”.162 The Declaration and specifically the preamble 
gave meaning to the American founding and regime.
163
 This was a startling argument for 
Jaffa to make since anti-communism was the vital galvanising force in the development of 
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conservatism and conservatives perceived “equality” as a “god-term” of progressive 
liberalism. Remarkably, Jaffa presented his thesis at a conference dedicated to the future 
direction of conservatism under the title “Equality as a Conservative Virtue”. Until this point, 
it had been clear that equality was manifestly not a conservative value. Liberty rather than 
equality was the central proposition of America.
164
 Willmoore Kendall cautioned National 
Review readers to be wary of the implications of Jaffa’s thought. Kendall feared “a series of 
Abraham Lincolns, each persuaded that he is superior in wisdom and virtue to the Fathers, 
each prepared to insist that those who oppose this or that new application of the equality 
standard are denying the possibility of self-government”. This mentality, he argued, would 
always lead to war. The end-point of Jaffa’s progressive Lincolnian successors was the 
“cooperative commonwealth of men who will be so equal that no one will be able to tell them 
apart”.165 Jaffa rejected the notion that he or Lincoln supported anything like a socialist 
equality. Far from egalitarianism, Jaffa claimed he meant a Lincolnian equality of 
opportunity, not outcome.
166
  
As a thinker, conservative, and proponent of Lincoln, Jaffa was rigorous and demanding. He 
deviated both from Straussian and conservative articles of faith when his line of reasoning led 
him to. His determination for philosophical coherence led Buckley to quip that “[i]f you think 
Harry Jaffa is hard to argue with, try agreeing with him; it is nearly impossible”.167 
Throughout the sixty year or so history of conservatism, Harry Jaffa has been the most visible 
and consistent proponent of Lincoln and a conservatism founded on Lincolnian principles. 
Jaffa’s Lincoln and his conservatism are inexorably linked; two sides of the same coin. 
Despite his reference to common conservative principles, at its core, Jaffa’s Lincoln 
represents a very different form of conservatism from that of many of his contemporaries in 
the 1960s and ‘70s.168 He stood for the morally robust Jaffaite-Straussian conservatism then 
peculiar to himself and his disciples.  
Jaffa was often successful in defending Lincoln’s standing within conservative circles. He 
wrote in broadly the same idiom, the same journals, and shared their social and political 
beliefs. Nevertheless, suspicions remained around both him and Lincoln. Until the movement 
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came to accept the philosophic precepts of Jaffaite conservatism – in particular equality and 
virtue based governance – or until Lincoln was presented in more traditionally conservative 
terms, the right’s relationship with Lincoln would continue to have an ambiguous streak.   
When Weaver, Kirk, and Jaffa wrote their earliest works on Lincoln, conservatism as a social 
and political force was imperfectly formed. While Weaver hoped to use Lincoln as an 
exemplar of a politics of principle for the overly pragmatic Republican Party and Kirk had a 
modest role in Michigan Republican politics, they were far more critics of modern society 
than genuine political operatives. Likewise, Jaffa’s thought placed an emphasis on political 
philosophy but his starting point was modernity’s inability to distinguish wrong from right. 
His foundational critique, like Strauss, was in many ways a cultural and intellectual one.  
The primary argument of the post-war traditionalists was that at the moment the West was 
called to defend itself against evil, the liberal order had defaulted. The traditionalists sought 
the (re)establishment of absolute moral precepts in society – “a bulwark of ideas, tradition, 
and truth” against evil and the corrosive effects of relativism.169 Lincoln appealed to the 
traditionalists because they interpreted him as an authentic and American counter-example to 
the modern moral degradation and challenge to the Establishment’s malaise. For Richard 
Weaver and Harry Jaffa, Lincoln was the ideal symbol of absolute principles against 
relativism. Weaver’s Lincoln was the great Republican and American standard for timeless 
ideals; the vehicle through which, by emulation, society might restore its moral mind. Jaffa’s 
Lincoln, too, stood as a model for modern men, but Jaffa also believed that the historic 
Lincoln meliorated the modernity of American by endowing the nation with a political 
religion predicated on the “ancient” thought of the Declaration transfigured. Lincoln’s 
principled stand against slavery and his opposition of the compromised solution of Popular 
Sovereignty, coupled with the poetic rhetoric of principle and syllogism made him a powerful 
image in defence of absolutes, all the more so because of his role in one of the great moral 
victories of American history.  
This conclusion, however, was not recognised by all. Kirk, like Weaver and Jaffa, believed in 
an objective morality and the failure of liberalism, but emphasised order and continuity. In 
light of his gradualism, his scepticism over Lincoln and lifelong reluctance to champion 
Lincoln too straightforwardly followed from his conservative philosophy. Nevertheless, 
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Lincoln’s personal virtue and moral uprightness won regard from Kirk and a small but 
respected place in his writings. 
For those conservatives whose concern for moral epistemologies was at the centre of their 
thought, Lincoln was a useful, even powerful symbol. In the post-war years, morally driven 
traditionalism was a useful motivator of would-be conservatives and Lincoln appealed to this 
impulse. At a time when conservatism was “bookless” and only beginning to articulate its 
message, the ability to point to Lincoln as a symbol was valuable. 
The traditionalists were eager to refute the criticism that their political views were un-
American and sought to demonstrate the existence of an American conservative pedigree; to 
show that conservative principles were derived from American history. Working through the 
legacy of President Lincoln was a part of this search for a history useable by the conservative 
cause. Lincoln’s recognition and popularity meant that identifying the conservative cause 
with him was a step toward respectability. His image as an American success became useful 
in establishing a new conservative genealogy and justifying conservatism. In the search for a 
useable heritage, Jaffa played a crucial role: Kesler writes “Crisis of the House Divided 
brought to sight Lincoln’s greatness. It reminded conservatives that noble political actions are 
possible within democracy, and that democracy itself sometimes demands them, from 
statesmen, soldiers, and ordinary citizens alike. In other words, citizens seeking something 
worth conserving didn’t have to pine for long-ago, far-away aristocracy, or for transplanted 
truths”.170 Lincoln, Jaffa thought, was the very soul of American conservatism. 
There was a degree of political consideration in the appropriation of Lincoln. The Republican 
Party of the mid-twentieth century continued to conceive of itself as the party of Lincoln. By 
presenting Lincoln as a politician of immense principle, the traditionalists’ implicit, and 
occasionally explicit, message to the Republican Party was a call to restore principle to the 
political platform: to become a party of principle, as it had been under Lincoln. Lincoln 
served as a standard bearer for Republican traditionalists and a call to conscience for the 
wider party. 
At this stage in its development, conservatism was in reality a blend of various and 
competing challenges to the liberal consensus. As conservative anti-liberals, the work of 
Kirk, Weaver, and Jaffa – at times radically different – occasionally sits together 
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uncomfortably. As it emerged as a political and intellectual movement, the political element 
of conservatism became a priority alongside its moral one. Organising the three strands of 
conservatism into an electorally viable and coherent philosophy became a matter of urgency. 
When those theorists interested in the political nature and future of the conservative 
movement wrote about Lincoln, it was not Lincoln as symbolic statesman, but Lincoln as a 
political figure – one with a verifiable political record. Such men, National Review senior 
editors Willmoore Kendall and Frank Meyer chief among them, venerated the Framers of the 
Constitution and the United States experiment in “ordered liberty”. As much as Lincoln was a 
moral symbol and Republican icon, they found plenty in the sixteenth president’s politics and 
impact on America’s political institutions to trouble them deeply.  
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2 
Modern Copperheads: An Anti-Lincoln Challenge 
 
The 1960s are remembered for the entrance of social and political radicalism into mass 
culture, but these years were also fruitful ones for the emerging conservative movement. 
Conservatives still largely conceived of themselves as members of a beleaguered remnant but 
during this decade they began to find an audience. National Review’s circulation, thirty 
thousand in 1960, had more than trebled by 1965, surpassing a hundred thousand by 1970.
171
 
In 1962 William F. Buckley’s new twice-weekly column began circulation in 32 papers; by 
1970 it appeared in over 300 papers nationally.
172
 Within the Republican Party, Senator Barry 
Goldwater had become the leading representative of conservatism in politics. His manifesto, 
The Conscience of a Conservative, published in 1960 (and ghost-written by Buckley’s 
brother-in-law, L. Brent Bozell), was a national bestseller. Nixon won the 1960 presidential 
nomination but Goldwater made an impressive showing and, after a tightly contested race, 
was the Republican presidential nominee in 1964. Goldwater’s White house bid was based on 
conservative principles and, while Lyndon Johnson defeated him in a landslide, the campaign 
was a watershed moment for conservatism in both the Republican Party and the nation at 
large. The movement’s early intellectual lights, the likes of Russell Kirk, Richard Weaver, 
and Friedrich Hayek, had entered the public square to protest the direction of the nation.
173
 
Since their entry into public discourse, however, conservatives had made strides toward 
forming a genuine movement with a political and cultural voice. Their challenge was to 
present a coherent alternative to the prevailing New Deal liberalism. 
As George Nash has outlined, the conservatives contended with allegations that their outlook 
was European and alien to the United States.
174
 Adding fuel to this claim was that where 
America’s “Old Right” had been a largely Protestant domain, many of the leading new 
conservative intellectuals, particularly at National Review, were or became Roman Catholics. 
The Catholic turn in post-war conservatism manifested itself especially in the movement’s 
emphasis on locating themselves and the United States within a wider tradition of “the 
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West”.175 This broader “Western” perspective and the prevalence of Catholics in a still 
largely Protestant nation lent itself to the criticism that conservatism was an un-American 
phenomenon, giving urgency to the conservative search for an indigenous heritage.
176
 By the 
end of the 1950s conservatives had developed several methods of countering this charge. 
With Richard Weaver and Harry Jaffa, and to a lesser extent Russell Kirk, the employment of 
Abraham Lincoln was a part of this strategy. Lincoln was used as a symbol of an indigenous 
conservatism and deployed in defence of conservative values. By the mid-1960s the 
conservative line, advanced by increasingly prominent public figures and in journals like 
National Review and Modern Age, was composed of a series of conservative themes. 
American values were articulated as a part of the “timeless” principles drawn from the 
accumulated wisdom of the West: natural law and Christian revelation, the need for a small 
state and liberty under law.
177
 From this perspective, the South was looked to as a “nonliberal 
bulwark against the rising radical tide”.178  
Gradually, from the competing anti-liberal voices an “orthodoxy” or mainstream emerged 
and was presented as indigenous and “venerable”. Informed variously by the libertarian 
Albert Nock’s view of the state as the enemy and José Ortega y Gasset’s notion of a revolt 
against the masses, the conservatism of the early 1960s was largely anti-majoritarian. The 
movement harboured deep suspicions about centralisation and the dangers of “plebiscitary 
democracy”. It was distrustful of abstract political theories and radical “liberals in a hurry”, 
and hostile toward the accumulation of power, whether in electoral majorities, “imperial” 
presidencies, or the Supreme Court. Conservatives perceived themselves as defending high 
culture and bourgeois mores against mass culture; standing for what they saw as the lasting 
achievements of Western civilization. In politics, they adopted a similar posture of resistance. 
They sought to conserve freedom, private property, and the sovereignty of the states against 
the state and the “tyranny of majority”.179 For a number of conservative intellectuals, 
including Frank Meyer and Willmoore Kendall, this was in line with the tradition of the 
Founding Fathers, set forth in the Constitution and illuminated by the Federalist Papers. As a 
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voice for the “conservative mainstream”, Frank Meyer was one of the foremost proponents of 
this interpretation of America’s past.180  
The emergent orthodoxy did not preclude the existence alternative perspectives. There 
remained a libertarian movement outside of conservatism and elements of the Old Right 
continued on, critical of the conservatives’ close embrace of capitalism and demands for 
active foreign policy. Within the conservative movement itself, Nash identifies two major 
dissenting positions with different conceptions of government. The first, the Straussian 
school – represented by Harry Jaffa, Walter Berns, and other of Strauss’s students – held a 
classical interpretation of the role of the state as a body to cultivate virtue amongst its 
citizens. Influenced to a degree by the Straussian approach but otherwise unique, the political 
theorist Willmoore Kendall proposed a majoritarian conservatism at odds with the mainline 
conservative position.
181
 The point, however, it that while conservatism lacked complete 
internal coherence in its intellectual foundations, on a practical level of activism, the 
movement made considerable strides toward political and social legitimacy. 
Very different claims about the role of government and the American tradition were 
embedded in the conservative thinkers’ competing foundations for political action. Meyer, 
Kendall, and Jaffa assessed Lincoln and his legacy in the context of America. Strikingly, both 
Meyer and Kendall challenged Lincoln’s place in history outright. They, for separate reasons, 
rejected Lincoln’s influence as a grievous distortion of the true American tradition. When 
both of these respected conservatives made public disavowals of the president, Harry Jaffa 
defended Lincoln as both an American and conservative great, albeit from Jaffa’s own 
ontologically distinct conception of conservatism. The resulting debates, ostensibly over the 
historical Lincoln, drew on the three thinkers’ very different political theories, historical 
interpretations, and core values. The Lincoln question hovered above the deeper struggles 
over the intellectual foundations of American conservatism that took place during the 
turbulent 1960s and ‘70s. 
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Frank S. Meyer: The Centralising Lincoln 
In practice establishing a coherent conservatism in the early ‘60s meant formulating a 
functional synthesis of the libertarian and traditionalist impulses and developing a workable 
conservative political doctrine. Of the conservatives, National Review senior-editor Frank 
Meyer, one of several prominent ex-communists in the movement, came closest to 
establishing, and then hewing to, a party line. Born in Newark, 1909, Meyer briefly attended 
Princeton before studying at Balliol College, Oxford. Drawn to both Marxism and the 
Catholic philosophy of his tutor, Martin D’Arcy, Meyer joined the Communist Party in the 
early 1930s and, at the Party’s bidding, did graduate work at the London School of 
Economics.
 182
 Returning to the United States, Meyer taught communist thought while 
attending the University of Chicago. He enlisted for military service during the Second World 
War but was discharged for medical reasons. During the war Meyer came to reject 
communism, breaking from the party in 1945.
183
 Like fellow former communists Whittaker 
Chambers and James Burnham, Meyer became an ardent critic of his former political faith. 
Meyer wrote political works and aided FBI anti-communist investigations from his relatively 
secluded home in upstate New York. At National Review Meyer succeeded Willmoore 
Kendall as editor of the magazine’s book review section.184 The language of communist 
dogmatism, however, never left Meyer completely: his monthly column was titled “Principles 
and Heresies”.185  
Taking the task of developing a coherent conservative creed upon himself, Meyer’s major 
intellectual output attempted to balance traditionalism with libertarianism. He held that, 
ultimately, freedom must be the end of politics. Political theory required radical emphasis on 
the individual. The quasi-theological title of his column was apt, for, at a foundational level, 
Meyer believed that conservatism could not function without a basis in principles and their 
clear articulation. He rejected Russell Kirk’s “conservatism of prescription as a negative 
philosophy, incapable of standing for right and actualising its belief in the integrity of 
mankind. Logically it meant “whatever is, is right”.186 Meyer acknowledged that Kirk was no 
blind preserver but in fact wished to conserve “the particular strand of tradition which 
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appealed to him”.187 But, “[t]he conscious conservatism of a revolutionary or 
postrevolutionary era faces problems inconceivable to the natural conservatism of a 
prerevolutionary time”.188 Instead of “affirming” the existent liberalism, conservatives must 
“select and adjudge”. Selecting and judging rightly, with reference to the collected wisdom of 
Western civilisation, was conservatism. In politics, practical principles were needed to 
safeguard liberty and project a rightly ordered conservatism against the dominant liberalism.  
 
The ultimate principle of Meyer’s thought was the unique integrity of the human person, “a 
belief that is the first principle of any philosophy of freedom”.189 The libertarian tradition ran 
deep in Meyer, he taught that “all value resides in the individual; all social institutions derive 
their value… and are justified only to the extent that they serve the needs of individuals”. 
Two political axioms emerge from these principles. First, due to man’s imperfection “the 
division of power (both within the political sphere and between the political sphere and other 
spheres) and unceasing vigilance to keep it divided are the essential safeguards of freedom”.  
And second, that the most essential division of power was of the state and the market; “the 
entire sphere of economic activity must remain free of political control”.190 Meyer summoned 
both Montesquieu and Madison’s Federalist 47, underpinned with libertarian support, to 
serve as conservatism’s political basis. 
 
Meyer did not, however, neglect tradition. He took seriously the notions of truth and 
transcendence while remaining convinced that freedom must be politics sole end.
 191
 His 
project was to reconcile freedom within the context of the Western Judeo-Christian tradition 
and this endeavour spilled into the pages of National Review in the early 1960s in a long-
form debate between Meyer and Brent Bozell. Bozell contended that virtue was the final end 
of political society, a key traditionalist tenet. Meyer rejected this. In justifying his position he 
attempted to square the circle of conservatism’s inherent libertarian-traditionalist tension. 
 
Meyer’s argument was three-fold. He acknowledged that freedom was not man’s ultimate 
end. “It is a condition, a decisive and integral condition, but still only a condition of that end, 
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which is virtue”.192 A rightly ordered life would be lived in pursuit of virtue, in accordance 
with reason and tradition. Virtue, however, could not be coerced and instead must be 
chosen.
193
 There is no virtue without freedom; a virtuous act without freedom is divested of 
virtue. If society was to foster virtue then it must create the conditions for virtue to flower, 
that is to say, political freedom. The coercive state robs its inhabitants of the opportunity for 
virtue. Meyer further insisted that virtue could exist only in individuals, not societies. States 
that fixated on the collective over the individual inevitably tended toward totalitarianism.
194
 
A conservative agenda, Meyer concluded, must be founded on realising political and 
economic freedom. “Virtue in freedom – this is the goal of our endeavour”.195  
 
Although critical of traditionalists for their perceived comfort with authoritarianism, Meyer 
was in search of a consensus, not libertarian critique. He was also sceptical of the market’s 
ability to impart virtue. “Conservatism, therefore, unites the ‘traditionalist’ emphasis upon 
virtue and the ‘libertarian’ emphasis upon freedom. The denial of the claims of virtue leads 
not to conservatism, but to spiritual aridity and social anarchy; the denial of the claims of 
freedom leads not to conservatism, but to authoritarianism and theocracy”.196 By holding the 
two tendencies in a precarious balance of “virtue within freedom” Meyer believed he had 
articulated the natural conservative consensus, a principled, positive conservatism for a post-
revolutionary era. Meyer further held that his “marriage” of traditionalism and libertarianism 
was the only authentic American conservatism. Without an emphasis on freedom, critics were 
right to claim that conservatism was little more than European authoritarianism misapplied to 
the American condition.
197
   
 
The marriage of liberty and virtue, however, was criticised from all sides. Weaver found it 
too harsh on community; Kirk, Meyer’s most trenchant critic, decried it as disconnected from 
justice and in celebration of the “freedom of the Congo”; Willmoore Kendall thought it 
doctrinaire.
198
 Still, Meyer’s consensus found traction as the debates over first principles 
began to subside. “Fusionism”, a term widely used, although not by Meyer, became the de 
facto position of National Review conservatives. “Virtue within freedom” was a tent large 
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enough to accommodate most and the best compromise available. Coupled with support for 
Goldwater and opposition to communism, fusionism was the foundation of conservatism in 
the 1960s.
199
 
 
The first of Meyer’s remarks in a lively debate about Lincoln appeared in June 1965. The 
dispute began with a small paragraph, buried in the back of National Review’s Arts & 
Manners section. Meyer briefly reviewed Dean Sprague’s Freedom Under Lincoln, a 
narrative history, more popular than academic, that was critical of some of the Lincoln 
administration’s actions during the war.200 Sprague found fault with the system and Secretary 
of State William Seward more than with Lincoln: the president was “caught in an agony” 
hating the authoritarianism he knew necessary for the preservation of the Union.
201
 Meyer’s 
review was bitter. He agreed with the thrust of Sprague’s argument, but criticised his failure 
to reach the final conclusion that Lincoln was a coldblooded authoritarian. Even so, Sprague 
was courageous for even daring “to pierce the myth of Abraham Lincoln’s benevolence” and 
examine a period that was, “in terms of civil liberties, the most ruthless in American history”. 
The historical record that Sprague outlined was clear: in light of “the naked use of federal 
power” against both the population and the press, Meyer suggested that a better title would 
have been Repression Under Lincoln.
202
 
National Review published two letters in response. The first, from a “fellow conservative… 
and an admirer of Lincoln”, “vigorously” protested the verdict. Any authoritarianism on 
Lincoln’s part was out of sheer necessity. To doubt his benevolence was to ignore his letter to 
Mrs Bixby, his conciliatory Reconstruction programme, and the above-the-fray 
contemplativeness of the Second Inaugural Address.
203
  
The second letter, published discretely in a block of letters and without fanfare, was by 
William F. Buckley. The articulate Buckley was the dynamic force behind National Review 
and an essential adhesive for the conservative movement. As the public face of conservatism 
Buckley provided a platform from which to advance conservative ideas and gave direction to 
the movement. Occasionally, he played a regulatory role over the movement’s public 
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standpoints. Buckley intended for conservatism to be palatable for the mainstream, a 
persuasion with appeal to intelligent opinion makers and without the aura of fringe 
crankery.
204
 To this end, he was unafraid to wield his editorial power to keep the conservative 
movement from too close an association with marginal views. He had attempted to freeze 
anti-Semitism out of the right and shunned the American Mercury. He allowed Whittaker 
Chambers to savage Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged. Following the Lincoln debate, Buckley 
dedicated an issue of NR to the demolition of the John Birch Society whose anti-communist 
paranoia tarnished the conservative movement’s attempts to engage with the mainstream.205  
Buckley rebutted and gently admonished Meyer for his comments on Lincoln, signalling that 
conservatism was not about to reject a president widely considered among the greatest.   
Some conservatives have a Thing on Lincoln, including, unfortunately, my esteemed 
colleague Mr. Frank Meyer. It is too bad to see the argument burst out of its ghetto 
(“Lincoln was a relativist,” “He didn’t understand the Constitution,” He was a poor 
statesman” – not untenable arguments) to incorporate the charge… that Lincoln was anti-
humanitarian. It seems to me that this is worse than mere tendentious ideological 
revisionism. It comes close to blasphemy to say such a thing about a President whose 
recorded words preaching love and reconciliation, because of their sublime quality, could 
not have come except from a pure heart, words which do more even now to inspire lively 
sentiments of faith, hope and charity than the millions of words and deeds of the little 
florence nightingales [sic] in and out of the world of ideology.
206
 
Buckley knew that some conservative intellectuals, including several within his close circle, 
held reservations about Lincoln. Concerned that the sentiment might burst forth in the public, 
Buckley tempered it with a pre-emptive defence. Avoiding historical and philosophical 
arguments, Buckley, impressed by the man and the power of his language as an inspiration to 
virtue, found most to praise in Lincoln’s “recorded words”. When Meyer pressed his 
argument, Buckley left the rebuttal to Lincoln scholars, but left no doubt as to where his 
sympathies lay. 
The issue was not settled with Buckley’s response. Freedom Under Lincoln had crystallised 
Meyer’s thought and Buckley’s step of public letter-writing did not foreclose debate. In an 
essay length articulation of his reasoning, Meyer outlined several of what would become the 
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classic conservative reservations about Lincoln, arguments with sharp resonance in the 
contemporary political climate. Although Buckley occasionally engaged in doctrinal policing, 
he generally preferred to act as an umpire in the intra-conservative debates.
207
 Typically he 
gave his editors latitude to pursue their own arguments within the conservative ambit. Even 
so, the editorial note outlining the contents of the issue was clear that “Frank Meyer sharply 
disagrees with Mr. Buckley on, of all people, Abraham Lincoln”.208  
Meyer admitted that he was hesitant to put forward his views on Lincoln since they ran so 
against the pieties of his age, but he and the movement broadly were no strangers to being 
outside of the mainstream. Their self-conception as an embattled remnant allowed Meyer, 
Kendall, and others, to make unpopular stands, like the public defence of Joseph McCarthy. 
Kevin Mattson argues that the conservative movement of the 1960s, far from a collection of 
staid conformists, was a radical challenge to the (liberal) establishment.
209
 Meyer’s 
iconoclastic defenestration of Lincoln was part and parcel of the conservative rebellion 
against mainstream society. Within National Review, Meyer and Buckley were unafraid to go 
beyond popular opinion but their impulse to shock was seasoned by James Burnham, the man 
with perhaps the most influence over Buckley. As a senior-editor, Burnham favoured a 
conciliatory approach toward the mainstream, anxious about veering into “right-wing 
provincialism”.210 Any overtures to moderates struck Meyer as shallow and unprincipled and, 
despite his secluded lifestyle, his conflict with Burnham over National Review’s direction 
was intense.
211
  
Setting aside his reservations, Meyer pressed ahead with his criticism of Lincoln.
212
 “[I]t has 
been borne in upon me more and more that his pivotal role in our history was essentially 
negative to the genius and freedom of our country”.213 Unlike Kirk, Meyer was not interested 
in Lincoln’s personal virtues or magnanimity. Nor was he assuaged by the “magnificent 
language and… personal acts of individual kindness” that Buckley cited. Questions of person 
and language could be put to one side; the issue was political and historic. Lincoln had a 
profound and negative impact on the American experiment in ordered liberty. If anything, 
Lincoln’s personal virtue brought his repressive political manoeuvres into sharper relief. 
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Judgement of him as a man was virtually impious but “men who live by politics in the 
forefront of history can and will be judged politically and historically”.214 
As Meyer interpreted it, the Founding was an “exalted attempt, through the Constitution in its 
original form, to establish for the first time in human experience political mechanisms to 
guarantee the liberty of the individual person by limiting the power of government”.215 It was 
an attempt to actualise the notion that all value was in the individual and therefore liberty 
must be guaranteed – the first principle of Meyer’s political thought. The constitutional order 
also realised Meyer’s essential political axioms. The separation of powers and the freedom of 
the economy were established through “what has usually been called ‘checks and balances,’ 
but it is more accurately designated as the setting up of a state of tension between all the 
political centers of power so that effective final power rests in none of them”.216 By carefully 
dividing sovereignty among the people, the Constitution limited the dangerous accretion of 
power and prevented any one branch of government exerting dominance over the others.  
Meyer had an idiosyncratic understanding of the forces at work in it. He argued that the 
essential division of power was “the tension between the several states and the national 
government”.217 Before the Civil War it was unknown whether secession was lawful. It was 
conceivable that states might secede in response federal abuses of power and this extreme 
possibility was a final check on the government. The question of secession was at stake in 
1860. Northern and Southern Partisans both forced the issue of state-federal relations but 
“[Lincoln] alone had the power to reaffirm the constitutional balance. Instead, under the 
spurious slogan of Union, he moved at every point (no matter that he would have preferred to 
achieve his ends without war; so would every ideologue) to consolidate central power and 
render nugatory the autonomy of the states”.218 Lincoln, Meyer charged, forever skewed the 
constitutional order in favour of the federal government.  
The issue of state authority against the federal government had special resonance at Meyer’s 
time of writing. His Lincoln essay was written in light of the Civil Rights Act and during the 
month the Voting Rights Act was signed into law. Meyer’s analysis of the question of 
secession was also directly influenced by the conservative movement’s infatuation with the 
South. The Southern States had long been solid Democratic votes, a part of the longstanding 
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New Deal coalition. However, Southern electoral allegiance to the Democratic Party was 
beginning to falter just as many conservatives were finding much to admire, or at least 
sympathise with, in the South. The growing appreciation of the South’s conservative nature 
was informed by the number of conservative voices that emerged from the region. Richard 
Weaver, the Southern Agrarians, and even Michigander Russell Kirk, advanced a narrative 
framing the South as the conservative soul of nation and alternative to liberal America. 
Mattson suggests that the conservative embrace of the South and, at times, a sympathetic 
view of the Confederacy was emblematic of the movement’s rebellion against the 
mainstream; “[w]hat could be more rebellious than the Stars and Bars?” The Southern 
agrarian-republican tradition, from Jefferson through Calhoun and into the twentieth century, 
became essential for the conservative imagination in their search for a usable heritage.
219
  
Moreover, many conservatives were uncomfortable at best with the course the civil rights 
movement had taken in both the North and South. Racial prejudice and opposition to radical 
change combined with a genuine concern for the constitutionality of the Warren Court’s 
decisions and steps the federal government took. Desegregation bussing and the 
federalisation of the National Guard at Little Rock left many conservatives feeling that a 
second Civil War, or at least Second Reconstruction, was at hand.
220
 Although the magazine 
later altered its tone, during the mid-to-late 1950s, National Review’s editorial line was 
cautiously in favour of white supremacy in the South for the time being, on the basis of white 
cultural, not racial, superiority.
221
  
Coinciding with conservative sympathy for Southern whites was an increasingly Southern 
political strategy. For a variety of factors the once solid South was in the process of an 
electoral transformation. Goldwater’s “Southern strategy” had won Mississippi, Alabama, 
Georgia, South Carolina, and Louisiana for the Republican Party for first time since 
Reconstruction, signalling a shift in earnest toward Republican electoral success in the 
South.
222
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Meyer had long been critical of attempts to resolve civil rights issues at the federal level. He 
firmly supported the “states’ rights” position, arguing in 1957 that the Supreme Court 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education “rode roughshod over precedent and reason and 
constitutional obligation” by force of “positivist sociological assertion” and “Liberal 
cant”.223Meyer held that the tradition of states’ rights superseded the claims of the oppressed 
black population. No branch of the federal government had the authority to compel a 
resolution on the nation when “profound differences” existed between the people. To support 
the contemporary states’ rights cause, Meyer drew on John Calhoun’s nullification, 
concurrent majorities, and secessionist arguments.
224
 To defend Southern segregationist 
policies, Meyer suggested the states employ nullification and interposition, and strengthen 
their militias.
225
  
The parallels between the lead-up to the Civil War and the crises of the civil rights era meant 
that historical analogies were readily apparent and frequently made. To conservatives, the 
government coercion of established “folkways” echoed Lincoln’s Civil War power grabs. 
The tense question of states’ rights dovetailed with the growing tendency to associate Lincoln 
with liberal activism. Meyer’s belief that the state-federal tension was essential to the 
Constitution made his interpretation of Lincoln as an early proponent of federal rapacity an 
obvious conclusion. Lincoln became a symbol of federal supremacy – a precursor to 
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson – and this perspective is ever-present in his portrayal.  
One of Meyer’s biographers has argued that his reservations regarding the civil rights 
movement were indeed constitutionally and not racially based.
226
 The status of the 
Constitution, states’ rights, and the American tradition were at the forefront in his mind. He 
hoped these considerations would “give pause to those thoughtful men, particularly in the 
North, whom compassion for a servile people and devotion to abstract justice” had caused 
them to lose sight of the dangers of federal overreach.
227
 However, friend Garry Wills 
reflected that Meyer’s outlook grew darker in the late ‘60s, particularly after his diagnosis 
with cancer. He found that “[Meyer’s wife] could no longer argue and laugh him out of his 
antiblack outbursts”, suggesting that Meyer, like many in his era, held racial or cultural 
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prejudices against the African-American population.
228
 Even so, Meyer admired Booker T. 
Washington and argued that “the Negro people will gain respect and status primarily on the 
basis of their achievements of economic and social skills and disciplines – a truth that 
hundreds of thousands of solid Negro families are demonstrating in our time”.229 Instead of 
federal action, he believed the best results for African-Americans would come through the 
diligent practice of conservative values and the enactment of conservative economic policies 
that would benefit all. 
Beyond his impact on the federal-state balance, Meyer held Lincoln accountable for further 
wrongdoings. “It is on his shoulders that the responsibility for war must be placed”.230 Had he 
not been ideologically motivated, Lincoln would have allowed the seven original secessionist 
states to leave the Union peaceably and thereby retain the loyalty of Virginia and the upper 
South. The natural congruity of interest between the states would naturally lead to reunion.
231
 
Instead, Lincoln’s stand on principle, Meyer alleged, doomed the nation to an avoidable war.  
This contention conformed to the still dominant “revisionist” interpretation of the war. 
Emerging in the 1920s and 30s as an anti-war reaction to the First World War, revisionist 
scholars held that peace was the natural state of human affairs. War was entirely irrational 
and would never be chosen by rational actors. The Civil War was not the result of sectional 
differences but rather caused by an unnatural inflammation of the public’s emotions into an 
hysterical state. The war was needless: to the leading revisionist historians, Avery Craven 
and, especially Lincoln biographer James G. Randall, it was a result of minor sectional 
differences artificially stoked by demagogues in both the North and the South. “They were 
both fighting mythical devils”. The revisionists placed blame at the feet of “extremists” from 
both sections, but reserved special ire for abolitionists. They championed “moderate” figures 
like James Buchanan and Stephen Douglas. Randall argued that Lincoln had been a 
moderate. In the first two of his four-part biography of Lincoln Randall portrayed Lincoln as 
essentially a Douglas Democrat. In 1961, Randall’s The Civil War and Reconstruction, a key 
text of the revisionist school, was revised and republished to acclaim.
232
 Unlike Randall, 
however, Meyer placed Lincoln squarely amongst the extremists. 
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Moreover, Meyer detected in Lincoln a calculated ruthlessness in his prosecution of the war. 
His aim was to eliminate the autonomy of the states and to this end he inculcated a “win at 
any cost” mentality. Total war – “war conducted to achieve victory neglecting every other 
moral end” – is inexcusable in a fratricidal conflict, yet, “this was Lincoln's pattern of war 
leadership: in the North, a repressive dictatorship; against the South, the brutal meat-grinder 
tactics of ‘Unconditional Surrender’ Grant and the brigand campaigns waged against civilians 
by Sherman; in war aims, no effort at reconciliation, only the complete triumph of central 
government”.233 Lincoln’s words might inspire an elevation of spirit, Meyer conceded, but 
they only served to mask his monstrous deeds and aims. 
Were it not for the catastrophic damage Lincoln inflicted upon the American system, the 
Roosevelt revolution might have never occurred. For the libertarian and anti-communist 
Meyer, the centralisation and expansion of the federal government in the New Deal was the 
great error of the American twentieth century and the genesis of the “coercive welfare state… 
against which we are fighting today”. He drew a direct line from Lincoln to Franklin 
Roosevelt. “Lincoln undermined the constitutional safeguards of freedom as he opened the 
way to centralized government with all its attendant political evils”.234 Meyer understood the 
world in terms of history and tradition and with reference to its impact on the modern 
political situation. To him, Lincoln became an antecedent of Roosevelt, one that paved the 
way for his innovations. Opposing the New Deal had been a galvanising factor in the 
emergence of post-war conservatism. If Lincoln was a proto-Roosevelt, he must be rejected 
by true conservatives. The association of Lincoln with Roosevelt was not an unusual one: 
Roosevelt himself had employed Lincoln as a “useable history”, naming him, along with 
Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, and Woodrow Wilson, as fathers of the New Deal.
235
 In 
a way, Meyer was rejecting Roosevelt’s Lincoln. 
The theme of Lincoln as dictator was out of the mainstream but not without precedent. As 
National Review’s book review editor and as a prolific reader, Meyer was likely aware of 
literary critic Edmund Wilson’s unconventional analysis of Lincoln from his influential 
Patriotic Gore. Written at the height of the Cold War, Patriotic Gore featured a strong 
subtextual critique of American domestic and foreign policy. Its introduction was a study of 
War: The Quest to Understand, ed. James M. McPherson and William J. Cooper, Jr. (Columbia, SC: University 
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power in US history. “Union”, wrote Wilson, was “simply the form the power drive took”. 
“If we would grasp the significance of the Civil War in relation to the history of our time, we 
should consider Abraham Lincoln in connection to the other leaders who have engaged in 
similar [unification] tasks. The chief of these leaders have been Bismarck and Lenin”. 
Lincoln, Bismarck and Lenin, “presided over the unifications of the three great new modern 
powers”.236 “Each established a strong central government over hitherto loosely coordinated 
people. Lincoln kept the Union together by subordinating the South to the North”.237 
Wilson’s Lincoln was an “uncompromising” dictator that distorted the American system and 
was succeeded by agencies that continue to exercise this power”.238 The United States’ strong 
central government and history of power-driven adventurism was the realisation of policies 
initiated by Lincoln. Wilson was no conservative – he rejected the movement’s aggressive 
anti-communism and Cold War “liberation” strategy – but his theme of Lincoln as dictator 
was a likely influence on Meyer’s thought.  
In any case, Meyer’s essay provoked a considerable response from National Review’s 
readership and contributors.
239
 The magazine published a representative cross-section of the 
correspondence, much critical but with a sizable minority that agreed with Meyer’s 
iconoclasm.
240
  
Meyer responded directly in defence of his thesis. His critics, he argued, pursued two main 
avenues of criticism. The first alleged that Meyer was guilty of “unconservative” behaviour 
for “questioning American legend”. He responded that conservatives must, in the words of 
Richard Weaver, “distinguish… between traditions when they clash”.241 When the clashing 
traditions in question were the constitutional order and the legacy of Lincoln, there was no 
contest: the constitutional order was the highest tradition of the United States: all else was 
ancillary. 
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The second line of criticism argued that since the Constitution presupposed Union, in the 
event that the existence of the Union is threatened, defence of the nation overrides 
constitutionality.
242
 Meyer pronounced the argument anathema.
243
 “Lincoln … can be ranged 
among the disciples of this concept which is the polar opposite of the American 
Constitutional tradition of tension, balance, and freedom”. This contradicted the essential 
libertarian component of American conservatism. If the concept of nation above all is 
conservative, it is only in “the sense of the nineteenth century European authoritarian 
tradition of Maistre and Hegel”.244 A Lincoln that “enslaved free men” in the name of “the 
nation” was indeed a Bismarck with no place in the American tradition of liberty. 
Publishing Meyer’s anti-Lincoln broadside is suggestive of Buckley’s ecumenical grace in 
balancing the competing views within conservatism. There was a certain editorial line at 
National Review, but the journal was a space for conservative intellectuals to thrash out 
conclusions; competing arguments were allowed and encouraged and Buckley tended to give 
his veteran writers room to expound on their own, sometimes controversial, views.
245
 Meyer 
was not alone in his scepticism toward Lincoln. Kirk, Kendall, Wills, and Jeffrey Hart, 
influential writers or former writers for National Review, each broadly favoured the political 
tradition of Calhoun over Lincoln, if not Calhoun himself. However, “like Samuel Johnson 
taking care as a young parliamentary reporter that ‘the Whig dogs don’t have the best of it’”, 
Buckley tended to retain a right of reply for the side of the argument that he favoured.
246
  
A debater, polemicist, and prominent exponent of the right, as a public intellectual Buckley 
was primarily a communicator. Intelligent as he was, Buckley was neither a political theorist 
nor historian. A friend and colleague suggested that he focused his energies on “high-level 
conservative journalism, acting as a broker and analyst of ideas rather than an originator of 
them”; “he … left the metaphysics to others”.247  Deferring to those more qualified on a given 
subject, when discussing Lincoln, Buckley drew on his friend Harry Jaffa.
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For much of his long career Jaffa’s main avenue of publication was National Review, the 
consequence of intellectual ostracism and burned bridges.
249
 “It was only because of Bill that 
I was not swept under the rug”.250 Between the publication of Meyer’s review of Freedom 
Under Lincoln and his critical essay, one of Jaffa’s scholarly books, Equality and Liberty, 
with a positive portrayal of Lincoln, was reviewed favourably in National Review, albeit not 
by Meyer.
251
 Jaffa’s version of conservatism had opponents on the senior editorial board of 
National Review. “Buckley could not openly endorse my flat opposition to his editors”, Jaffa 
recalled, “but he made sure what I had to say was published”.252 His manuscripts were, for a 
time, sent straight to Buckley’s desk.253 In this instance, Jaffa’s pugilistic style was deployed 
against Meyer. As the magazine’s introductory remarks winkingly put it, “Prof. 
Jaffa…obviously believes that moderation in pursuit of Meyer is no virtue”.254 Jaffa believed 
the magazine’s readership was far more convinced by his advocacy of Lincoln than some of 
its editors were. 
Typical of Jaffa, his response to Meyer’s essay was both expansive and deep. “Bold” for 
rejecting received opinion, Jaffa claimed that Meyer’s conclusions were, nevertheless, based 
on a faulty interpretation of history and “inferences from the present that give erroneous 
impressions of the past”.255 Damningly, there was silence on slavery, the true matter of 
Lincoln’s thought on equality. De-contextualising Lincoln like this was nothing short of a 
“default” on Meyer’s own deeply held and eloquently expressed conviction of the “absolute 
value of human freedom”.256  
On the juridical basis of secession, Jaffa rejected Meyer’s arguments about the tension 
between the state and federal governments. He aligned himself, and attempted to align the 
conservative movement, with the venerable but not uncontested “Federalist” tradition that 
maintained a loose construction of the Constitution and a favourable disposition toward the 
scope of the federal government. Madison and Hamilton, Jaffa claimed, had argued that the 
Constitution was itself necessary because of the weakness of the Confederation in relation to 
the states. Washington himself had signed into law the First Bank of the United States, 
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legislation unconstitutional if the Constitution did not imply powers unstated in the actual 
document.
257
 Rejecting the strict constructionism implicit in Meyer’s position, Jaffa claimed 
that Lincoln and the conservative movement were heirs of “John Marshall’s jurisprudence” 
and the “indivisible and indestructible unionism of Webster and… Andrew Jackson”.258 This 
conservatism echoes not only Lincoln’s defence of Union, but the National Republicanism 
and Whiggery of Lincoln’s model, Henry Clay.  
The debate between Meyer and Jaffa had echoes of the Federalist-Republican division in the 
First Party System. There was a tension in the conservative movement that manifested itself 
in the clash between the state and federal governments. More broadly, the underlying division 
in the movement revolved around the tension between the Northern and the Southern 
cultures; between the mercantile and industrialist conservatism of Alexander Hamilton and 
the Jeffersonian vision of rural agrarianism.
259
 Jaffa, the arch-Lincolnian and conservative 
New Dealer, staked out a Whig influenced Federalist position. In the 1970s and ‘80s, as the 
conservative movement became involved in national governance and gained new allies, 
particularly the New York-centric and Beltway based “neoconservatives”, the classic 
Federalist-Republican debate came to the fore in a struggle over the direction of the 
movement. As early as 1965, signs of the coming debate were beginning to appear. 
Jaffa challenged Meyer’s claims about secession. Meyer had argued that until the war, 
secession served as a possible sanction against the excesses of the federal government. In 
response to the 1832 Nullification Crisis, Andrew Jackson declared secession incompatible 
with the existence of Union and received congressional support for a military response. “I 
believe”, wrote Jaffa, “that Jackson’s opinion on the supposed right of secession, based 
squarely on the major announcements of Hamilton, Madison, Washington, Marshall, and 
Webster, and many others in accord with the dominant tradition of American statesmanship, 
and an overwhelming majority of Americans, North and South”.260 Secession may have been 
the majority opinion in South Carolina, but it was not otherwise widely held: General Lee, for 
example, did not believe the Southern states were within their rights to leave the Union.
261
 
Jaffa ridiculed Meyer’s contention that secession was essential to the honest operation of the 
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government: “I do not know of a single authority who ever held that the actual Constitution 
ever depended for its efficacy upon uncertainty as to whether a state could secede”.262  
Equally absurd, he thought, was the suggestion that Lincoln ought to have relinquished 
federal authority over the original seven seceding states. Meyer’s was not a novel solution. A 
strategy of indulgence toward the secessionist states had been proposed, debated, and rejected 
during the actual crisis. Meyer’s solution was idealised and ahistorical. It ignored 
contemporary foreign policy considerations, potential grievances around the partition of the 
territories, the problem of fugitive slaves and resumption of the outlawed slave trade. 
Moreover, a precedent of secession opened the Union and Confederacy to further, potentially 
unrestrained, balkanisation. The proposal, plausible as it appeared at first blush, was bereft of 
“political realism”.263 Like most of Meyer’s conclusions about Lincoln, it was bold, but 
speciously founded. 
Jaffa also took issue with Meyer’s arguments on sovereignty and limited government on 
principle. The Founders had, contrary to Meyer’s suggestion that the Constitution “rested 
sovereignty nowhere”, clearly rested sovereignty in the people, a fact “found on nearly every 
great document of the period”.264 The issue was in what formulation were the people 
sovereign: as one national body, or in states? In a rhetorical step, Jaffa conflated Frank Meyer 
with Calhoun. According to Jaffa, Calhoun was the major intellectual opponent of Lincoln, if 
not his literal political opponent. Meyer’s notion of “multiple tensions” reflected the 
Calhounian doctrine of concurrent majorities. Unstated in Meyer’s essay was Calhoun’s 
support for slavery as a positive good. Slavery, Jaffa argued, was the ultimate form of 
unlimited government. Identifying political theories developed in defence of slavery with 
limited government was, Jaffa thought, a cancerous strategy. As a champion of limited 
government Meyer should be dissuaded and disgusted by Calhoun, not endorsing his political 
doctrines.
265
 
Lincoln understood, with supreme clarity, the connection between “free, popular, 
constitutional government, and the mighty proposition ‘that all men are created equal’”.266 
This, Jaffa proposed, was his genius. The crux of his defence of Lincoln was that 
constitutional construction was “absolutely subordinate” to the animating principle that gave 
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“life and meaning to the whole regime”.267 In contrast to Meyer, who feared that a focus on 
collective virtue was the road to totalitarianism, Jaffa held that government must be 
motivated by virtue. In practice the animating virtue was the equality of the Declaration of 
Independence. Consent, required for the establishment of government, is contingent upon 
“the primordial tenet” of equality. Lincoln saw that slavery, by denying consent and equality 
to those it enslaved, was nothing less than a direct challenge to the Constitutional regime. A 
state that permits the existence of slavery cannot denounce arbitrary government with any 
legitimacy. Lincoln, rightly, in his “recognition that all men have rights which no government 
should infringe”, was unafraid to put justice and moral coherency above questions of political 
arrangement.
268
   
Jaffa was still keen to defend Lincoln against charges of dogmatism. “Lincoln was no 
abolitionist; he was the least doctrinaire man that ever lived”.269 He was not utopian in 
understanding the obstacles to slavery’s extinction. Instead, he led the way toward freedom 
and endeavoured to block the extension of slavery. Jaffa and Jaffa’s Lincoln were convinced 
that the expansion of slavery into the territories, made possible by popular sovereignty and 
the ruling in Dred Scott v. Sandford, would result in the end of freedom. “The issue that led 
to his election was not, ‘Shall slavery be abolished?’ but ‘Shall slavery or freedom be 
abolished?’”.270 However, respectful of the Constitution, there is no evidence Lincoln would 
have challenged slavery in the South. Were it not for the attempt by the Southern 
Confederacy to “reverse the results of the election of 1860”, Lincoln “neither could nor 
would have taken any of those steps that led to the violent demise of slavery”.271  
In no way, Jaffa argued, did Lincoln intend the “destruction of the autonomy of the states” 
Meyer had alleged.
272
 Lincoln advocated “gradual, compensated emancipation, by state, not 
federal action”.273 The scheme allowed the states forty years for compliance and limited the 
federal government’s role to underwriting the costs to the states. Far from being an act of 
fire-breathing abolitionism, the Emancipation Proclamation represented an “obligation to the 
men in the ranks to neglect no means to end the war”.274 The terrible choices that required 
resolutions at the height of America’s greatest crisis, wrote Jaffa, “are not what may appear to 
267
 Ibid. 
268
 Ibid. 
269
 Ibid. 
270
 Ibid. 
271
 Ibid. 
272
 Ibid., p. 842. 
273
 Ibid. 
274
 Ibid. 
67 
the leisurely commentator”.275 As Lincoln himself had written, “I have not controlled events, 
events have controlled me”.276 Such was the state of the conservative movement in the 1960s, 
with its Kirkian emphasis on continuity and Meyer and others’ veneration of the 
constitutional order, that Lincoln’s lack of abolitionist instincts and moderation in opposing 
slavery were emphasised to mollify critics and defend his legacy.  
As a final point Jaffa returned to Lincoln’s defence of universal standards against relativism. 
Counter to the ascendant positivism of the 1960s, Jaffa argued that Lincoln stood against the 
notion that the Constitution “may mean whatever enough people (or the judges) think it 
should mean”.277 Government must be directed by moral purpose; morality is not dictated by 
“this debased, plebiscitary version of supposed free government”.278 Jaffa rejected Meyer’s 
contention that the government’s final end must be the establishment and defence of personal 
liberty. In Straussian thought the ultimate purpose of a polis was the cultivation of virtue. For 
Jaffa this meant that the American nation, as founded and rightly ordered by the Declaration 
of Independence, must, with due prudence, pursue virtue and justice. Such an imperative was 
vital for Lincoln as he led the nation against the subversion of America’s promise of equality. 
The Straussian argument was a densely reasoned and rhetorically powerful defence of virtue 
in the semi-settled debate over the true end of government. Out of step with the burgeoning 
fusionism, Harry Jaffa was for virtue with a roar.  
Slavery robbed its victims of their labour and their life. The doctrine of slavery as a positive 
good, absent at the Founding but having developed in the first half of the 19
th
 century, 
increased the moral horror of American slavery, culminating in the notorious Dred Scott 
decision that declared “blacks had no rights that whites were bound to respect”.279 “I can 
think of no good objection”, Jaffa wrote, “to either Nazism or Communism, that would not 
apply to the chattel slavery that once existed in this country”.280 If the Constitution is no 
longer the “instrument of liberty” it was before Lincoln’s presidency, this loss is mitigated by 
a “mighty entry: the destruction of that reproach to everything sacred to the American 
mission in the world”.281 Lincoln’s historic political legacy is more than defensible, but he 
ought to be encountered on a higher plain. “As Woodrow Wilson said, the phenomenon of 
275
 Ibid. 
276
 Ibid. 
277
 Ibid. 
278
 Ibid. 
279
 On slavery as a positive good, James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 1988), pp. 56-7. Also, Scott V. Sandford, 393(1856)., paragraph 407. 
280
 Jaffa, "Lincoln and the Cause of Freedom," p. 842. 
281
 Ibid. 
68 
Lincoln has made it possible to believe in democracy”.282 Implicit was Jaffa’s concern that 
the conservative movement risked working against justice in the present political situation. 
Conservatives were standing against human equality in opposing the civil rights movement, a 
truth that could not be voted up or down. In doing so they risked ceding the moral high-
ground to liberalism.
283
 
Jaffa’s essay received a number of critical responses. Several were disappointed by his 
employment and apparent endorsement of Andrew Jackson. Another interpreted his argument 
as a modern iteration of the divine right of kings.
284
 Meyer’s rejoinder came in early 1966 
with the weary title “Again on Lincoln”. “Professor Jaffa”, he wrote “is entitled to his loose-
constructionist position; he has distinguished company, men so different in other respects as 
Alexander Hamilton, John Marshall, Andrew Jackson, Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon 
Johnson”.285 None of the figures Meyer listed were widely well-regarded by the conservative 
movement, a kind of historical guilt by association. Roosevelt and Johnson, in particular, 
were considered statists notable for centralisation and federal overreach and Jaffa had also 
mentioned the unpopular Woodrow Wilson in his defence of Lincoln. The loose-
constructionist interpretation does have its origins in Washington’s presidency, Meyer 
allowed, but he criticised Jaffa for concealing the equally august strict-construction school 
that also has its origins in 1791. James Madison, the drafter of the Constitution, had argued 
against the Bank of the United States on strict-constructionist grounds. Within Washington’s 
cabinet, Thomas Jefferson and Edmund Randolph both repeated Madison’s arguments; 
Jefferson advancing the argument for states’ rights explicitly.286 Quite the opposite of Jaffa, 
Meyer “had rather supposed that until the days of Franklin Roosevelt the strict-constructionist 
theory predominated in the tradition – although battered from time to time by the power grabs 
of an Andrew Jackson or Abraham Lincoln”.287 After misrepresenting the construction debate 
in history, Meyer alleged, Jaffa had sided with the statist position. 
On secession, Meyer clarified his position. Division of sovereignty was the essential 
guarantee of division of power, he argued. Sovereignty implies the right to secession. The 
Constitution needed to balance the division of sovereignty while retaining a functioning 
federal union: the Federalist had made clear that past failed federal republics had been as 
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often the result of weak unions as over-mighty central authorities. The Constitution’s silence 
on secession, Meyer reiterated, was a deliberate omission intended to preserve the tension 
between the federal government and the states. Lincoln, “in words and deeds, before and after 
his election,” had provoked and intensified the challenge that culminated in the war that 
forever settled the secession debate and eliminated the states’ essential check on the federal 
government.
288
  
Jaffa’s arguments defied Meyer’s core belief that division of power is the practical 
requirement for liberty and that liberty is the correct object of politics. He embraced the 
broad-construction school of constitutional interpretation that had animated statists from 
Hamilton to LBJ. Further, he endorsed Lincoln’s provocations that collapsed the tension 
between state and federal authority. Although Meyer and Jaffa were personally friendly, 
Meyer was scathing of his artlessness. “Jaffa’s airy and cavalier lack of concern with how 
power is distributed leaves him with no defences, except hope, against the innate tendency of 
government to concentrate power and to ride roughshod over the individual. It fully explains 
his admiration of Jackson, Lincoln, et al”.289 Because he regards “the division of power as 
irrelevant to the ‘principle of a free constitution’… Jaffa does not begin to grasp the 
incalculable damage for which Lincoln is responsible”.290  For Meyer, whose project centred 
on establishing practical principles to secure freedom, Jaffa’s confidence in a virtuously 
ordered government was, at best, dangerously naïve. 
As threatening as his naïveté was Jaffa’s defence of Lincoln as a philosopher of equality. 
“The moral objections to slavery are manifold and I fully share Professor Jaffa’s sorrow at its 
historical existence in the United Sates. But … Jaffa, ignoring all the unexceptional grounds 
for the hatred of slavery, chooses to base his critique of American slavery on the proposition 
that the American polity is in its essence dedicated to equality – and to centre his vindication 
of Lincoln on Lincoln’s role as the champion of equality. Nothing in my opinion could be 
further from the truth than this”. That freedom was the essence of the American political 
heritage was semi-settled doctrine within conservatism. For Meyer certainly, “[t]he freedom 
of the individual person from government, not the equality of individual persons, is the 
central theme of our constitutional arrangements”.291  
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His break with communism was a culmination of a period of deep reflection on Marxism, 
brought about, in part, by exposure to Hayek’s Road to Serfdom.292 Like many former-
communists, Meyer came to view communism and the Soviet Union from an apocalyptic 
standpoint. Firm in his libertarian convictions and cauterised by anti-communist fervour, 
Meyer believed liberty was fundamentally inconsistent with equality. “Nor is this merely a 
matter of two different emphases. Freedom and equality are opposites; the freer men are the 
freer they are to demonstrate their inequality, and any political or social attempt – like those 
so frequent in the twentieth century – to enforce equality leads inevitably to the restriction 
and the eventual destruction of freedom”.293 Kirk, Kendall, and many of their contemporaries 
were strongly opposed to the equalitarian principle; in Meyer this opposition was especially 
intense.  
Libertarian apostle Murray Rothbard had criticised Meyer for allowing his “libertarian 
convictions [to be] fatally warped by his all-consuming desire to incarcerate and incinerate all 
Communists”.294 Meyer and Rothbard shared a similar view of equality, but Rothbard 
thought Meyer’s virulent anti-communism typical of apostasy: “[the] total loss of perspective 
that leads the defector, in guilt at his former actions as well as resentment against his former 
colleagues for not seeing the light”.295 Jaffa was no communist but Meyer saw in his 
philosophical defence of Lincoln the same impulses he exposed and excoriated in 
communism. The Libertarian anti-communist Meyer was philosophically and psychologically 
predisposed to reject Lincoln’s contention that America was dedicated to the proposition that 
all men are created equal as a misguided and ruinous heresy. 
Meyer did not deny the metaphysical or theological concept of equality before God, nor the 
equality of all before the law or government. Rather, the “equality which I regard as the 
opposite of freedom is the abstract, overarching, unmodified concept Professor Jaffa 
employs. The ideological drive to enforce such equality upon men, always unequally 
endowed, is the primrose path to tyranny”.296 Meyer’s charge echoes Kendall’s criticism of 
Jaffa’s Crisis of the House Divided, “the cooperative commonwealth of men who will be so 
equal that no one will be able to tell them apart”.297 Jaffa clarified his use of equality in 1975 
292
 William C. Dennis, “Foreword” in Frank S. Meyer, In Defense of Freedom and Related Essays (Indianapolis, 
IN: Liberty Fund, 1962), pp. xvii-xviii. 
293
 Meyer, "Again on Lincoln," p. 71. 
294
 Murray N. Rothbard, "The Communist as Bogey-Man," Left and Right vol. iii, no. 2 (1967), p. 22. 
295
 Ibid., p. 23. 
296
 Meyer, "Again on Lincoln," pp. 71, 85. 
297
 Willmoore Kendall, The Conservative Affirmation (Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery, 1963), p. 262. 
71 
in response to Kendall’s further criticism of Lincoln, arguing that equality, correctly 
understood, was a conservative value.
298
 Nevertheless, Jaffa’s arguments were interpreted by 
both Meyer and Kendall as unwitting endorsements of a quasi-communist philosophy.  
On Lincoln, Meyer remained steadfast that he was a centraliser that paved the way for the 
New Deal. He violated the constitutional balance, irreparably damaging the separation of 
powers that allowed successive presidents, including the incumbent Lyndon Johnson, to enact 
policies that expanded federal authority over the states, impinging on their folkways and 
sovereignty. Meyer added the charge that Lincoln was an early and prominent equalitarian 
who altered the course of the American political tradition. Lincoln’s advocate, Professor 
Jaffa, was promulgating a counterfeit conservatism that emphasised a troubling combination 
of the politics of virtue and equality. “Jaffa’s Lincoln is the champion of equality”, Meyer 
wrote in his strident, unrepentant conclusion. “The Lincoln of whom I wrote is the creator of 
concentrated power, the President who shattered the constitutional tension. They are one and 
the same man”. In Meyer’s political thought, the impulse toward equality always led to the 
restriction of freedom. Lincoln, dedicated as he was to principle that all men are created 
equal, threatened American freedom. Lincoln’s centralising tendencies and assault on the 
sovereignty of the states deepened Meyer’s conviction that equality was the enemy of liberty 
and that the constitutional order was the worse for his election. 
At the heart of Meyer and Jaffa’s disagreement were competing claims about the role of 
government and the nature of conservatism. Meyer had worked to establish a conservative 
mainstream and by the mid-1960s fusionism had, with some intellectual shoe-horning, 
achieved broad acceptance from the movement. Shifting away from Kirk, Bozell, and other 
traditionalist approaches, the conservative mainstream held that virtue was not the realm of 
the government: morality could not be legislated. The ultimate political aim must be liberty. 
It was out of this belief that Meyer’s criticism of Lincoln was born and, although some 
agreed with his analysis, it was a stark interpretation of the fusionist position and American 
history. By contrast Jaffa’s view was a part of what George Nash called “the Straussian 
dissent”. Meyer had previously disagreed with another Straussian, Walter Berns, who had 
railed against liberalism in the Supreme Court.
299
 Berns held the Straussian belief that 
protecting natural rights is insufficient for a state. They rejected the fusionist presumption 
toward liberty; instead, a good state must cultivate justice and produce virtuous citizens. 
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Berns taught that “[l]aw is concerned with the virtue of citizens…” “Man is by nature not an 
individual with inalienable rights, but a political being, who can achieve his nature, his end, 
only in the polis, if at all”.300 As the mainstream movement was settling on the libertarian-
tinted view of government, the Straussian school, of which Jaffa was a leading figure, 
provided something of a “minority report”. Where Meyer prized liberty and this led him, in a 
somewhat tortured way, to criticise Lincoln, the Straussians, and especially Jaffa, placed an 
overwhelming emphasis on virtue. They believed that neither liberty nor tradition were 
sufficient to adjudicate the just “strands of tradition” or the “immoral uses of liberty”.301  
Knowledge of moral right and the reason behind it was needed. Theirs was a conservatism 
that allowed for prudent but activist government in pursuit of just ends and virtuous citizens. 
Lincoln became one of their great symbols. Meyer and Jaffa’s disagreement about, for 
example, strict versus broad construction of the Constitution, was indicative of their 
respective philosophies. Although they spoke as conservatives, they had radically different 
visions of the philosophical underpinnings of government; their politics was similar but as 
men of ideas they differed tremendously. 
As is frequently the case with Lincoln, the debate was a proxy for the status of the 
Declaration of Independence in the American tradition. In the search for a viable conservative 
heritage, Meyer identified the Constitution as the key to the tradition. In the Constitution, he 
saw his axioms established in the language and prestige of the Founding Fathers. By securing 
liberty and natural rights, the Constitution was the legitimate foundation of American 
conservatism. Jaffa, by contrast had, at this point, a negative view of the Founders who, via 
Locke, were inescapably “modern”. The Constitution was a fine document, as far as it went, 
but it was the “highest American [expression of the regime] only if one interprets the high in 
light of the low”, the major failing of modern political science.302 Meyer offered a 
conservatism founded upon natural rights. Jaffa alleged that “all the state of nature theorists, 
and historical schools, tried to understand decent civil society – the high – in light of the most 
indecent and powerful passions”.303 The Constitution alone was devoid of its directing spirit. 
Since men are not angels, as Publius taught, the Framers had compromised over slavery. The 
Constitution was, therefore, not just low but also tarnished. The Constitution and, indeed, the 
entire American tradition were given full purpose by the transcendent truth of the Declaration 
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of Independence. That all men are created equal is the justice that the American regime ought 
to actualise, the ancient wisdom that, through Lincoln, rescued America from being a purely 
modern regime.  
Meyer reached the conclusion that Lincoln had gone far beyond the bounds of the 
Constitution and done irreparable violence to the American tradition. That society was less 
capable of thwarting the corrosive success of liberalism and the unrest of the 1960s was 
partly a result of Lincoln’s terrible judgement. Jaffa’s belief, however, that the genius of the 
American tradition was acknowledgement of man’s equality, led him to lionise Lincoln. He 
represented America as interpreted in the Straussian manner: the low – its political 
framework and liberties – in light of the high – eternal truth and justice.304 The tradition of 
Lincoln was the conservative tradition. Foregoing it risked a descent into the unalloyed 
modernism Lincoln had inoculated it against. 
The debate had largely dealt with Lincoln’s historic actions and the correct way, as 
conservatives, to interpret their impact. Part of the argument resulted from Meyer’s 
willingness to engage in conservative iconoclasm. To some extent the reclusive thinker was 
steeped in the mind-set of the Nockian beleaguered remnant and his own intellectual history 
had prepared him to make strongly principled, or even ideological, stands that left him very 
much in a (right-thinking) minority. Ever-present in the dispute was the fact that, although 
conservatism had something of a working orthodoxy, there were significant dissenting 
factions: these included the hard-line traditionalists and the classically-minded Straussians. 
The debate revealed deep divisions between these camps over methods of interpreting 
history, assumptions about the state, and political thought itself. Ostensibly about Lincoln – 
and for many this was the most salient feature of the series – embedded in both thinkers’ 
positions are very clear, and very contradictory, claims about the nature of conservatism.  
Both Meyer and Jaffa wrote to convince other conservatives. The discussion occurred within 
National Review and remained an intra-conservative affair, staying within the boundaries of 
the conservative intellectual milieu while the movement continued to gain legitimacy and 
votes. After a period of varying anti-liberal voices, “[s]omething called conservatism was 
winning adherents, and in these circumstances it became increasingly difficult to chide it for 
supposedly not belonging to the main currents of American history”.305 The movement began 
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to espouse a clear, if disputed, conservative American tradition. The movement had a 
plurality of voices arguing the case for its future and a plurality of positions on Lincoln but, 
as much activism and theory, those voices all in turn voted the same way. 
 
William F. Buckley: The Republican Lincoln 
Prefacing Meyer’s final anti-Lincoln reply was the announcement that, barring “tumultuous 
demand”, debate over Lincoln would be closed for the time being. As much as National 
Review was an avenue for developing conservative positions, the Lincoln debate was of only 
peripheral importance and had the potential to taint the movement as fringe or extremist. 
After Goldwater’s presidential campaign had been tainted with accusations of extremism, the 
conservative figureheads were eager to avoid further intellectual provincialism. However, the 
debate had caused a stir within the movement and Buckley assessed both arguments and 
produced a not uncritical defence of the president’s conservative legacy. 
Buckley’s judgement appeared in The Unmaking of a Mayor, the chronicle of his partially 
pedagogical 1965 New York mayoralty campaign. Buckley, in an effort to showcase 
conservative policies for New York City’s perennial problems, entered the race on the 
Conservative Party ticket as a spoiler against Republican candidate John Lindsay. In 
Buckley’s estimation, Lindsay was disdainful of the party. Lindsay, the congressman for the 
Upper East Side, had a liberal voting record and links to the Liberal Party of New York. 
During the 1964 election Lindsay had failed to support Buckley’s friend and ally Barry 
Goldwater.
306
 “Lindsay's Republican Party is a rump affair, captive in his and others' hands, 
no more representative of the body of Republican thought than the Democratic Party in 
Mississippi is representative of the Democratic Party nationally”.307 Lindsay and the 
Democratic candidate, Abe Beame, Buckley joked, were biologically distinct, but politically 
identical.
308
  
As much as Buckley’s mayoral challenge was a personal campaign against Lindsay, whose 
apparent vacuity Buckley detested, the future of the Republican Party was also at stake. The 
Conservative Party of New York was concerned with the ideological purity of the Republican 
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Party. In the wake of the 1964 election, critics of conservatism within the party saw in 
Lindsay and other “Rockefeller Republicans” a way back to electoral success. However, 
despite his failure, Goldwater had given conservatism a degree of public respectability. 
Buckley sought to retrench the conservative position and ostracise moderates and liberals 
within the party.
309
 Should Lindsay make a strong showing, however, the Lindsay-
Rockefeller Republicans would enter the next presidential nomination convention with 
significant prestige. Buckley had no real intention of beating Lindsay, instead seeking to 
make Lindsay untenable within Republicanism and prevent his election. Lindsay’s staff 
agreed. They reported that Buckley’s aim was to “eliminate from major elective office a 
moderate Republican who would, if elected, become a threat within the Republican Party, to 
the Goldwater extremists”.310  
For his part, Lindsay had an awkward relationship with his party and ran as an 
independent.
311
 Lindsay presented himself as a “fusion” candidate choosing as running-mates 
members of the Liberal and Democratic parties.
312
 In response Buckley positioned himself as 
a loyal Republican standing for the party’s integrity. “It is my judgement that John Lindsay 
will do as much harm to the Republican Party if he is elected and becomes powerful, as 
anyone who has threatened the Party’s role as defender of the tablets in recent history…If the 
Republican Party is transformed in his image, I shall give you the Republican Party and go 
elsewhere”.313 
To counter this criticism, Lindsay framed himself as a Republican in the Lincolnian tradition. 
“[The Republican Party is] the party of Lincoln, of civil rights”.314 “I am a Lincolnian, in that 
I believe when an individual or a locality can’t help itself, it is the function of the federal 
government to help it… live in dignity and to live decently as human beings. This is the 
ancient tradition… of Republican thought”.315 Lindsay, Buckley observed, had as little 
trouble “name-dropping” Lincoln as a Democrat would in referring to Jefferson. It was 
“standard practice among politicians” and an act of “arbitrary” co-option.316 In The 
Unmaking of a Mayor Buckley set about assessing Lincoln to both retroactively strip the 
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victorious candidate Lindsay of his Republican rhetorical shield and parse out the Lincoln 
debate within conservative intellectual circles. 
Buckley’s first argument was that the meaning of “Lincolnian Republican” in the mid-1960s 
was far from clear. The president was “an infinitely complicated man” and “learned debate 
still rages about the exact nature of his contributions to the formulation of American political 
philosophy”.317 To claim “Lincolnianism” was not a complete position – neither as a 
Republican nor a politician. The onus, Buckley argued, was on those who would claim 
Lincoln to articulate “just what it is that he means by this tradition, especially insofar as it is 
separable from the Democratic tradition”.318 Whether a “Lincoln Republican” differed from a 
typical member of the contemporary Democratic Party was the foremost question. If 
Lindsay’s so-called Lincolnian Republicanism made him a Democrat in all but name, he was 
an “embarrassment” to the two-party system. 
Certainly Lincoln was anti-slavery: a Lincolnian could not, therefore, be for slavery, yet 
slavery had no un-contentious analogue in 1960s America. Lindsay castigated Goldwater as 
anti-Lincoln, but, Buckley observed, “one of the nation’s best Lincoln scholars and most 
ardent admirers of him, Professor Harry Jaffa… was a supporter of Barry Goldwater”.319 
Conversely, Frank Meyer had decried Lincoln as the “champion of executive and statist 
arbitrariness”, the antithesis of conservatism as it was presently understood. “If the modern 
politician’s invocation of Lincoln is to be taken as other than opportunistic and saprophytic, 
the invoker must describe what it is about Lincoln that he understands to be the quintessential 
Lincoln”.320 Buckley held that Lindsay had failed to articulate what aspect of Lincoln’s 
presidency, character, or legacy, he stood for. His Lincolnianism was “proprietary, 
historically snobbish, diffuse and sentimentalized”. “[E]vasive” and “intellectually 
incoherent”, Lindsay’s evocations of Lincoln amounted to little more than a fig leaf for 
“extreme” liberalism.321  
Following his critique of Lindsay’s content-light historical claims, Buckley evaluated which 
elements of Lincoln’s life and presidency might be applicable to the present political 
situation. This was Buckley’s most complete assessment of the Lincoln question that was the 
catalyst of the Jaffa-Meyer debate. Buckley, in diplomatic fashion, was careful to 
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acknowledge both of his friends views as he reached his own conclusion, all the while 
persistently criticising Lindsay and his allies.  
He rejected Lindsay’s contention that Lincoln’s Republican Party was the party of “civil 
rights”. “[N]ot according to the modern understanding of civil rights – the Democratic Party 
clearly deserves that title”.322 Buckley knew from the Lincoln critics among his colleagues 
that the president was open to criticism for executive overreach and the contravention of civil 
liberties. Lincoln had suspended habeas corpus and it could be argued that the Emancipation 
Proclamation ignored due process. Buckley argued that Lincoln’s consternation over the 
Emancipation Proclamation’s constitutionality and the fact that he was swayed by military 
necessity, not abolitionism, was evidence that he was not a champion of individual rights 
against the majority.
323
 However, Buckley reiterated Jaffa’s point that Lincoln was “perhaps 
the most powerful advocate in history of human equality as the necessary basis of self-
government”. He reconciled this apparent contradiction by concluding that “Lincoln simply 
didn’t have the time or the opportunity to concern himself with the existing, or the 
problematical, threat of big business, or, in any systematic way, with the federal bureaucracy, 
and its bearing on human rights”.324  
Lindsay implied that as a Republican and supporter of the Liberal Party he, like Lincoln with 
Southerner Andrew Johnson, was a “fusion candidate”. Buckley, via Lincoln, was sceptical 
of this claim. “As to the matter of fusion”, he quoted Lincoln, “I am for it, if it can be had on 
Republican grounds: and I am not for it on any other terms. A fusion on any other terms 
would be as foolish as unprincipled… I am against letting down the Republican standard one 
hairs-breadth”.325 He further cited the Cooper Union address in which Lincoln declared the 
Republican Party to be the party of conservatism against the radical Southern fire-eaters. 
Lindsay positioned himself as the candidate of compromise, but Lincoln, Buckley reminded 
him, poured scorn on “contrivances such as groping for some middle ground between right 
and wrong”.326  
If anything, Buckley argued, Lincoln ought to be an embarrassment to liberals. Against the 
federal poverty and welfare programmes of the Great Society, Buckley cited the “Ten 
Cannots”, a set of propositions encouraging thrift and industry over welfarism, widely 
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misattributed to Lincoln, in this instance by Buckley.
327
 Here Buckley made an early and 
poorly researched attempt to claim Lincoln for capitalism and freemarket solutions to poverty 
over state welfare, a strategy that would be picked up on by later conservatives. If, on a 
rhetorical level, Lincoln could not be used as a conservative symbol of stability, he could be 
neatly employed in the service of the conservative challenge of the Great Society. The use of 
a misattributed quotation suggests Buckley’s more polemical approach to the debate.  
More embarrassing for liberals were Lincoln’s comments on race and “civil rights as they are 
currently understood”.328 Again, closely following Jaffa’s interpretation, Buckley insisted that 
“as a defender of the metaphysical proposition that men are equal, Lincoln was the greatest 
postbiblical political philosopher”. From a modern perspective, however, Lincoln’s views 
were not merely segregationist, but outright racist. Lincoln had claimed “that there is a 
physical difference between the white and black races which I believe will forever forbid the 
two races living together on terms of social and political equality. And inasmuch as they 
cannot so live, while they do remain together there must be the position of superior and 
inferior, and I as much as any other man am in favour of having the superior position 
assigned to the white race”.329 If, Buckley wrote, the Republican Party would make Lincoln 
its moral guide to civil rights issues, it followed that Goldwater’s personal support for 
desegregation but unwillingness to challenge the “folkways” of the South in contravention of 
states’ rights was the most “Lincolnian” approach.330  
It might be conceded that Lincoln’s views would have changed with the shifting social 
mores, Buckley allowed, but this cannot be presumed. Neither Goldwater nor Lindsay would 
accept Lincoln’s Charleston remarks on race but “if tradition means anything at all,” then the 
tradition of Lincoln on the issue of segregation is far closer to Goldwater than it is to modern 
liberal positions. It is the Democratic tradition, not that of Lincoln or the Republican Party, to 
erode the venerable and ancient constitutional system.
331
 As much as Buckley tended to defer 
to his colleagues, this conclusion ran against Jaffa’s contention that truth could not be 
dictated by popular opinion, and Meyer and Kendall’s criticism of Lincoln as the un-maker of 
constitutional order. 
 The “Ten Cannots”, originally written by William Boetcker.
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Buckley did, however, affirm the traditionalist conclusion that “[a]t the profoundest level, 
Lincoln was a moralist”. Drawing on Jaffa’s view that Lincoln held that “for transcendent 
reasons logically explicable, men cannot be treated as other than equal”, as well as Richard 
Weaver’s argument from definition, Buckley concluded that as a philosopher and statesman, 
Lincoln was dedicated to moral realism. As Buckley understood it, Lincoln was a part of the 
tradition of natural law and opposed to the pervasive relativism “that modern liberalism 
absolutely depends upon”.332 “Beyond this towering point” – the point traditionalists had 
staked their claim over Lincoln upon – “Lincoln is up for grabs and has been claimed as a 
patron by any number of ideological opponents”, including the Warren Court and 
contemporary liberals.
333
 Buckley fully endorsed as both useful and accurate the traditionalist 
approach to the moralist Lincoln, but remained aware of the Lincoln image’s contested and 
malleable nature. 
In short, Buckley cautioned that the rhetorical appropriation of Lincoln was, if not 
meaningless, problematic. “A contemporary liberal Republican of limited imagination would, 
if wholly honest, more likely be saying that he is a Republican notwithstanding many of the 
utterances and attitudes of Abraham Lincoln. A conservative Republican of wider 
imagination would defend the proposition that Lincoln was a great political philosopher, 
though inept, at times, in statesmanship and ill-advised in some of his utterances”.334 As a 
politician Lincoln was bound to his historic context, not a substitute for a modern political 
platform. “[E]xercises in posthumous political reconciliation at the precinct level of political 
controversy are either playful, arbitrary, or vulgar”.335 Lincoln could not be brought to bear 
on contemporary political discourse without further clarification. Lindsay, according to 
Buckley, had based his Republican status on the so-called Lincoln tradition that, barring 
further explanation from Lindsay, Buckley had, for his readers, undermined.  
Despite his warnings, Buckley engaged in some appropriation of Lincoln of his own. Not 
only was Lincoln a part of his critique of Lindsay, the successors of Lincoln’s positive 
contributions were the conservative positions within the Republican Party. He affirmed 
Jaffa’s interpretation of Lincoln, but also accepted some of Meyer’s criticisms, although 
without endorsing his negative conclusion. Against Meyer’s gravest charges, Buckley found 
Lincoln not guilty. Instead he blamed the liberal tradition, a tradition in which Lincoln, he 
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determined, had no part. Liberalism, undergirded by the moral relativism Lincoln had 
opposed, had had a corrosive effect on America. Buckley’s conclusion fell between Jaffa and 
Meyer, but erred toward Jaffa’s positive assessment of the president. He did not accept fully 
the reverence of Lincoln that Jaffa proffered, but neither did he take seriously Meyer and 
Kendall’s claims that he was the fons et origo of the liberalism he opposed in Lindsay. As 
editor of National Review, Buckley had allowed Meyer the space to put forward his criticism 
of Lincoln. In The Unmaking of a Mayor he rejected Meyer’s conclusions but suggested that 
a degree of historically minded criticism of Lincoln’s leadership was the best approach for 
conservative Republicans. 
Buckley’s Lincoln was a Republican luminary, one whose views were incongruent with the 
liberalism of Lindsay and those like him. Putting light between the Republican Party and 
Lindsay liberals was one of Buckley’s primary aims and if the symbol of a liberal Lincoln 
was a prop to keep them within the party, Buckley sought to attack that symbol and its usage. 
Lincoln became another part of Buckley’s anti-liberal, anti-Lindsay arsenal. While Lindsay 
won the mayoral election, the symbol of Lincoln was not enough to keep him in the 
Republican fold and he left for the Democratic Party in 1971. 
1965 was the hundredth anniversary of Lincoln’s assassination and Buckley understood that 
the president had powerful symbolic value. He was eager to reject claims of liberal 
legitimacy founded on appeals to Lincoln and to show that the rise of conservatism within the 
Republican Party was congruent with the Lincoln tradition. As Lincoln was becoming 
increasingly interpreted as a liberal or progressive icon, Buckley made a qualified 
counterclaim for conservatism.  
 
81 
3 
Further Conservative Challenges  
 
Willmoore Kendall: The Derailer Lincoln 
As a thinker, Willmoore Kendall supplied academic credentials and intellectual brilliance to 
the nascent movement. An important guiding light, one of his contributions was another 
influential and critical interpretation of Lincoln’s impact on American history. As with Frank 
Meyer, Kendall revered the American tradition. He came to view Lincoln not as a symbol of 
the tradition but as its chief heretic. Rank and file conservatives, like most Americans in the 
mid-twentieth century, had considerable respect for Lincoln.
336
  Kendall is notable for his 
anti-Lincoln analysis that a number of intellectuals found convincing. The reasoning behind 
his high profile dissent was indicative of his alternative vision of conservatism, one that 
rejected fusionism for a conservative majoritarianism that gained favour after his death. 
Growing up in small-town Oklahoma, Kendall (b. 1910) led a precocious academic life.
337
 He 
entered university at age 12, graduating before turning twenty.
338
 As a Rhodes Scholar, 
Kendall studied Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at Oxford, regarding himself as “a man 
of the Left” and possibly a Trotskyist.339 Completing his studies in 1935, he was a 
correspondent in Madrid, covering the build-up to the Spanish Civil War. In Spain, he 
aligned himself with Trotskyism in opposition to the “dictatorial, totalitarian, antidemocratic 
aspects” of Stalinist communism.340 Opposition became an outright hostility toward 
communism, a central tenet of his later thought. George Nash argues that Kendall’s 
experience with the violence and social collapse of Spain informed his belief in the necessity 
of a societal consensus or orthodoxy and in the dangers inherent to “an open society”.341  
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Kendall’s first major work, John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority Rule (1941), was highly 
acclaimed. He addressed the apparent contradiction of Locke’s advocacy of both natural 
rights and majority rule. In contrast to conventional approaches, Kendall resolved the tension 
by arguing that Locke was a majority-rule democrat whose consensus-based majority, as 
opposed to crude majoritarianism, would never “withdraw a right which the individual ought 
to have” – a recurrent theme of Kendall’s thought.342 Based on this book, Kendall joined the 
Political Science faculty at Yale. He was a popular teacher and advisor but his argumentative 
disposition and unorthodox and increasingly conservative thought put him at odds with the 
university. Kendall left Yale acrimoniously after fourteen years.
343
 He finished his academic 
career developing a doctoral programme at the University of Dallas, a private Catholic 
institution. At Yale, Kendall’s students included William F. Buckley and L. Brent Bozell. 
Buckley brought Kendall into National Review at its inception to serve, with James Burnham, 
as a founding senior editor and lend gravity to the magazine’s masthead.344   
Dwight Macdonald characterised Kendall as “a wild Yale don of extreme, eccentric, and very 
abstract views who could get a conversation to the shouting stage faster than anyone in living 
memory”.345 Macdonald’s portrait was uncharitable toward Kendall’s thought, but captured 
his disputatious nature and readiness to defy convention. National Review editor Jeffrey Hart 
wrote that Kendall claimed “flatly that his goal was to be the theoretician of the American 
conservative movement”, a desire that put him at odds personally with others at the journal. 
Although he alienated most of his former colleagues, Kendall was profoundly influential on 
many of them including Buckley, Bozell, and Hart, as well as Garry Wills.
346
 His thought 
developed over his lifetime but his most mature and conservative work attempted to resolve 
the tension between majoritarianism and virtue, pitting him against the largely anti-
majoritarian outlook of conservatism and the fusionist emphasis on negative liberty. 
Nevertheless, Hart, writing after Kendall’s death, suggested that he “remains, beyond a 
possibility of challenge, the most important political theorist to have emerged in the twenty-
odd years since the end of World War II”.347 
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Kendall’s primary criticism of Lincoln was that he had “derailed” the authentic American 
political tradition. The posthumously published Basic Symbols of the American Political 
Tradition (1970) was the clearest enunciation of Kendall’s antipathy. Employing Eric 
Voegelin’s methodology of symbols – myths or images that provide self-understanding to a 
society – Kendall traced the American political tradition from the Mayflower onward. 
Specifically, he charted the derailment of the true symbols of America and the distortion of 
the nation’s political tradition. Kendall’s main contention was that the “supreme symbol” of 
America was “self-government by a virtuous people” through legislative supremacy.348 The 
basic symbols of the American tradition were, therefore, “representative assembly 
deliberating under God; the virtuous people, virtuous because deeply religious and thus 
committed to the process of searching for the transcendent Truth”.349 At some point in the 
nation’s history, Kendall suggested, the rival symbols of equality and absolute rights gained 
currency, beginning the “derailment” of the authentic tradition; the distorted version is the 
conceptual framework of liberalism. Kendall did not name Lincoln as the source of 
derailment but rather that he was essential in legitimising the ersatz symbols. 
Kendall believed that the Gettysburg Address was revered because it appeared to be an 
eloquent and succinct summation of the American tradition. In reality, however, its appeal is 
based on the modern acceptance of the distorted tradition. The Address’s elegance is 
insidious, obscuring the “Lincolnian heresies” embedded within.350 By emphasising equality, 
Lincoln undermined the authentic American symbols in favour of a rights-based tradition. 
Despite his rightward shift there was a consistency to Kendall’s thought. Motifs of societal 
orthodoxy, the “virtuous people”, and majoritarianism recur, although the latter concept 
underwent refinement. Early in his tenure at Yale, Kendall described himself as an “old-
fashioned majority-rule democrat”; even as a conservative he remained a registered Democrat 
until his death.
351
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the absolute right to free speech. Any society unable to arrest growing social divisions, he 
argued, would descend into the progressive breakdown of its common premises and resort to 
violence for the arbitration of public questions.
352
 Kendall’s conservative vision was 
dedicated to the maintenance of social cohesion and the politics of due political process, 
rejecting political claims based on absolute rights. 
The basis of this philosophy was legislative supremacy. The supreme governing body of the 
United States, Kendall claimed, as established by the Constitution, is Congress. Congress is 
the practical manifestation of “We the People”. Kendall’s conservative contemporaries were 
critical of majoritarianism since simple majoritarianism allows majorities to ride roughshod 
over minorities and threaten societal consensus. To overcome these objections and reconcile 
majoritarianism with his own belief in transcendent truth, Kendall relied on the symbols of 
the “virtuous people” and the “Constitutional morality” of The Federalist Papers.  
The “virtuous people” was not a claim about human nature, but a metaphor for the aggregate 
ability of the American people to choose right; an instinctual goodness “in their hips”. 
The American people, unlike perhaps other people, have a sense of right and wrong; they do 
have, in other words, a feeling for justice and doing that which promotes the true interests of 
the community. Off at the end, if given sufficient opportunity (which involves time to 
deliberate and meditate), the vast majority of the American people will opt for that which is just 
and designed to promote the permanent and aggregate interests of the community; they will, to 
turn the proposition around, reject the appeals of factions. And with this we have come back to 
the supreme symbols of the American tradition, that is, to the symbols of a virtuous people 
through deliberative process striving to achieve and advance their declared purposes which 
involve, inter alia, better ordering with justice.
353
 
Nash suggests that Kendall’s faith in the virtuous people was derived, in part, from his youth 
in small town Oklahoma; Kendall himself claimed to be an “Appalachians-to-the-Rockies 
American”, cognizant of the supposed moral superiority of heartland America. Lincoln was a 
just this sort of man: disdainful of pretension and, at times, derided as a rail-splitter and 
prairie politician. Kendall, however, never emphasised this aspect of the Lincoln image. 
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Instead he fixed on the president as a symbol of equalitarian liberalism, not American 
virtue.
354
 
The deliberative process Kendall celebrated occurred in the legislative branch of government 
as ordered by the Constitution. Specifically, Kendall meant the Constitution as interpreted by 
the Federalist. He argued that it was Publius who taught that the federal government is 
formed of three equal branches where the Constitution alone established a clear legislative 
supremacy. Out of fidelity to the Federalist, Congress restrains from exercising its “supreme 
weapons” to force its agenda through over the executive and judicial branches.  
The constitutional order of the Federalist was crafted to encourage deliberation with the 
maintenance of social consensus its underlying intention. The “Constitutional morality” 
established a system with in-built delays in the decision making process – staggered 
elections, the Presidential veto, judicial oversight, and the presence of various intra-party 
factions. “Delay is requisite for, or, in other words, allows for, the emergence of a consensus 
among the people concerning proposals and programs in the political arena – a consensus that 
is, in important particulars, different from just simple majority rule which characterises direct 
democracy”.355 Deliberative, “Madisonian majoritarianism”, maintains cohesion. That the 
majority must effectively convince the minority is just since all are equal in their capacity to 
give consent, a principle Kendall traced to the Mayflower Compact of 1620.
356
 In practice 
“Congress must and should, week after week, month after month, and even, in some cases, 
year after year, keep on deliberating until, to all intents and purposes, all agree”.357 Through 
the deliberative process, the “virtuous people” would ultimately choose right.  
Since its establishment, the traditional federalist system had been seriously challenged and 
Kendall blamed Lincoln for the assault on the American consensus. A divisive leader, 
Lincoln was elected in a plurality – meaning he lacked the legitimacy of consensus – and 
under his leadership the United States was torn asunder. In reviewing Jaffa’s Crisis of the 
House Divided in 1959, Kendall insinuated that Lincoln bore responsibility for the escalation 
of the Civil War for his failure to compromise and refusal to explore alternatives to war. He 
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suggested that “Southerners were entitled to secede if the issue was to be drawn on Lincoln’s 
terms”.358   
In The Basic Symbols, Lincoln is the major actor in the derailment of the authentic tradition, 
doing violence to the traditional symbol while promoting a new one. Subsequently, the 
Lincoln image has been used to advance that rival tradition. To illustrate the Lincolnian 
heresies, Kendall made a close dialectical reading of the Gettysburg Address, Lincoln’s most 
damaging influence on the tradition. The first distortion is in the famous opening, “four-score 
and seven years ago” wherein the nation was “conceived in liberty”. By setting 1776 as the 
date of national conception, Lincoln was asserting that the Declaration of Independence was 
the founding moment of the United States. In effect he endowed the Declaration with 
constitutional status, which allowed him to then claim that the nation was “dedicated to the 
proposition that all men are created equal”. Lincoln’s so-called “supreme commitment” to 
equality is in actuality an illegitimate symbol, incompatible with, and threatening to, the 
authentic tradition.
359
  
From this derailment, succeeding generations have seized on the illegitimate symbol of 
“equality” and, shifting its definition, sought to establish it as the supreme symbol of political 
life. There are now two competing traditions: the Lincoln tradition – which “holds to a rather 
extreme view of equality” – and “an older one, which holds that our supreme symbol is to 
rule the deliberate sense of the community”.360 The incompatibility of these traditions, 
Kendall argued, was the root cause of America’s “schizophrenic” relationship with its 
tradition. Lincoln’s inauguration, or, at least, legitimation, of a rival symbol and his 
adherence to a political philosophy of absolute rights was the basis of Kendall’s frustration 
with him.  
Kendall rejected all politics based on equality and absolute rights. To that end The Basic 
Symbols was a sustained effort to minimise the importance of the Declaration in American 
history. To explain why equality remained a prominent, if not the dominant, symbol in 
political discourse despite its illegitimacy, Kendall blamed Lincoln for, effectively, deceiving 
the nation. He argued that the Declaration does not fulfil the role in the American tradition 
that Lincoln ascribed it. Historically, the Declaration established the independence of thirteen 
independent sovereign states, not the United States as a nation. Moreover, within America’s 
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political tradition, the Declaration could not be the point of foundation. The ratification of the 
Constitution has a much stronger claim to foundational status, as do earlier points in the 
tradition. “For whatever reason…Lincoln is guilty of committing a very serious error, for he 
fixes our beginning as a people, any way you look at it, either at a point after our beginning 
or before it”.361 The Constitution, composed and ratified in a significantly more deliberative 
manner than the Declaration, has far greater legitimacy. Those that signed the Declaration did 
so simply to establish independence from Britain. Its function was to state the reasons for 
separating from Britain. Without deliberative consent, there is nothing binding in the 
Declaration of Independence’s rhetorical exhortations.362 
Even if Lincoln was correct about the constitutional status of the Declaration, Kendall 
maintained, it was still a distortion to claim that it demanded a supreme commitment to 
equality. “[Lincoln] is still not entitled off of the text of the document to wrench from it a 
single proposition and make that our supreme commitment”.363 The text itself supports four 
different and partly contradictory propositions – equality, life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness. In the context of the complete document and its function, Kendall concluded that 
the Declaration of Independence should be understood as an injunction to future governments 
to “(1) honour and secure the inalienable rights of man; and hence (2) derive their powers 
from the consent of the governed”.364 
To fix upon the Declaration and to extract from it our basic commitment in the manner 
that Lincoln has done cannot help but create a distorted picture of our tradition. This 
alone is a very serious matter. But what is more, we are now in the process of seeing how 
it is that a tradition is derailed. Those who seize upon and stress the ‘all men are created 
equal’ clause, quite in keeping with the Lincolnian view of the tradition, have slowly, 
and understandably enough, fixed upon the symbol of equality as supreme.  
For Kendall, the Constitution superseded the Declaration in every way. The Constitution’s 
preamble, he noted, outlining the aims of government, makes no mention of Lincoln’s so-
called overriding commitment to equality.
365
   
Kendall argued that the constitutional morality remained intact until the Civil War.
366
 
Although Lincoln helped ordain the tradition of absolute rights, he was not its progenitor. 
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Instead, Kendall suggested vaguely that the seeds of derailment were planted somewhere in 
the intervening years between the Founding and Civil War. The existing “seeds” allowed 
Lincoln to “speak in the manner he did at Gettysburg and get away with it”.367 In time, 
Lincoln became the most visible and authoritative proponent of the new symbol. 
Placing equality (or any absolute right) at the centre of political society was deleterious to the 
continued functioning of the constitutional order. The Lincolnian tradition overlooked the 
Federalist morality. Instead, a “new morality” has flourished, rejecting patience, deliberation, 
and consensus. Kendall feared that impatience with deliberation would lead society to lose 
faith in Congress and empower the executive and judiciary to seek the fulfilment of rights 
over and above existing consensus.
368
 As Kendall understood it, the politics of absolute rights 
was an existential threat to the constitutional order, a push toward the open society and the 
potential breakdown of civil society.  
The attack on Lincoln reflects Kendall’s thought at the height of the civil rights era.369 Before 
the New Deal, Lincoln’s image had been employed in defence of segregationist policies but, 
during the 1950s and ‘60s, Lincoln became associated with the goals and successes of civil 
rights.
370
 Expanding on the Depression-era theme of Lincoln as “helper of all men”, parallels 
between the abolition slavery and the African-American struggle for civil rights were 
frequently drawn. Martin Luther King, Jr. called for “a second Emancipation Proclamation”, 
defining the Emancipation Proclamation as a document with civil rights at its heart. Lyndon 
Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act into law in the room that Lincoln signed the 
Emancipation Proclamation to underscore Lincolnian parallels.
371
  
By association and selective historical interpretation, Lincoln became popularly perceived as 
“racial integration’s prophet” and a precursor to the progressive and egalitarian 
movements.
372
 The notion of Lincoln as a proto-civil rights crusader, a reading largely at 
odds with the then current revisionist and psycho-historical historiography, became so 
entrenched in the popular imagination that the anti-slavery aspects of his presidency became 
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the dominant aspect of his legacy.
373
 This new aspect of the Lincoln image was the Lincoln 
that Kendall reacted against. 
Kendall was not opposed to the civil rights movement in principle, nor the political gains they 
sought. He nevertheless harboured concerns about the movement’s nature.374 Kendall 
suggested that the struggle for African-American civil rights was a unique phenomenon in 
American history, predicting it would precipitate a constitutional crisis. The constitutional 
system was capable of absorbing drastic changes to its political make up, as the 
Prohibitionists and Suffragists had shown. The civil rights movement, however, was 
fundamentally different. Its revolutionary demands and conviction that change would be the 
fulfilment of longstanding promises gave the movement an unprecedented reluctance to 
accept failure or compromise.  
The problem was society’s capacity to accept integration in the short term. Due to its unique 
nature, Kendall worried that the civil rights movement might be incapable of waiting in the 
“political anteroom”; that is, of following the constitutional morality and waiting for 
consensus to shift in favour of integration. He feared that the recalcitrance of the South and 
the impatience of the movement could only be resolved by judicial fiat or bare 
majoritarianism, or both, in tandem with the executive coercion required to enforce rights. 
The result would be an abuse of the system that would damage, irreparably, the already 
threatened constitutional order.
375
 
Nash suggests that Kendall’s fear of social breakdown was the result of his experiences 
during the Spanish Civil War. It became essential for him that society maintain a consensus 
based political and social orthodoxy: “that tissue of judgments, defining the good life and 
indicating the meaning of human existence…who see in it…the ultimate justification of their 
society”.376 Kendall believed that a mythopoeic foundation was necessary for the functioning 
and preservation a society and was concerned that the United States might lose its shared 
basis. He did not predict a second Civil War, but rather that the executive and judiciary would 
enforce the movement’s demands without securing consensus, thereby profoundly changing 
the nature of American government. 
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Kendall’s condemnation of Lincoln was along the same lines as his criticism of the civil 
rights movement’s use of natural rights and equality. The argument in his The Civil Rights 
Movement and the Coming Constitutional Crisis – the danger that impatient actors, seeking to 
institute rights-based policies present to the constitutional order – is prominent in The Basic 
Symbols as evidence of the Lincolnian derailment. 
The heroes of the new morality, ascendant amongst intellectuals, were “the Warrens, Blacks, 
Douglases, along with the Wilsons, Roosevelts I and II, and the Lincolns”.377 The 
constitutional morality has been replaced by an “apostolic succession of great leaders…each 
of whom sees more deeply than the preceding leader into the specifically American problem, 
which is posed by the ‘all men are created equal’ clause of the Declaration of 
Independence”.378 It is a utopian dream built upon the hubristic notion of America as the New 
Jerusalem. The consequence of Lincoln’s heretical vision, enshrined in the Gettysburg 
Address, is the derailment of the majoritarian constitutional order and the attendant 
constitutional crisis. “The false myths produce the fanatics amongst us”, wrote Kendall, and 
the Lincolnian symbol of equality as an absolute right is a false myth.  
Interestingly, Kendall came to believe that the impending constitutional crisis of the civil 
rights era was avoided through traditional consensus politics. The movement “softened” and 
opened itself to the deliberative process. The resulting transformations were achieved through 
the legislature, the constitutionally correct branch of government and Kendall became one of 
the few conservative intellectuals to celebrate the civil rights legislation as “great 
conservative victories”.379    
Kendall set the tone for a detectable undercurrent of reservation about Lincoln within 
conservatism. Many conservatives, although the proportion should not be exaggerated, were 
convinced by Kendall and Meyer’s scepticism toward Lincoln. Garry Wills, the conservative 
wunderkind who later broke with the movement, described the rhetoric of the Gettysburg 
Address as “seductive” in his book on the Declaration of Independence.  He later imported 
parts of Kendall’s argument in his post-conservative Pulitzer-winning Lincoln at Gettysburg. 
Wills’ analysis of the Gettysburg Address suggested that Kendall was essentially correct 
about Lincoln. The speech was “one of the most daring acts of open-air sleight-of-hand ever 
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witnessed by the unsuspecting”.380 Other conservative thinkers, especially those closer to the 
paleoconservative perspective, employed elements of Kendall’s anti-Lincoln argument to 
bolster their own views.  
 
Kendall’s stand against the first Republican president is one of his enduring contributions to 
conservatism. A second was the impact he had on Harry Jaffa’s thought and, indirectly, in 
giving birth to the so-called West Coast Straussians, an explicitly conservative branch of the 
Straussian school. 
 
Kendall first challenged Jaffa in his review of Crisis of the House Divided.
381
 Jaffa joked that 
it was “the most generous review ever written about a book with which the reviewer so 
thoroughly disagreed”.382 Kendall praised Crisis’s rigour, commending it to a wide 
readership, but cautioned readers to “keep a sharp lookout” for the limitations of Jaffa’s 
argument. Jaffa later suggested that Kendall’s criticism was intended to put distance between 
himself and Jaffa so as not to tarnish the younger academic with his own reputation.
383
 
Nevertheless, there was genuine disagreement between the two. Written in 1959, the review 
was an inchoate formulation the critique Kendall’s later expanded in The Basic Symbols. 
Criticism aside, the friendship between Jaffa and Kendall, and need for conservative 
solidarity in its early stages, prevented Kendall’s total rejection of Jaffa’s thesis.  
 
Kendall recognised that Jaffa’s chief concern was the status of the Declaration of 
Independence’s equality clause in the political tradition of America. Kendall suggested, and 
Jaffa agreed, that the question was the same as the question of Lincoln’s status vis-à-vis the 
Founding Fathers, which was the same again as the very possibility of democracy as a 
realistic form of government.
384
 Jaffa’s solution – that the equality clause is the essential idea 
of the American tradition and that Lincoln perfected the Founders’ work by returning to the 
Declaration of Independence, transcending it, and building a political religion around the new 
Declaration – is argued against at length in The Basic Symbols. Kendall uncovered a 
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contradiction in Jaffa’s Lincoln. As Catherine and Michael Zuckert indicate, Jaffa’s argument 
entailed Lincoln transforming the Declaration of Independence to impart the modern 
American regime with transcendent virtue. This amounted to a strategy of “Jaffa’s Lincoln 
apparently endors[ing] the founders and their work but in fact overcome[ing] and 
transcend[ing] them”.385 Jaffa implied the need to “follow the imperfect founders as a 
solution to the imperfection of the founders” – a summary Jaffa later admitted was “a 
caricature… not without merit”.386  
Jaffa and Kendall presented surprisingly similar arguments concerning Lincoln’s apparent 
transformation of the American tradition; their vastly different philosophies, however, led 
them to utterly disagree on the nature of the Lincolnian divergence. Where Jaffa celebrated 
this transformation as a laudatory achievement with Lincoln as saviour of the American 
regime, Kendall rejected Jaffa’s Straussian framework, seeing the transformation as an 
illegitimate and altogether dangerous distortion of the original tradition. Moreover, Kendall 
found Jaffa’s solution to the problem of self-government disturbing, specifically his anti-
Caesar counter to the “Caesarist potential” of the constitutional system. Jaffa argued that 
Lincoln believed that the constitutional system would bring forth an anti-Caesar leader to 
form a political religion for society to live by. Jaffa supposed Lincoln to be this statesman; 
Kendall thought the prospect “hair-raising”. To Kendall, Jaffa’s heroic Lincoln was an attack 
on the deliberating people.  
Although linked by their emphasis on virtue, Kendall and Jaffa’s political philosophies 
differed strikingly. Kendall’s commitment to societal consensus was in contrast to Jaffa’s 
stress reference to justice that surpasses immediate political and historic contexts. The 
disagreement was more a question of modes than ends. Jaffa thought great statesmen were 
necessary to direct regimes toward virtue; Kendall believed that, given the right process, the 
people would choose virtue themselves. Empowering a leader over the deliberating people 
would have disastrous results, claimed Kendall. He envisioned a grim future: 
an endless series of Abraham Lincoln’s, each persuaded that he is superior in wisdom and 
virtue to the Fathers, each prepared to insist that those who oppose this or that new application 
of the equality standard are denying the possibility of self-government, each ultimately willing 
to plunge America into Civil War rather than concede his point – and off at the end, of course, 
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the cooperative commonwealth of men who will be so equal that no one will be able to tell 
them apart.
387
 
 
Both Kendall’s allegiance to the legislative process and his anti-communism are clear in this 
prediction. Like his conservative contemporaries, Kendall was manifestly anti-utopian and 
Jaffa’s – at the time liberal – philosophy had utopian overtones. The anti-Caesar Lincoln 
conjured, for these intellectuals who owe a significant debt to the Burkean critique of the 
French Revolution, the spectre of an American Robespierre. 
 
The inevitable result of Lincoln’s presidency and the unwitting endpoint of Jaffa’s political 
thought, Kendall claimed, was a roadmap for aggressive progressivism. “The Caesarism we 
all need to fear is the contemporary Liberal movement, dedicated like Lincoln to the 
egalitarian reforms sanctioned by mandates emanating from national majorities – a 
movement which is Lincoln’s legitimate offspring”.388 The very concept of “virtuous leaders” 
able to force “transcendent truths” on a nation was alarmingly close to liberal impatience with 
the fundamentally conservative legislative process. This impatience leads them to favour 
judicial activism and imperial presidencies. Even after Jaffa’s rightward turn in 1961, his 
Lincoln inspired thought remained a rights based political philosophy, as threatening to 
Kendall’s deliberative process as modern liberalism. In other words, Jaffa’s Lincoln, far from 
being conservative, was a symbol of progressivism. His “open-ended warrant for 
transcending the [F]ounding” suggested an unfolding liberalism that verged on outright 
historicism, the bête noire of Straussian thought.
389
  
 
Jaffa struggled with this powerful critique and responded in 1975 with a long review of The 
Basic Symbols. Jaffa’s essay, “Equality as a Conservative Principle”, is a characteristically 
full-throated refutation of Kendall’s thesis and criticism of Lincoln. 390 In defence of Lincoln, 
Jaffa made the controversial argument that equality, correctly understood, did not lead 
inexorably to socialism but was a requirement for conservatism. A contentious and radical 
move, it highlighted the distance between Jaffa’s thought and the movement in the 1960s. It 
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also represented a shift in his thinking about America, the Founders, Lincoln, and equality 
away from the traditional Straussian position he had held in Crisis.
391
 
Jaffa first attacked Kendall’s historical analysis. Kendall had argued that the Civil War was 
necessary only insofar as Jaffa’s absolute terms are accepted; Lincoln had ignored viable 
alternatives and prosecuted the war unnecessarily.
392
 Jaffa responded that one of Kendall’s 
suggested alternatives, compensated emancipation, was, an anachronistic policy analogous to 
purchasing “Soviet state industries and returning them to free capitalistic enterprise” as a 
strategy for pursuing détente with the Soviet Union.
393
 Rather than “drawn on Lincoln’s 
terms”, secession had been assured by the South. By rejecting Stephen Douglas, the viable 
Democratic candidate, over demands for an aggressive federal slave code, and then rejecting 
the duly elected president over slavery in the territories, Southern radicals established the 
terms of secession for themselves.
394
 Jaffa wondered “whether Kendall was simply ignorant 
of the history of the period, or only pretended to be so”.395 After a lengthy examination of the 
crisis, Jaffa concluded that war was indeed inevitable and while Lincoln understood this, 
Kendall did not.
396
  
 
Jaffa’s philosophic defence claimed that equality was not only a conservative principle, but 
foundational to the United States. In this argument, the atypical aspects of Jaffa’s particular 
conservatism emerged and a major plank of West Coast Straussianism took shape. Jaffa had 
no issue with Kendall’s emphasis on deliberation and the virtue of the people, but argued that 
Kendall assumed the existence of the people. According to Jaffa, “a people become a people 
only by virtue of the principle of equality”. In other words, a society only exists through 
equality.
397
  
Jaffa contended that the ambition of Kendall’s final years was to read Locke out of the 
American political tradition; a project that explains his distaste for the Declaration of 
Independence.
 398
 In doing so he treated consent as an end principle, failing to recognise that 
it was actually contingent upon man’s natural freedom and equality. Using Lincoln to 
articulate the principle, Jaffa quoted the president at Peoria: “Judge Douglas... paraphrases 
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our argument by saying: ‘The white people of Nebraska are good enough to govern 
themselves, but they are not good enough to govern a few miserable negroes!!’ Well, I doubt 
not that the people of Nebraska are, and will continue to be as good as the average of people 
elsewhere. I do not say the contrary. What I do say is, that no man is good enough to govern 
another man, without that other’s consent”.399 If men were not free and equal, Jaffa 
concluded, no consent would be necessary to govern them.  
The common freedom and equality of mankind is not only the basis of consent, it is also the 
source of political obligation, the doctrine of limited government, and an ethical code.
400
 
Following Locke, Jaffa’s central premise held that man is neither a god nor a beast and 
therefore, no one man may claim authority over another, as a god may over a man or a man 
over a beast. To say that men are created equal is to acknowledge a truth about man’s status 
in the universe. It does not deny the very real differences between people, but rather “for the 
sake of those differences”, denies the right of anyone to govern another as if they were gods 
or the others beasts.
401
 Understood thus, (limited) equality is the necessary foundation for 
civil society that, in turn, is the justification for the unequal outcomes of civil society.
402
 
Presenting the contentious notion of equality in this manner was a departure for Jaffa. In 
Crisis, he had held that the Declaration of Independence and its reference to equality was 
established on a very different reading of Locke. He had originally interpreted the Founders’ 
use of equality as a negative right, drawn from the state of nature and moved beyond as civil 
society emerged. This interpretation stemmed from Strauss’s controversial view, subscribed 
to by Jaffa, that Locke was a crypto-Hobbesian. The Founders, by accident or design, had 
imported the modern concept of natural rights into the founding and, therefore, into the 
American regime. As a result of Strauss’s overwhelmingly negative view of modern regimes, 
Jaffa was admittedly “scathing” toward the Founders. “Gradually… [Jaffa] came to doubt the 
authority [he] had ascribed [to this interpretation]”.403  In his response to Kendall, several 
years after Strauss’s death, Jaffa employed a revised interpretation of Locke that understood 
equality as a natural and self-evident truth based on distinct ontological categories. In Jaffa’s 
hands Locke’s thought became a contemporary reformulation of Aristotle’s and, as an 
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Aristotelian rather than Hobbesian, Locke became a thinker in the ancient mould.
404
 The 
“ancient” Locke, Jaffa suggested, was the true influence of the Founders. Jefferson and the 
other Founders had, contrary to his original belief, embedded ancient thought into the 
American regime; it was, inherently, a good one. 
This new conclusion changed the meaning of the Declaration of Independence and Lincoln’s 
role in the American tradition. When Lincoln said that Jefferson had placed in the 
Declaration “an abstract truth, applicable to all times and places” and spoken of America’s 
“ancient faith”, he was neither wrong, nor preaching a noble lie to redeem America. He was 
accurately re-articulating the Founders’ belief. The equality of the Declaration was founded 
on ancient, natural law by the Founders themselves. The upshot of Jaffa’s revised argument is 
that Lincoln was no longer a benevolent transformer. Rather than instilling the Declaration 
with ancient philosophy, he restored adherence to its original ancient content. Redeemer more 
than saviour, Lincoln was a philosopher-statesman who saw the true nature of the Declaration 
from the outset. To counter Kendall’s critique, Jaffa retreated from suggesting that Lincoln 
modified or, to use Kendall’s term, derailed the American tradition. In his new conception, 
Lincoln had restored the nation’s fidelity to the correct tradition. Neither at Gettysburg, nor 
anywhere else, had Lincoln changed or derailed the true tradition of the Founders.
405
 
Kendall claimed Lincoln had held “curious notions” about equality and had succeeded in 
establishing them in the American tradition. Jaffa rejected this, without irony, as an 
unsubstantiated assertion that failed to engage with Lincoln’s thought beyond an 
idiosyncratic reading of the Gettysburg Address. While he was correct about Kendall’s 
limited evidence, he ignored the fact that his own view of Lincoln had, until recently, 
presented the president as a similarly transformative figure.
406
 Jaffa also responded that 
Kendall distorted the meaning of Lincoln’s statements about equality.407 In The Basic 
Symbols, Lincoln is condemned as a symbol of absolute equality but Jaffa was adamant that 
Lincoln endorsed only what would come to be understood as equality of rights and equality 
of opportunity. Lincoln, like modern conservatives, rejected the political impulse for equality 
of condition: 
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Certainly the negro is not our equal in colour – perhaps not in many other respects; still, in the 
right to put into his mouth the bread that his own hands have earned, he is the equal of every 
other man… In pointing out that more has been given [to] you, you cannot be justified in taking 
away the little which has been given [to] him. All I ask for the negro is that if you do not like 
him, let him alone. If God gave him little… that little let him enjoy.408 
To Lincoln, equality meant “nothing more than the equal right of all men to be treated 
justly”.409 If Lincoln was a symbol, Jaffa argued, he was a symbol of the thoroughly 
American concepts of self-reliance and self-advancement. Kendall’s Lincoln was an 
egalitarian; a charge Jaffa claimed was tantamount to slander.  
From his Lockean standpoint of limited equality, Jaffa demanded a less apocalyptic reading 
of equality from Kendall, one not axiomatically equated with socialism. Jaffa argued that 
conservatives needed to realise that equality is necessary for private property. Following 
Locke’s Second Treatise, it is a person’s natural and equal right to their own body and labour 
that forms the basis of private property. When Madison supposed that the first role of 
government was protecting man’s unequal capacities of property acquisition, he was 
appealing to the Lockean understanding of equality, labour, and property.
410
 Civil society and 
the conservative principles of property rights, personal freedoms, and ethical codes are each 
predicated on human equality. Lincoln understood its centrality when he said equality was 
“the father of all moral principle”.411 It must be remembered, then, Jaffa argued, that when 
Lincoln spoke about equality, he meant it only in the limited sense. His use of equality shared 
nothing with the grossly expanded definitions used by communists or contemporary 
progressives. It is a myth “that Lincoln was somehow the spiritual father of the New Deal, of 
the expanded presidency of the twentieth century, and of the welfare state”. Lincoln, “almost 
wholly occupied with the prosecution of the war”, had only a limited role in the “domestic 
legislation” of his administration. “The Republican Party over which he presided sponsored a 
great deal of legislation” – largely traditional Whig measures. Lincoln signed them into law 
as a “matter of course” and they laid the foundation for the “ebullient capitalism” of the 
following decades.
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Jaffa also noted that Kendall, like Meyer, was critical of Lincoln on equality without 
reference to slavery.
413
 Totalitarian in nature, Jaffa argued that chattel slavery was both anti-
reason and anti-Christian. Kendall’s failure to contextualise Lincoln’s comments undermined 
his criticism, presenting a misleading version of the president.
414
 Downplaying slavery or 
eliding it altogether was a common trend among conservative critics of Lincoln. However, 
the abolitionist aspects of Lincoln presidency only really became the prime focus of his 
legacy during the 1960s. Kendall and Meyer’s failure to emphasise slavery was congruent 
with Lincoln’s traditional popular image. Before the mid-1960s, textbooks stressed Lincoln 
and the Union rather than Lincoln and slavery.
415
 Kendall and Meyer addressed Lincoln on 
grounds that many would have found accurate and appropriate; Jaffa’s interpretation of 
Lincoln is closer to the sort of emphasis that would come to dominate the Lincoln image. His 
is part of a newer, albeit for him conservative, approach to Lincoln, one broadly informed by 
the civil rights era.   
The increasingly frequent invocation of Lincoln as a symbol of racial and social equality 
compounded Kendall’s frustration with Lincoln as a derailer of the tradition. Kendall was, in 
part, blaming Lincoln for his use in modern politics and reading contemporary ideologies 
onto the president. There is a sense in which the progressives did trace their heritage back to 
Lincoln. His speeches and writings were increasingly interpreted in the light of egalitarianism 
and invoked in support of their causes. On these grounds Kendall was somewhat justified in 
claiming that Lincoln was a symbol of equality. The symbolic Lincoln was a legitimate target 
of conservative criticism. Kendall, however, went further and took aim at the historic 
Lincoln.  
Indirectly, Jaffa sought to wrench Lincoln from the left. Already critical of the association of 
Lincoln with welfarism, the egalitarian Lincoln, he claimed, was a progressive fantasy: 
Lincoln’s equalitarianism was a “just and generous conservatism”.416 In a bold statement, 
Jaffa claimed that the new conservatism was identical with the “Old Liberalism” and opposed 
to the radical progressivism masquerading as “New Liberalism”. “The Old Liberalism saw 
life as a race, in which justice demanded for everyone only a fair or equal chance in the 
competition. But the New Liberalism sees the race itself as wrong. [Old Liberalism] 
413
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demanded the removal of artificial or merely conventional inequalities. But it recognized and 
demanded the fullest scope for natural inequalities…the New Liberalism denies natural no 
less than conventional inequalities”.417 This articulation of conservatism, founded on equality 
and self-consciously “liberal”, was a source of much conservative teeth-gnashing. In ways 
similar to Frank Meyer’s argument, Jaffa was convinced that conservatism required ordering 
beyond mere prescription. It also needed to do more than simply secure liberty. Jaffa instead 
sought to shape a conservatism guided by Straussian natural right. Lincoln was the beau ideal 
for this endeavour.  
Kendall’s Madisonian majoritarianism and Jaffa’s conservatism of natural right were both 
concerned with engaging with the morally transcendent within a framework of prudent 
political philosophy. Neither thinkers’ philosophy was representative of the mainstream of 
conservative political thought in the movement’s nascence, yet both would prove influential 
doctrines. As conservatism began to transition in the late 1960s and early ‘70s from an anti-
majoritarian outlook to a philosophy of the “silent majority”, Kendall’s Madisonian 
majoritarianism underwrote the strategic shift intellectually. Likewise, in an effort to provide 
alternatives to the entrenched relativism and big government programmes, conservative 
thinkers moved away from prescription and simple limitations on the government. Dissenting 
viewpoints in the 1960s, both Kendall and Jaffa’s political thought became increasingly 
important to the conservative movement in the 1970s and ‘80s. In terms of their differing 
interpretations of Lincoln, the Jaffaite position continued to gain currency within the National 
Review crowd as Buckley was increasingly convinced by his morally rigorous conservatism. 
Traditionally outsiders to the nation’s highest office, the Reagan revolution complicated 
conservatives’ view of the executive office. Sometimes the executive might advance moral, 
conservative purposes – perhaps a little like freeing the slaves. However, this new vision was 
not universal. The older view of limited government had life left in it, as did the conservative 
anti-Lincolnian tradition. 
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The (Southern) Traditionalist Backlash 
M. E. Bradford: The Yankee Gnostic Lincoln  
Kendall’s premature death prevented a Kendallian response to Jaffa’s arguments. One of his 
appointments in his doctoral programme, however, the English Professor Melvin Bradford (b. 
1934), advanced a virulent recapitulation of anti-Lincoln argument, drawing on Meyer, 
Kendall, and his own, deeply Southern, conservatism. Born in Texas, Bradford studied 
English at the University of Oklahoma before taking his PhD from Vanderbilt under Donald 
Davidson, “the only completely faithful Agrarian”.418  
When Bradford emerged as a rhetorician and Southern intellect in the late 1960s, he was 
identified as successor to Richard Weaver. However, respectful of Weaver as a “rigorous and 
principled conservative”, Bradford distinguished himself sharply from the North Carolinian. 
Weaver, he suggested, was “a man of systems, an admirer of Plato and a devotee of the 
argument from definition – but not as a representative of any Southern conservatism we can 
recognise”.419  As a thinker who emphasised archetypes and ideals, Weaver was more 
characteristic of New England than the South.
420
 Instead, Bradford took his mentor Davidson 
as a model. Davidson believed that Southern writers needed to live actively to the public 
square and Bradford accepted this vocation as his own.
421
 Of all Bradford’s wide-ranging and 
public activities, his assault on Abraham Lincoln’s life and legacy was by far the most 
prominent and enduring. 
A partisan of the South, Bradford was loyal to the faith of his fathers. In politics, Bradford 
stood for regionalism, agrarianism, organic social order, and the Protestant religion. A 
Dixiecrat by heritage, Bradford worked for George Wallace’s 1972 presidential campaign. In 
1975 he took the difficult step of joining the party of Lincoln in support of Ronald Reagan.
422
 
By the time of his death in 1993, Bradford was the preeminent thinker of paleoconservatism – 
a term only beginning to gain currency. During his lifetime he preferred to be known as a 
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“traditionalist conservative” or even reactionary – “[m]erely to conserve”, he noted, “is 
sometimes to perpetuate what is outrageous”. 423  
Bradford’s examination of Lincoln began with a rhetorician’s focus on his speeches and 
writings. From there he developed a comprehensive challenge to Lincoln’s status in 
American history. Shifting between rhetorical, political, and historical analysis in a series of 
essays and speeches, Bradford called into question Lincoln’s political and economic 
intentions, his views on race, and his wartime conduct. Most troubling for Bradford was 
Lincoln’s misinterpretation of the American past and frightening vision for a new American 
future.
424
 Anti-Lincolnianism was a minority position within conservatism and Bradford’s 
was the most wide-ranging and complete conservative challenge to the president in the 1970s 
and ‘80s. It did not, however, fall on entirely deaf ears. Bradford advanced his case in a series 
of essays and speeches published, largely in conservative journals like Modern Age and The 
American Spectator.
425
 
Bradford claimed that Lincoln’s soaring language was cynically manipulative and intended to 
advance a profoundly ideological agenda. He treated Lincoln’s “speeches and other writings, 
in all of their opportunistic variety, not as expressions of a political philosophy, but as 
exercises in management and manipulation, an artful music played to life and lower the 
passions and, in behalf of a ‘policy’ never fully stated (in fact, altered as he went along), to 
persuade”.426 Among presidents, Lincoln was unmatched in the art of persuasion. His 
success, however, came through the employment of dark rhetorical strategies: “the trope of 
affected modesty; the oraculum (speaking in the epideictic vein, the language of the gods); 
the diabole (slandering, predicting the worst); the argumentum ad populum (flattering the 
people); the false dilemma (crocodilities – unacceptable choices); and, especially, the 
argument ad verecundiam (an appeal to traditional values, to the prescription of the 
Revolution). Only the last of these strategies involves a serious pretence of rationality; and 
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even appealing to an imaginary history, Lincoln is being duplicitous.”427 Not an ethical 
rhetorician, Lincoln was a utopian ideologue and cynical political animal that alarmed and 
outraged the public to achieve his goals. There is some irony in this critique. Where William 
Buckley praised Lincoln’s language as inspirational and Frank Meyer criticised Lincoln by 
stripping him of his rhetorical shield – “Lincoln without Rhetoric” – Bradford located the 
heart of Lincoln’s duplicity in his rarefied language. 
Lincoln’s political ends, along with his rhetorical and political persona, changed over his 
career. Bradford identified three distinct phases: Whig, Puritan, and Cromwellian.
428
 Before 
1854 Lincoln was essentially an orthodox Whig who frequently used homey Jacksonian 
language – “a potent and calculated brew”.429 The Peoria speech marked the transition into 
the Puritanical phase of Lincoln’s career. Instead of accepting that this transformation was the 
result of a political evolution, as was usually held, Bradford contended that the overturning of 
the Missouri Compromise merely afforded Lincoln an opening through which to revive his 
failed political career. He could make hay out of opposition to slavery to challenge Stephen 
Douglas and wrench the Midwest out of the Democratic Party’s national coalition.430 “When 
I say Lincoln was our first Puritan president”, explained Bradford, “I am chiefly referring to a 
distinction of style, to his habit of wrapping up his policy in the idiom of Holy Scripture, 
concealing within  the Trojan Horse of his gasconade and moral superiority an agenda that 
never would have been approved if presented in any other form”.431 The Puritanical Lincoln, 
he alleged, had a utopian vision and the “faith that he was able to perform this prophetic, 
teleological task”.432 “[T]wo elements in this Lincoln… mark him as a dangerous man. The 
first is his faith in necessity, and his suspicion that he knows its disposition for the future… 
The second ingredient is a streak of rhetorical dishonesty, located primarily in his use of an 
ad hominem mask”.433 Thus, Lincoln became the very Caesar he warned of in his Lyceum 
Address. 
The final stage, the Cromwellian Lincoln of 1862-5, was the most dangerous and damaging 
to the American political tradition. In his rhetoric “the real is defined in terms of what is yet 
to come, and the meaning of the present lies only in its pointing thither”. When this type of 
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outlook is bound to a political abstraction – in Lincoln’s case, equality – it “can have no other 
result than a totalitarian order”.434 Like Meyer and Kendall, Bradford interpreted Lincoln’s 
presidency as a monumental step away from the ordered liberty of the Framers and toward 
tyranny.  
Bradford’s early Lincoln criticism was always built from the foundation of an analysis of 
Lincoln’s rhetoric. His major argument held that Lincoln successfully employed utopian 
rhetoric to transform the United States from a “nomocratic” regime – ordered by laws and 
procedures – into a “teleocratic” regime – empowered to achieve the ends it determined as 
good over and above procedural form.
435
 Once again, the allegation that Lincoln placed 
abstract rights above the Constitutional order was the focus of conservative ire.  
Bradford drew heavily on the thought of Eric Voegelin, an intellectual admired among 
conservatives.
436
 A German émigré and anti-totalitarian, Voegelin postulated that orthodox 
Christianity “de-divinised” society by bifurcating the spiritual and the temporal world, most 
powerfully through St. Augustine’s City of God. From the twelfth century on, however, 
Christian and secular thinkers began to break with the Augustinian worldview and 
reintroduce eschatological readings of history. Endowing history with meaning implies 
direction. Many reformers and revolutionaries have since attempted to make “immanent” any 
such historical meanings, thereby bringing about the “eschaton”. Speculations as to the eidos 
or meaning of history were alternatives to the orthodox (Augustinian) paradigm, similar to 
the early Christian Gnostic cults. Voegelin used “Gnostic” to describe claims of salvific 
knowledge (gnosis) that pertained to the bringing about, in a temporal sense, the final 
meaning of history and “a state of perfection”.437 
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Gnosticism need not be religious, Voegelin noted. Modern forms of Gnosticism “may be 
primarily intellectual and assume the form of speculative penetration to the mystery of 
creation and existence” like “the contemplative gnosis of Hegel or Schelling”. Elsewise, it 
“may be primarily emotional and assume the form of an indwelling of divine substance in the 
human soul”. “Or it may be primarily volitional and assume the form of activist redemption 
of man and society, as in the instance of revolutionary activists like Comte, Marx, or 
Hitler”.438 Bradford uncovered the political form of gnosis in Lincoln, “for the men who fall 
into these experiences divinise themselves by substituting more massive modes of 
participation in divinity for faith in the Christian sense”.439  
Voegelin believed that there was a great danger in Gnosticism: God is sacrificed to 
civilisation and the spirit of life is killed.
440
 The Gnostic obsession leads inevitably to a 
callousness toward the present and those who defend it. “The limit is reached when an 
activist sect which represents the Gnostic truth organises the civilisation into an empire under 
its rule. Totalitarianism, defined as the existential rule of Gnostic activists, is the end form of 
progressive civilisation”.441 
Bradford was convinced that Lincoln had used intoxicating rhetoric to establish the “quasi-
religion” of equality as a gnostic vision for America.442 His gnosis was essentially Jacobin in 
character and his rhetorical idiom that of a “backcountry philosophe… a rational, 
progressivist superman”.443 In his analysis of the Lyceum Address, Bradford – who intended 
it partly as a response to Jaffa’s Crisis – claimed that Lincoln employed the threat of civil 
violence and tyranny as a false dilemma to justify the transformation of the United States into 
a teleocratic regime based on “reason, cold, calculating, and unimpassioned reason”.444 
Superficially, the address was concerned with preserving the constitutional institutions of 
political life. However, “[u]pon examination of his entire text, it becomes quite clear that 
what the orator attempts through the arts of language is not preservation but change: radical 
alterations in the basis and organization of American society”.445 Relying on Lincoln’s legal 
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partner William Herndon’s biography of the president, Bradford contended that his gnostic 
“Bonapartism” was fuelled by an overwhelming personal ambition.446 
Lincoln’s Jacobin rhetoric was transitory and he shifted to a rhetoric of righteous Puritanism. 
Bradford was particularly troubled by Lincoln’s use of the tenor of the King James Bible – 
the language of the highest authority in post-Great-Awakening America. He held that Lincoln 
used this voice to venture beyond the political and into the moral, endowing his equalitarian 
vision with Patristic authority. When Lincoln spoke of “new birth”, he meant the rejection of 
heritage in favour of the new founding promised in the Lyceum Address. When he said 
government of the people “shall not perish”, he evoked John’s Gospel. Not, as John intended, 
to mean that man shall not perish, but rather the re-divinised state.
447
 At Lyceum, Lincoln 
preached from the “high temple” of Federalism “where liberty has its altar in the temple of 
philosophy”.448 The secular Gnosticism of Lincoln’s civic religion was deeply anti-Christian 
as Lincoln made a conscious effort to either replace or subsume the Church within faith in the 
State.
449
 
Eventually, Lincoln lost “himself completely in an idiom for calling forth the New 
Jerusalem” of equality.450 Lincoln believed “every ‘good cause’ [was] a reason for increasing 
the scope of government”. He maintained that in Lincoln’s political thought, “[a]ll that 
matters is the telos, the general objective, and bullying is not merely allowed, but 
required”.451 The Second Inaugural Address was the final revelation of Lincoln’s heretofore 
concealed millennialism. Lincoln looked to Providence and in it saw his reflection; in victory 
he became “a scripture unto himself”.452 As per Voegelin, the Gnostic outlook is inherently 
totalitarian: Lincoln’s accumulation of executive powers in pursuit of equality was indicative 
of his equalitarian nature. “It would be simple enough”, noted Bradford, a Southern 
Methodist, “to be ruled directly by messages from God. But an imitation of that arrangement 
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leaves us uneasy… Under such circumstances the worry is that we are more likely to arrive at 
the final plain of desolation than to a happy port in the New Zion of the Puritan vision.”453  
Not only had Lincoln succeeded in transforming the Founding into the juggernaut of modern 
federal government. Bradford’s capped his case against Lincoln by criticising his use of 
pseudo-Christian rhetoric leading to its permanent entrenchment in political discourse. 
Lincoln’s moral idiom, sacralised by martyrdom, enshrined the “trends he set in motion with 
his executive fiat”. It became, Bradford discovered, “both unpatriotic and irreligious to look 
behind the words of so august a presence”.454  
Bradford repeated the frequent conservative allegation against Lincoln. In pursuit of the 
Gnostic impulse, Lincoln distorted the meaning of the Founding and the Declaration of 
Independence. Bradford accepted the interpretation of the Declaration held by both his 
mentor, Donald Davidson, and Willmoore Kendall.
455
  He injected himself into Jaffa’s debate 
with Kendall, commenting that his purview was to challenge Jaffa, whose theoretical 
foundation “lead him to conclusions so very different from my own”.456 Bradford claimed 
that the equality of opportunity that Jaffa suggested characterised Lincoln’s thought was 
axiomatically impossible. It led inevitably toward a policy of equality of outcome. Lincoln 
was champion of the ersatz tradition that saw in the Declaration a promise of equality to be 
fulfilled in the unfolding of history. Not only was this dangerous – “a splendid edifice built 
upon a keg of gunpowder” – but wrongheaded: Lincoln had deliberately misinterpreted 
Jefferson’s intentions.457 The Declaration was not revolutionary in nature. It merely affirmed 
the presiding status quo of the colonies and Britain as “Englishmen with a difference”. In the 
context of a dispute between Englishmen over the rights of Englishmen, it was little more 
than the divorce between the colonies and George III.  
It was Lincoln that secured the mundane Declaration its legacy as “pure gnostic force”.458 In 
truth, when the Founders declared “all men were created equal”, they meant the free men of 
the newly independent states, “not as individuals, but rather in their corporate capacity”.459 
“Therefore, the following ‘all men’—created equal in their right to expect from any 
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government to which they might submit freedom from corporate bondage, genocide, and 
massive confiscation—are persons prudent together, respectful of the law which makes them 
one, even though forced to stand henceforth apart: equal as one free state is as free as 
another”.460 The text of the Declaration makes petitions against Native Americans, slaves, 
and the King’s use of foreign mercenaries. Surely, Bradford appealed, such “racist, 
xenophobic, and religious assumptions have no place in the expression of philosophic 
truth”.461 They would, however, not be out of place in a document of prescriptive law – “And 
therefore”, concluded Bradford, “in our Declaration of Independence”.462  
Like Kendall, Bradford’s anti-Lincolnianism had a largely theoretical component. Lincoln 
had transformed the United States of the Framers into a regime ordered by the telos of 
equality, consistently expanding the powers of the executive to do so. But Bradford also went 
further than Kendall or Meyer in his criticism of Lincoln. He imputed bad faith and malicious 
intent into each of the president’s actions. He felt a real antipathy toward Lincoln, admitting 
to experiencing waves of loathing whenever he saw the Lincoln Memorial.
463
 Bradford’s 
animus was personal and as much with Lincoln the man as with his legacy.  
In his portrait, Abraham Lincoln was extraordinarily manipulative and ambitious. Instead of 
buffeted by the storms of conflict, Bradford’s Lincoln dominated the Civil War for his own 
and Republican benefit; he was at “the heart of the major political events of his era”.464 
Lincoln claimed to have been controlled by events. Bradford alleged that, in reality, his 
modus operandi was to “[w]ait, set up or encourage pressure, then jump, and call it God”.465  
Lincoln’s rhetoric developed as he discovered more effective means of manipulating the 
nation. His re-emergence at Peoria as an opponent of slavery was motivated purely by 
political opportunism. Lincoln recognised that anti-slavery had significantly more traction 
than traditional Whig issues, so the Kansas-Nebraska Act became a bludgeon with which to 
attack Douglas and the Democratic coalition.
466
 Since the whole nation shared the same racist 
outlook, Bradford argued, the Northern Whigs’ emphasis on slavery was motivated by a 
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desire to cripple the Southern way of life rather than genuine concern for slaves.
467
 Lincoln 
advised his party to emphasise slavery to form a Northern sectional party and mask their 
plans to affect wide-ranging Whig policies. His anti-slavery was purely abstract: he 
emphasised the Declaration of Independence but left the Illinois state black codes in place 
and offered no real opportunity for advancement to freed slaves. Furthermore, anti-slavery 
was regional in nature. For geographical reasons Northerners were exempt from the 
forthcoming social upheaval that would ravage the South.
468
 The disconnect between 
Lincoln’s rhetorical platitudes and his conduct was immense. “[His] double-talk left his part 
of the country with a durable heritage of pious self-congratulation… Left it with the habit of 
concealing its larger objectives behind a façade of racial generosity, of using the Negro as a 
reason for policies and laws which make only minimal alterations to his condition; and also 
with the habit of seeming to offer a great deal more than it is willing to give”.469 Moreover, 
Bradford suggested that the North’s self-righteous satisfaction continued into the twentieth 
century. 
The historic Lincoln was a consummate schemer, skilled with pork-barrel patronage. His 
political economy followed the formula of “tax and tax, spend and spend”.470 It took, 
Bradford noted bitterly, the secession of the South and a “High Whig” in the Oval Office to 
enact, after “four-score and seven years”, the Hamiltonian dream of “energetic 
government”.471 Lincoln’s claim that government ought to do for a community “whatever 
they need to have done, but can not do, at all, or can not, so well, for themselves” was a blank 
cheque for governmental expansion that led directly to the rise of the welfare state.
472
 
In economics, Lincoln was a disaster. Before his rise to national office, he had all but 
bankrupted Illinois with a poorly-conceived infrastructural project. As president, the national 
banking system was expanded massively; specie depreciated in value by two-thirds; and the 
tariff rose from 18.84% to 47.56%, staying above 40% for all but two years until the Wilson 
Administration.
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commercial cronyism, justifying it by military necessity. The seeds of the corrupt and 
rapacious Gilded Age were sown by Lincoln.
474
 
His record on civil liberties was further proof of his wickedness. Between April 12 and July 
4, 1861, Lincoln governed without Congress, as de facto dictator. By pleading necessity for 
his huge expansions of the government Lincoln retained his façade of modest Whiggery with 
Jacksonian window-dressing.
475
 Bradford recited the classic litany of Lincoln’s violations of 
political rights: seizure of property; arrest of up to twenty-thousand political opponents, and 
their confinement without trial in “a Northern ‘Gulag’”; the closure of over three hundred 
newspapers; and the importation of massive numbers of foreign mercenaries.
476
 Lincoln 
flagrantly ignored the Constitution: the Emancipation Proclamation and formation of West 
Virginia both trampled the Constitution for “expediency’s” sake.477 In his hands, the war was 
more than an engine for preserving the Union; it was a tool for the transformation of the 
Union’s very nature.478 
Bradford also blamed Lincoln for precipitating the war. Misguided in believing a Southern 
majority would remain loyal to the Union, he had woefully underestimated Southern 
regionalism. Bradford regarded the South’s obduracy as a wholesale revolution against 
Lincoln’s Northern industrialism. Further, Lincoln needed a national crisis: the Lyceum 
prediction required disorder. “Though he was no sadist and no warmonger, and though he got 
for his pains much more of a conflict than he had in mind, Lincoln hoped for an ‘insurrection’ 
of some sort – an uprising he could use”.479 As he admitted to Orville Browning “the plan 
succeeded. They attacked Sumter, it fell, and thus did more service than it otherwise 
could”.480 
Finally, as Commander-in-Chief, Lincoln was an incompetent and a brute. Motivated by 
gnostic equalitarianism and Republican ambition, he was surpassingly callous toward both 
Southerners and “Billy Yank” on the front lines. Lack of concern for men under arms was 
evident in the appointment of party hack Simon Cameron as Secretary of War, and the 
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tolerance of rotten supply contracts. In a campaign of breath-taking cynicism, Lincoln 
manipulated the war effort and the army for explicit Republican gain, rigging the system to 
secure the military vote for the 1864 election. However, “all such mendacity was nothing in 
comparison to the price in blood paid for Lincoln’s attempts to give the nation a genuine 
Republican hero”.481 Bradford claimed that Lincoln made his military appointments based on 
political opinions rather than expertise. Those that failed to show ideological purity were 
cashiered or demoted – “scapegoats thrown by Lincoln to the radical wolves”. His chosen 
generals were “right-thinking incompetents”, appointments his chief-of-staff called “little 
better than murder”.  It was only when Grant and Sherman “converted” to radicalism that 
Lincoln’s disastrous policy finally abated.482 
Lincoln was a cynical dictator and manipulative ideologue but his assassination transfigured 
the “secular puritan” into an American manifestation of the “dying god”.483 Death enshrined 
his political programme and placed a divine stamp on his image forever.
484
 Bradford was 
convinced that the dominance of big government liberalism was founded on the Lincoln 
myth, now outside the bounds of historical inquiry.
485
 By overturning the image, Bradford 
sought to show that Lincoln “left behind him a trail of blood, an emancipation under the 
worst possible circumstances, and a political example which continues to injure the Republic 
which he did so much to undermine. It is at our peril that we continue to reverence his 
name”.486 At the very least, Bradford hoped he might deprive progressives of the Lincoln 
myth, who, in their “apostate vanity” and “intellectual arrogance”, would use it “to 
accomplish their distortion”. In a moment of conciliation, Bradford admitted that “[i]n all his 
protean complexity, the sad man from Illinois deserves a better fate”.487 
 
On the whole, however, Bradford’s portrait was remarkable for his candid bitterness toward 
Lincoln. In this, his thinking was informed by Lost Cause nostalgia. Bradford’s Southern 
identity and attendant conservatism were marrow-deep: “I inherited what Burke called a 
prescriptive identity, just as I inherited my identity”.488 Born in Fort Worth, Bradford was a 
sixth generation Texan with heritage in Alabama and Tennessee. His was still, in many ways, 
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a Confederate family. “We were a story-telling people. All my life I heard stories about the 
Civil War, particularly from my grandmother and great-uncle… Emerson says that everyone 
belongs to the ‘party of memory’ or the ‘party of hope’, and I grew up within the party of 
memory. Reconstructing the past helped my family define who we were”.489 
  
Bradford succeeded in a school system overwhelmingly Southern in its curriculum.
490
 The 
Texan universities were deemed overly radical, so he attended the University of Oklahoma on 
a Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps scholarship. After serving briefly on the USS Hornet, 
Bradford joined the teaching staff at the Naval Academy.
491
 Naval service was a period of 
political reflection for Bradford. “That’s where I realised that the point of departure in my 
thinking was different than most other Americans”.492 “I was simply a Southerner like my 
father and grandfathers, which meant a conservative Democrat with political antecedents 
running back through secession to Thomas Jefferson, the Antifederalists, and the English 
Country Party tradition”.493 Bradford gravitated toward Vanderbilt University, the old 
intellectual cradle of the Southern Agrarians.
494
 Its English department “was a veritable 
nursery of intellectual conservatism”.495 Davidson’s supervision was particularly formative; 
“I for one could never commence any project without feeling that I performed against his 
measure and beneath his eye”, Bradford noted.496 Bradford imbibed the Agrarians’ critique. 
The mythopoeic South of their manifesto I’ll Take My Stand reflected the world in which he 
was “born and raised”.497 The Old South, imaginatively reconstructed, was an existential 
challenge to the state of modernity. The Agrarians’ South was not moonlight and magnolias, 
but a reminder of the path that America should have followed, one that kept fidelity with the 
Jeffersonian promise of the Founders. It was both a metaphorical rebuke to the modern 
United States and a distant alternative to capitalist industrialism.
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There was, for Bradford, an important distinction between a conservative who is Southern 
and a Southern conservative.
499
 Southern conservatism was a cultural and political 
formulation based on the unique character of the South.
500
 In interpreting the South, Bradford 
relied on Davidson and Vanderbilt historian and Agrarian, Frank Owsley. They downplayed 
the importance of slavery and the planter class to the antebellum South, emphasising instead 
the yeoman class. The South, they said, had been an organic, unified social order that secured 
both individual rights and liberty within a collective community. The Southern character was 
proud, honourable, and aware of the limitations of human nature; bound by kinship, family, 
society, and God, but independent of formal political structures.
501
 Vestiges of the Southern 
social structure survived the Civil War in the conservatism that Bradford affirmed. Southern 
conservatives were non-ideological. They did not thirst for normative principals but were 
satisfied with the wisdom received from their forebears as Christians and as Americans in the 
tradition of English Whigs. It was the oldest American conservatism, different from “Crown 
and Altar” toryism and as antithetical to libertarianism as it was to egalitarianism. Southern 
conservatism was individualism within a powerful social bond.
502
 For Bradford, as with 
Davidson, his heritage endowed him with identity and history, and gave authority to his 
values.
503
 
 
Bradford’s Southern partisanship is the obvious source of his antipathy toward Lincoln. The 
faith of his fathers had been secession and the Confederacy. In 1957 Davidson published Still 
Rebels, Still Yankees, a collection of essays articulating his rejection of the notion of coherent 
United States and belief, instead, in distinct American sections. His title exemplified 
Bradford: he was a Rebel still and, drawing his identity from the well of Southern history, he 
movement and gradually drifted apart, despite several reunions. The Agrarians have been widely analysed: two 
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could have been no other. For a man who was historian-in-chief and a commander in the 
Sons of Confederate Veterans, and recipient of the Confederate Legion of Merit, seeing 
Lincoln as an enemy was the natural outgrowth of his identity.
504
 Bradford’s major 
interlocutor on Lincoln, the indefatigable Harry Jaffa, made the point glibly: “Lincoln stole 
Mel Bradford’s great-grandfather’s slaves”.505 After Bradford’s death, Jaffa eulogised him by 
expounding on his “loyalty to the Old South – the South of which he knew from what he 
regarded as the only ultimately reliable authority, namely ‘our fathers’”.506 Indeed, many of 
Bradford’s arguments revived those made in the ante- and early post-bellum South, 
particularly Alexander Stephens and Jefferson Davis’s post-war apologias. The journal 
Southern Partisan called Bradford the “guardian of the tablets” and, in this regard, he was.507 
A true believer in patrimony, Bradford’s fathers (or great-grandfathers, in his case) were 
Confederate soldiers. He was carrying on the struggle through an intellectual defence of the 
South against the North. Lincoln, the Yankee Commander-in-Chief, remained his principal 
foe.  
 
Bradford, however, departed somewhat from his teachers. The Agrarians were convinced that 
Lincoln was almost untouchable. There appeared to be “a Lincoln cult bordering on pagan 
deification”, Frank Owsley wrote. Scholars have “followed their emotions and bias to 
overemphasise certain elements and minimise others”. The Agrarians did not criticise 
Lincoln’s character, however, but his lack of judgement.508  Like Bradford, Davidson 
followed Owsley’s interpretation of the War as a campaign of intellectual and cultural 
aggression by the industrial Northern against the agrarian South. The Northern assault cast 
aside the Founders’ compromises and established Northern interests as the national interest. 
The Northern heretics sought to subvert the republican ideals of America, still kept to in the 
South, with the industrialist ideology of the philosophes. Davidson identified the Radical 
Republicans and their intellectual allies like Horace Greeley, William Lloyd Garrison, and 
Harriet Beecher Stowe as the drivers of the Northern intellectual assault. Lincoln, a moderate 
opponent of slavery, they argued, was not generally antagonistic toward the South. It was the 
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anti-South faction that convinced Lincoln of a slave-power conspiracy. Lincoln needed to 
secure Union and prevent Southern sectional interests overtaking Northern ones (that is, those 
Lincoln believed to be the national interests). He was tragically mistaken. The South had no 
intention of challenging the Northern way of life but, if roused, it would fight until the last. 
Bradford rejected any clemency toward the historic Lincoln. His Lincoln was not swayed by 
radical rhetoric but the very source of cultural aggression. Bradford essentially distilled the 
Agrarian argument of a Northern cultural assault and attributed it to the person of Lincoln. In 
each of his stages, Lincoln was the ideal form of the anti-Southern Yankee gnostic. The 
Northern cultural edifice remained the aggressor in the war on the South and broader 
American tradition but in Lincoln Bradford had a personification of the Northern challenge. 
In part the focus on Lincoln had an epideictic function. Bradford’s writing was rhetorically 
minded and Lincoln was a useful shorthand; a clear target for neo-Confederate wrath and a 
synecdochic version of Davidson’s Northern culture war. Bradford’s true enemy was always 
modernity and, in the sweep of American history, Lincoln became the symbolic and historical 
harbinger of modernity. By criticising Lincoln, Bradford was attacking the very idea of 
modernity as much as he was challenging the historical figure. 
 
Debasing the Lincoln symbol was necessary for Bradford’s project. Steeped in the Agrarian 
reverence for poetic imagery, he understood the rhetorical authority of the Lincoln image. 
Bradford hoped for the replacement of the modern, industrial society with the [re]established 
Southern way of life. By its very existence, the mythopoeic South was a challenge to 
modernity. However, the form the Lincoln image began to take during the latter half of the 
twentieth century was noxious to the Agrarian’s mythic South. From the 1960s onward 
Lincoln’s greatness was linked to his role in the abolition of slavery. The Old South that 
Bradford and his predecessors presented significantly downplayed the role of slavery. Its 
palatability as a rebuke to modernity was contingent on understating the “peculiar 
institution’s” centrality to Southern society. “Lincoln the Emancipator” was a constant 
reminder of Southern complicity in the great sin of slavery. To maintain his own symbol, 
Bradford needed to radically undermine the Emancipator image and the role of slavery in the 
cause of the war. To that end he was eager to portray Lincoln as a racist, imperialist, Puritan 
Bonaparte, willing to use duplicitous rhetoric to advance the Northern, and his own, interests. 
If the Lincoln myth stood, the Agrarians’ Old South could not. Bradford confronted this 
challenge in a way his forebears had not needed to. The shift in focus from Lincoln as saviour 
of the Union to Lincoln as Emancipator presented Bradford with a challenge the original 
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Agrarians had not faced. This is not to suggest, however, that Bradford did not genuinely 
believe he had captured Lincoln’s true nature in ways that defenders of the president had not. 
No, Bradford was too much a partisan of the South not to see Lincoln in this light and too 
candid and gentlemanly a debater to falsify his conclusions for ideological gain. 
 
Bradford fit less than comfortably within the broader conservative movement. He joined the 
Republican Party and, in some ways, it was a natural shift: the Democratic Party increasingly 
favoured big-government solutions and liberal positions on social issues. The conservative 
wing of the Republican Party became a refuge for many conservative Democrats. Jaffa noted: 
 
We shared a hatred of Communism abroad and socialism at home. We both loathed 
‘race-based remedies.’ We felt much the same way about the liberal statism that would 
replace the family and its extension in neighbourhood communities, neighbourhood 
schools, neighbourhood churches and synagogues, and voluntary charitable 
organizations. In fact, we shared a conviction concerning states' rights, even though Mel, 
following John C. Calhoun, could not see the connection that I (and Abraham Lincoln) 
saw between states' and natural rights. 
Above all, we shared a hatred for that acid of modernity, moral relativism, which lay at 
the heart of the welfare state, and which was dissolving the very basis of our 
civilization.
509
  
 
Even so, the conservatism of the Reagan Revolution embraced freemarket policies and a 
hawkish tone foreign policy that Bradford, closer to the pre-Buckley Old Right, struggled to 
countenance.
510
  
 
Within the conservative intellectual milieu, Bradford was in good standing. Jeffrey Hart, in 
particular, was complimentary about Bradford. He was an “American Plutarch” and 
“Confederate Voegelin”, “engaged in a long and valuable dispute about the legacy of 
Abraham Lincoln”.511 Bradford was especially important to a circle of traditionalist, mostly 
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Southern, thinkers. Given the breadth and erudition of his work, there was at least a tolerance 
for Bradford’s anti-Lincolnianism among conservatives, although many were  not entirely 
convinced. His Lincoln articles were often paired with a response from Harry Jaffa and the 
two maintained a vigorous debate through various avenues for over two decades. In speeches 
and in print Bradford’s views were given an airing, although usually with a Jaffaite pro-
Lincoln rejoinder.
512
  
 
Bradford’s animus toward Lincoln might have remained within the conservative traditionalist 
and Southern intellectual ghettoes had it not become a political cudgel. Bradford expected 
and received the nomination for the chair of the National Endowment for the Humanities 
(NEH) in the early days of the Reagan administration. When details of his nomination leaked, 
it begat a small storm. Bradford let it be known that he intended to curb support for “cultural 
populism” in favour of “Western Civilisation” and “see that conservatives get a better shake 
than they did in [his predecessor’s] regime”. He was a colourful figure whose views were 
easily mined for headlines. Within the administration there was a backlash against Bradford, 
allegedly spearheaded by Irving Kristol. The neoconservative faction, of which Kristol was a 
leading figure, had been rivals of the Southern conservatives in the old Democratic coalition, 
they were now competitors for influence within the new Republican majority. They favoured 
Democrat William Bennett for the chairmanship. A memorandum, “Quotations from 
Chairman Mel”, circulated amongst White House Staffers, emphasising, among other things, 
Bradford’s anti-Lincoln views.513 Syndicated pundit George Will argued in his column that 
Bradford’s nomination was a provocation and gift to the left. Echoing Jaffa, Will believed 
Lincoln was “the greatest statesman in the history of democracy because he drew a line in the 
dust, limiting popular sovereignty”. “It is not harmless for a great political party to mock its 
noble past”; it would be a tactical error and a gross mistake for Reagan to force through the 
Walter Berns, Harry Jaffa, George Will, and, we hazard, a consensus of historians”. Elsewhere, Jaffa contended 
that Hart agreed with Bradford’s argument, although not necessarily on his condemnation of Lincoln. 
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nomination of a “shrill despiser of the first Republican president”.514 Bradford’s candidacy 
gained the approval of thirty Republican Senators and the written support of many 
conservative academics, including Jaffa. Ultimately, however, Bennett was nominated and 
appointed; Bradford’s published comments on Lincoln apparently a decisive factor. Bradford 
was bitterly disappointed. His allies interpreted Bennett’s selection as a neoconservative 
triumph for liberalism over authentic conservatism. They believed the use of Bradford’s 
academic Lincoln views to attack his political life to be ruthlessly cynical.
515
  
 
Mel Bradford was a throwback. His views on politics, the South, and Lincoln were, in the 
Reagan years, anachronistic. The Southern conservatism he treasured was in part opposed to 
and otherwise subsumed into the Reaganite conservative movement. He stood against the 
federal government at a time when the conservative movement controlled the White House 
and the apparatus of state for the first time. During Bradford’s later years there was an influx 
into the conservative movement of thinkers with a greater level of comfort with the federal 
government. With their liberal intellectual foundations, the neoconservatives saw a definite 
role for the government in both domestic and international settings. The increasing influence 
of the Jaffaite “West Coast” Straussians contributed to a considerable shift in the movement, 
creating space for a conservatism of natural rights. Likewise, the influential George Will 
advanced the idea of “statecraft as soulcraft”.516  Instead of being demonised as an abuser of 
federal power, Lincoln became the model of salutary, even beneficent, executive leadership. 
A conservative Lincoln was beginning to emerge along clearly Jaffaite terms.
517
 Similarly, in 
contrast to Bradford’s agrarian vision, Reagan’s economic reforms and the Kempian 
emphasis on the power of the market allowed Lincoln to be praised precisely as an exponent 
of the industrial capitalism Bradford deplored. Later conservatives, including Allen Guelzo 
and Rich Lowry, have proclaimed a conservative Lincoln along these very lines.
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Following the nomination battle, Bradford entered a remarkably productive period until his 
death. He rededicated himself to the anti-Lincoln position, several of his most strident anti-
Lincoln works appearing after 1981. Politically, he grew increasingly disillusioned with the 
Reagan administration’s inability to enact a conservative transformation and was frequently 
critical of the influence of the neoconservatives. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, his 
political allegiances placed him closer to the emerging paleoconservative reaction to the state 
of the Republican Party than the mainline party. His work appeared increasingly often in the 
paleoconservative journal Chronicles.
519
 Bradford retained a coterie of traditionalist 
intellectual allies and disciples that, at the time of his death, included “Russell Kirk, Forrest 
McDonald, Frederick Wilhelmsen, Thomas Landess, Samuel Francis, Jeffrey Hart, Thomas 
Fleming, Clyde Wilson, and [James McClellan]” – many Southern and most involved with 
the paleoconservative dissent.
520
  
 
Even if his politics were closer to the paleoconservative position, Bradford retained relatively 
good standing within the wider movement. He still appeared frequently in Modern Age, The 
American Spectator, and the Heritage Foundation’s Policy Review.521  Between 1981 and 
1991, National Review, still the primary journal of big-tent conservatism, published 
seventeen articles by Bradford and reviewed his work favourably. Toward the end of the 
decade, however, there was a shift away from his position on Lincoln. Late in 1989, National 
Review ran a review of Don Fehrenbacher’s Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and Writings by 
Chronicles editor and Bradford associate Thomas Fleming. Under the heading “Lincoln’s 
Tragic Heroism”, Fleming advanced, with explicit reference to Bradford, a restatement of 
Bradford’s attack on Lincoln. Lincoln, he wrote, “reforged the old federal Republic into a 
nation ‘dedicated to a proposition’. That dedication has meant… Wilsonian crusades to save 
and extend democracy, the New Deal with its labyrinth of welfare entitlements, and the civil 
rights revolution which now extends the status of privileged minority to fully three-fourths of 
the population”.522 These grievances reflect the complaints paleoconservatives levelled at the 
Straussian and neoconservative branches of conservatism and modernity broadly. “There is” 
Fleming concluded, “no doubt of Lincoln’s greatness... He is our Julius Caesar, our 
Cromwell…  However, among conservatives who still refuse to seek salvation in the state, 
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there ought to be room for a small remnant of doubters who prefer Cato to Caesar, Falkland 
to Cromwell, and the corrupt Stephen Douglas to the not entirely incorruptible Abraham 
Lincoln”.523 Fleming’s review was the last anti-Lincoln article printed by National Review – 
although the magazine reprinted Willmoore Kendall’s critical-yet-laudatory review of Jaffa’s 
Crisis of the House Divided in 1995 when Crisis was republished. In the month following 
Fleming’s review, NR printed a response from Harry Jaffa, a consummate demolition of 
Fleming’s – and Bradford’s – position.524 The ideological disparity over Lincoln between 
Bradford and National Review was brought to a head in 1991 when the magazine refused to 
publish Bradford’s review of Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution by 
James McPherson – a mainstream scholar admired on the right. In response, Bradford 
concluded his two and a half decade long relationship with the journal.
525
 Reflecting the shift 
toward the Jaffaite position within the conservative mainstream, future references to Lincoln 
in National Review were largely positive. References to Lincoln were frequently along 
specifically Jaffaite lines – including those written by Jaffa himself and his students, namely 
Charles Kesler and Ken Masugi – or tended to associated Lincoln with contemporary 
conservative figures like Reagan or George W. Bush. This trend was not universal. Outside 
the conservative mainstream, the traditionalist Modern Age remained wary of the Straussian 
inflected Lincoln. Upon Bradford’s death a significant part of an issue was dedicated to 
memorialising and affirming their late contributor.
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 In spite of conservatism’s growing 
comfort with Lincoln, there remained in the traditionalist, Southern, and paleoconservative 
camps (ones with much overlap), a prejudice for the American Cato over the American 
Caesar. 
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Conclusion 
Getting right with Lincoln – or, Jaffa Agonistes 
 
By all accounts a political movement that is self-consciously conservative implies, at its 
heart, the preservation or conservation of something. The several debates about Abraham 
Lincoln that the conservative movement underwent were not period defining moments in the 
emergence of conservatism in America, but they were indicators of its on-going process of 
self-definition. Those conservatives that scrutinised Lincoln recognised that his presidency 
remains the point about which American history pivots. To place themselves and the 
movement they were forming in relation to Lincoln was a necessary step for self-definition; a 
clarion statement about how they understood themselves and how they envisioned the state of 
modern, and historic, America.  
In the early stages of conservatism, its major thinkers had a certain anti-majoritarian 
inclination. They understood themselves as bastions of right-thinking; defenders of the 
Western tradition under siege. Russell Kirk is the classic example of this conservative 
discomfort with twentieth century society. Kirk initially disregarded Lincoln in his sweep of 
Anglophone conservatism, favouring, among others, John C. Calhoun. His aversion gradually 
gave way to a view that accepted Lincoln as a conservative figure. The influence of Richard 
Weaver on Kirk’s thought is clear as Kirk partially accepted Weaver’s arguments about 
Lincoln as an oasis of moral realism. Later conservatives, Meyer and Bradford in particular, 
had their own awkward relationships with modernity and mass society. Their rejection of 
Lincoln is symbolic of their rejection of modern, popular America.  
The early conservatives sought to attest that conservatism was indeed a legitimate perspective 
in American society. Lincoln – perhaps, along with Washington and Jefferson – is the 
essential figure of American history. He is the most prominent of the historic presidents and a 
symbol of America’s values and greatness. For the conservative mind the question was two-
fold. Was there in fact a conservative tradition, and if so, how did Abraham Lincoln figure in 
it? Kirk understood this dilemma, at least in part, when attempted to write a conservative 
tradition. He prized stability, hierarchy, and order and, on those terms, he all but omitted 
Lincoln. Eventually Kirk did elevate Lincoln to the pantheon of conservative figures, by 
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virtue of the president’s moderation and personal qualities. Following Kirk’s only partially 
successful attempt at writing the conservative tradition, two subsequent approaches to writing 
the conservative tradition emerged. The first claimed that yes, such a tradition did exist and it 
was in the teachings of the Founders as ratified by the Constitution and articulated in the 
Federalist. This position of Constitutional veneration was adopted by Meyer, Kendall, and – 
with a Southern traditionalist addition – Bradford. To explain the dominance of liberalism in 
the contemporary political context, each thinker concluded that the venerable and 
conservative tradition of the Founders must have been, at some point, gravely distorted. For 
blame they turned to the greatest moment of crisis in American history and the man that 
presided over it. These thinkers each determined that Lincoln was at least partially 
responsible for the emergence of liberalism. Reaching similar conclusions for various, if 
related reasons, they saw Lincoln as the point of divergence in American tradition. Whether 
by damaging the balance of the Constitution, establishing a rival supreme symbol, or 
perniciously saturating heretical notions into American life, Lincoln’s presidency was the 
moment at which the experiment in ordered liberty had soured. Their conservatism entailed a 
return to what they understood as the original tradition, the tradition of the Founders that 
preceded the Lincolnian error. 
The second response was that adopted by Harry Jaffa and, in some ways, although to a far 
lesser extent, Richard Weaver. As a disciple of Strauss, Jaffa interpreted the Founding as an 
event inescapably modern in nature. As a regime, the United States was bound up with the 
failings of modernity. America needed Lincoln, the magnanimous philosopher-statesman, to 
transfigure the Declaration of Independence into an articulation of an ancient, transcendent 
truth, and dedicate the nation to its pursuit. In doing so, Lincoln delivered the Union from 
historicism and the path to nihilism.  
Both arguments set upon Lincoln as the turning point in American history. What was in 
dispute was whether the Lincolnian transformation was salutary or catastrophic. On one level, 
the debate turns on the relative status of the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution. It was Lincoln that brought the compromises of the Constitution into line with 
the promises of the Declaration. Those thinkers critical of Lincoln held that the Constitution, 
far above the Declaration of Independence, was the basis of the United States and the 
conservative tradition. They respected the Constitution for the form of government it 
established and denigrated the Declaration as, at best, naïve. For Meyer, the Constitution had 
liberty at its heart; for Kendall, consensus. As they understood it, in the political sphere 
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conservatism and the conservative tradition was nomocratic, concerned ultimately with the 
processes of government. Lincoln, they argued, assaulted the regime by replacing its 
nomocratic basis with one of ends. Through Lincoln and the Declaration, the United States 
made a utopian turn. It became a teleocracy, empowered to achieve its lofty aims. Jaffa, firm 
in the Straussian belief that a good state is one ordered toward virtue, rejoiced in this 
transformation. Lincoln endowed the nation with a statement of justice and virtue at its heart. 
To Jaffa’s critics, this constituted a peculiarly moralistic progressivism. Where Meyer, 
Kendall, Bradford, and Kirk tried to balance liberty and virtue, Jaffa and the Straussian 
school thought it a failure for the state to remain agnostic on morality. In the shadow of 
communism abroad and in memory of the horrors of the World War and the Holocaust, the 
state must stand for justice, lest it abet wrong. By demonstrating that the evil of slavery 
cannot be voted up or down, Lincoln was a powerful symbol for a conservatism built on 
Straussian insights.  
In effect, the rival approaches to interpreting history each proposed a different aspect of the 
American heritage as the authentic conservative history. Both recognised Lincoln’s centrality. 
Following the criticism implicit in Willmoore Kendall’s The Basic Symbols of the American 
Political Tradition, Jaffa produced something of a synthesis between these views. He revised 
his interpretation of the Founding Fathers, concluding that they were less modern than he 
originally believed. In Jaffa’s new interpretation, Lincoln no longer reinterpreted the 
Declaration of Independence because he was not required to: the Founders had understood its 
full truth initially. Therefore, the American tradition as far back as the Founding was good 
and virtuous. Less a turning point, Lincoln did not redeem the Founding, but restored it after 
a period of abasement. His “Second Founding” made good on the original Founding’s 
promise. Jaffa claimed the American tradition was conservative because it was justly ordered 
as early as the Founding; the Revolution was a conservative revolution that established 
natural right. It is unfair, however, to imply that Jaffa or Jaffa’s Lincoln – or Jaffa’s Founding 
Fathers – were determined to establish America as a teleocratic regime. He argued 
consistently through his career that both the Founders and Lincoln were supremely prudential 
men, scrupulously constitutional in their outlook. Lincoln, Jaffa contended, stood for rightly 
ordered, prudential and constitutional government. In Jaffa’s occasionally heady moral tones, 
the message of Lincoln’s moderation was occasionally lost. It was, however, his hope that 
Lincoln’s example of the founding truths would become what American conservatism was in 
the business of conserving. 
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As Jaffa understood it, his project was not outlining his own philosophy for the right, but the 
re-presentation of Lincoln’s arguments to a modern audience. He sought to demonstrate, 
incontrovertibly, that Lincoln was the great principled statesman of America and that the 
conservatives were his successors. Jaffa believed himself to be a part of the debate through 
Western thought, from the Classical era into the twentieth century, between natural right and 
power. The question had manifested in America in the clash between Lincoln’s political 
philosophy and that of John C. Calhoun. This conflict, Jaffa believed, was very much alive. 
By defending Lincoln from conservative critics, Jaffa believed he was resisting the 
Calhounian impulse within modernity and within conservatism. “Calhoun’s heirs have 
dominated the academy and by a shallow and permissive historicism and relativism have 
subjected ‘the laws of nature and of nature’s God’ to scorn and contempt…. We must then 
take up the weapons of truth and go forth to battle once again for the cause of Father 
Abraham, of Union, and of Freedom, as in the olden time”.527 Indeed, critics of Jaffa, 
including those sympathetic to his causes, have suggested that he too freely associated, or 
even conflated, his opponents – Kendall, Meyer, Bradford as well as Bork, Scalia, and 
Rehnquist – with Calhoun.528 
As a Straussian, Jaffa believed fundamentally that ideas were paramount. For all he shared 
with his allies in practical terms, his central concern for conservatism was that it be rightly 
ordered for the right reasons. By this he meant a conservatism that was empowered and 
governed by the Declaration of Independence. For conservatives to be politically right their 
policies must be underpinned with true ideas – the low must be seen in light of the high. In 
Lincoln, the United States has the greatest vision of a true, moral conservatism. “As Harry 
Jaffa has argued wisely and often”, reads the ten year anniversary editorial of the Claremont 
Review of Books, a journal deeply informed by Straussian-Jaffaite conservatism, “a return to 
the principles of the Constitution and the Gettysburg Address requires something like a 
revolution not only against modern liberalism but also within modern conservatism”.529 For 
the remaining Burkean conservatives, however, the Claremont school is anathema. Paul 
Gottfried, for example, disputes whether Jaffa is conservative at all, suggesting that Buckley 
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opportunistically brought Jaffa, a right-wing progressive liberal, and his views to the fore in 
the 1970s to give “new meaning to his drifting movement”.530  
Critics notwithstanding, the Jaffaite conception of Lincoln, and, to some extent, of 
conservatism itself, has gained considerable acceptance. This is not to say that Jaffa and his 
views have been unequivocally embraced – opponents, some of them vociferous, still exist on 
the fringe. But within the broad movement, Jaffa’s interpretation is the bedrock for twenty-
first century conservative readings of Abraham Lincoln and the right’s claims over the 
president. The Jaffaite Lincoln gained credence as conservatism developed and its historic 
and political context shifted. Buckley protégé Richard Brookhiser noted that initially “few 
conservatives agreed with Jaffa. Russell Kirk was nostalgic for Confederates and Tories. 
Frank Meyer thought well of the American Revolutions, but condemned Lincoln as a statist. 
Jaffa fought with both of them. One of Jaffa’s few converts was Bill [Buckley] – oddly 
enough, considering [Buckley’s] early support for segregation, but Bill always liked a good 
debater”.531 He added “when I came to read the founders on my own, I saw how right Jaffa 
was”.532 Another Buckley protégé, Joe Sobran, admired the mature Jaffa’s interpretation of 
Lincoln and the Founding during the late 1970s. “[T]his, surely, is the American tradition: 
individualism, freedom, and, yes, equality. That these ideas are constantly misapplied does 
not affect their truth…. Jaffa’s book brilliantly tears away conceptual distractions, and reveals 
our own first principles to us”.533 Steven Hayward recalled a neoconservative luminary, 
probably Irving Kristol, who admitted that Jaffa was enjoying a vindication: “It was not clear 
even as late as 1980 which direction the conservative movement would take in the aftermath 
of Reagan’s election. It could have gone in the direction of Russell Kirk, toward a Burkean, 
tradition-oriented conservatism, or in a more purely libertarian direction. Instead, the main 
current of conservatism has come to focus on the American Founding and the centrality of 
the Declaration of Independence”.534 In a biography of the political philosopher in National 
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Review, John J. Miller suggested that “Jaffa may be the most important conservative political 
theorist of his generation”, a generation that, it should be noted, included Frank Meyer, 
Willmoore Kendall, and a platoon of other seminal conservatives.
535
  Hyperbole aside, Jaffa 
was important in shaping conservatism and integral in guiding the way it interpreted Lincoln.  
Although the perception of Lincoln within the major conservative publications is a generally 
positive one, there remain critical voices on the fringes of the movement. The remnants of the 
anti-Lincoln challenges made by Meyer, Kendall and Bradford have small but serious 
followings. The anti-Lincoln right occupies extremities of both the libertarian and 
traditionalist sub-branches of conservatism with a solid cross-over in their arguments and 
sources. On the traditionalist anti-Lincoln fringe, the Bradford influence is pervasive; he is 
the authoritative voice. Paleoconservative magazines like The American Conservative and the 
Rockford Institute’s Chronicles, following Bradford, maintain a critical line. The libertarian 
anti-Lincoln tradition incorporates Frank Meyer’s critique of Lincoln as a centralizer that 
fought the legitimate act of secession and Bradford’s litany of charges. The anti-Lincoln 
impulses and the interplay between them are best exemplified by Thomas DiLorenzo. A 
prolific and shrill critic of Lincoln, DiLorenzo is both a senior fellow in the libertarian 
Ludwig Von Mises Institute and an associated scholar of the Southern, borderline 
neoconfederate Abbeville Institute.
536
 By regurgitating and expanding Bradford and Meyer’s 
criticisms, DiLorenzo has attracted a cult following but, unlike his forebears, he has far less 
legitimacy within the conservative movement.
537
  
As staunch as conservative and libertarian critics of Lincoln are, their intellectual leaders are 
marginal at best. The paleoconservative magazines have low circulation: The American 
Conservative has 8,000 subscribers; Chronicles approximately 6,000; Southern Partisan is 
available only online. The paleoconservative moment reached its high watermark in 1992 and 
never regained its influence, although the anti-Lincoln libertarian fringe maintains a cult 
following. By contrast, the essentially pro-Lincoln conservative magazines National Review 
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and The Weekly Standard have circulations of 166,000, and 105,000 respectively.
538
 Indeed, 
conservative academic Barry Shain, a thinker in the Kendall-Bradford tradition, while 
suggesting interpretations of Lincoln as a tool for distinguishing true conservatives from 
neoconservatives and classical liberals, admitted that he was one of only two “conservatives” 
recently surveyed to deem Lincoln a failure.
539
 
The first generation of conservative intellectuals were far more likely to entertain anti-
Lincoln views than their successors. Why, then, did the Jaffaite Lincoln, or at least a version 
heavily influenced by Jaffa, come to dominate over and against the various permutations of 
the anti-Lincoln tradition? Much of the explanation lies in the changes within conservatism 
and the shifting historical and electoral realities of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
Foremost, Meyer and Kendall were both critical of Lincoln at the height of the civil rights 
movement. Conservatives in the fifties and sixties embraced Southern society and culture as a 
bulwark against liberalism. They were, by and large, wary of the constitutional issues at stake 
in the civil rights movement. With the general end to that tumultuous era and desegregation a 
fait accompli, Lincoln was no longer an historic example of modern radical transformation. 
Once the justness of the civil rights cause was widely acknowledged on the right, Lincoln 
could even be deployed as a conservative leader on abolition and civil rights. In a similar 
vein, the end of the Cold War and threat of domestic communism led to a fundamental shift 
in conservative thinking on equality. Without the threat of totalitarianism, a new willingness 
to entertain shades of meaning in equality emerged where previously the conservative 
approach had bordered on apocalyptic. As opportunity and aspiration became the hallmark of 
Republican politics, instead of a by-word for egalitarianism, Lincoln could be appreciated as 
a prophet of equality of opportunity – not outcome. Equality could, as Jaffa had argued, be a 
conservative principle. Finally, through Reagan conservatism was itself successful as a 
mainstream political persuasion. Self-described conservatives are no longer an isolated 
remnant rebelling against the liberal establishment. They are an establishment in and of 
themselves. A hundred and fifty years after his death, no broad-based American movement 
can seriously reject Lincoln. Instead of rejecting the trappings of the “liberal establishment”, 
the conservative intellectuals have sought to appropriate some of the choice symbols of 
America, including Lincoln. 
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To establish whether Abraham Lincoln was conservative is, in a sense, Sisyphean. As the 
nation changed, so did, inevitably, the conservative movement. Over the twentieth century 
there was a gradual but distinct shift in the movement’s primary emphases. As conservatives 
embraced new orientations they found themselves closer to Lincoln. Where the president was 
difficult to hold up on the basis of Kirkian prescriptive right he is, as Weaver and Jaffa held, a 
leading symbol of natural right.  Lincoln is not easily lionised as a champion of hierarchy 
and order, but as a symbol of freedom and opportunity he is ideal. Where there are questions 
about him as a standard for civil liberties, Lincoln is the great symbol of a celebration of 
liberty that remembers the freedom of slaves. As conservatives came to conceive of 
themselves as a leading and modern political movement instead of a civilizational rear-guard 
action, they embraced Lincoln as an energetic and conservative president of the modern era. 
For over fifty years Harry Jaffa has been the determined proponent and defender of Lincoln 
within conservatism. Both in his explicitly Lincolnian work and his wider thought, Jaffa has 
maintained that true American conservatism must look constantly to Lincoln for direction and 
inspiration. When conservative luminaries like Meyer, Kendall, and Kirk questioned whether 
Lincoln ought to hold the respect of conservatives or whether the principles of the 
Declaration of Independence could be the basis of a meaningful tradition, Jaffa rose to defend 
the first Republican president. Jaffa’s success was in part due to the strength of his 
arguments. They were thoroughly grounded in the American tradition and rigorously 
reasoned. As a debater, he was unafraid to make his point sharply; many friends and allies 
felt the sharp end of his zealous pen. The impressive array of Jaffa’s opponents also speaks to 
his sheer longevity. He debated every major conservative or libertarian critic of Lincoln over 
the past five decades and outlived most. When Lincoln was challenged on the right in the 
early decades of conservatism, Jaffa made the case for Lincoln’s conservative nature. 
Gradually, others became converted to the Jaffaite view, William F. Buckley perhaps most 
importantly. In the later decades of the conservative era, through his own work and that of his 
students, Jaffa has been integral in not only defending Lincoln within conservatism, but 
shaping the Lincoln image on the right.  
We might say, in closing, that the general acceptance of Lincoln by the conservative right is 
down to the essential place of Abraham Lincoln in America. The question remains how can a 
movement be authentically American if it stands against him? With some exceptions, the 
American conservative movement now seeks to appropriate the sixteenth – and first 
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Republican – president as its own. The right, finally, has gotten right with Lincoln. It has 
done so on remarkably Jaffaite terms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
129 
Bibliography: 
Primary Sources 
Introduction 
Obama, Barack. The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream. 
Melbourne, Australia: Text Publishing Company, 2007. 
Obama, Barack. "Perfecting Our Union." The Atlantic  (2011): 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/02/perfecting-our-union/308832/. 
 
Gestures Toward a Conservative Lincoln 
Introduction 
Buckley, William F., Jr. God and Man at Yale: The Superstitions of "Academic Freedom". 
Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery Co., 1951. 
Rossiter, Clinton Lawrence. Conservatism in America: The Thankless Persuasion. 2nd ed. 
New York, NY: Knopf, 1962. 
Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. "The New Conservatism: Politics of Nostalgia." The Reporter, 6 June 
1955, pp. 9-12. 
 
Richard M. Weaver 
Bradford, M. E. "The Agrarianism of Richard Weaver: Beginnings and Completions." 
Modern Age vol. 14, no. 3-4 (1970): pp. 249-56. 
Buckley, William F. , Jr, ed. Did You Ever See a Dream Walking? American Conservative 
Thought in the Twentieth Century. Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 
1970. 
Kendall, Willmoore. "How to Read Richard Weaver: Philosopher of 'We the (Virtuous) 
People'." Intercollegiate Review vol. 2, no. 1 (1965): pp. 77-86. 
Weaver, Richard M. The Ethics of Rhetoric. Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery Company, 1953. 
Weaver, Richard M. Ideas Have Consequences. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
1948.  
Weaver, Richard M. "Letter." New York Times Book Review, March 21 1948, p. 29. 
Weaver, Richard M. "To Write the Truth." College English vol. 10, no. 1 (1948): pp. 25-30. 
Weaver, Richard M. Visions of Order: The Cultural Crisis of Our Times. Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1964. 
Weaver, Richard M. The Southern Tradition at Bay: A History of Postbellum Thought. Edited 
by George Core and M. E. Bradford. New Rochelle, NY: Arlington Books, 1968. 
Weaver, Richard M. "The Cultural Role of Rhetoric." In Language Is Sermonic: Richard M. 
Weaver on the Nature of Rhetoric, edited by Rennard Strickland Richard L. 
Johannesen, and Ralph T. Eubanks. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1970. 
Weaver, Richard M. Ideas Have Consequences. Paperback ed. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 1984. 
 
 
130 
Russell Kirk 
Kirk, Russell. The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Santayana. Chicago, IL: Henry 
Regnery Company, 1953. 
Kirk, Russell. "The Measure of Abraham Lincoln." The Month vol. 2, no. 4 (1954): pp. 197-
206. 
Kirk, Russell. "Ethical Labour." In Beyond the Dreams of Avarice, edited by Russell Kirk. 
Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery Company, 1956. 
Kirk, Russell. The Roots of American Order. LaSalle, I.L.: Open Court, 1974. 
Nock, Albert J. Mr. Jefferson. reprint ed: Hallberg Publishing Corp., 1983 
Pargellis, Stanley. "Lincoln's Political Philosophy." The Abraham Lincoln Quarterly vol. 3, 
no. 6 (1945): pp. 275-90. 
Regnery, Henry. "Russell Kirk and the Making of the Conservative Mind." Modern Age vol. 
21, no. 4 (1977): pp. 338-53. 
Schlamm, William S. "Civilized Conversation: Review of a Program for Conservatives." The 
Freeman December (1954): p. 233. 
Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. "The Politics of Nostalgia." In The Politics of Hope and Bitter 
Heritage: American Liberalism in the 1960s, edited by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1955. 
Trilling, Lionel. The Liberal Imagination: Essays on Literature and Society. New York, NY: 
The Viking Press, 1951. 
 
Harry V. Jaffa 
Jaffa, Harry V. Crisis of the House Divided: An Interpretation of the Lincoln-Douglas 
Debates. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc, 1959. 
Jaffa, Harry V. "Kendall & Carey: The Basic Symbols of the American Political Tradition " 
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review vol. 8, no. 2 (1975): 471-505. 
Jaffa, Harry V. "Lincoln and the Cause of Freedom." In The Conditions of Freedom: Essays 
in Political Philosophy. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975. 
Jaffa, Harry V. American Conservatism and the American Founding. Durham, NC: North 
Carolina Academic Press, 1982. 
Jaffa, Harry V. Crisis of the House Divided: An Interpretation of the Lincoln-Douglas 
Debates. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.  
Jaffa, Harry V. "The Legacy of Leo Strauss." The Claremont Review of Books vol. III, no. 3  
(1984): pp. 15-25. 
Jaffa, Harry V. "Crisis of the Strauss Divided: The Legacy Reconsidered." Social Research 
vol. 54, no. 3 (1987): pp. 579-603. 
Jaffa, Harry V. "Dear Professor Drury." Political Theory vol. 15, no. 3 (1987): pp. 316-35. 
Jaffa, Harry V. "The False Prophets of American Conservatism." In Claremont Institute 
Lincoln Day Conference, http://www.claremont.org/publications/pubid.670/pub_detail.asp, 
1998. 
Jaffa, Harry V. "Calhoun Versus Madison: The Transformation of the Thought of the 
Founding." In James Madison: Philosopher and Practitioner of Liberal Democracy, 
http://www.loc.gov/loc/madison/symposium.html, 2001. 
131 
Jaffa, Harry V. "The Party of Lincoln Vs the Party of Bureaucrats." Claremont Institute  
(1996): http://www.claremont.org/publications/pubid.485/pub_detail.asp. 
Jaffa, Harry V. "Strauss at 100." Claremont Institute  (2003): 
http://www.claremont.org/publications/pubid.269/pub_detail.asp#.  
Jaffa, Harry V. "The Soul of Buckley." National Review Online  (2008): 
http://www.nationalreview.com/blogs/print/224105. 
Jaffa, Harry V. Phone Conversation, March 14 2013. 
Kendall, Willmoore. "Source of American Caesarism: Review of Crisis of the House 
Divided." National Review vol. 47,  no. 25, 123-4. 
Kesler, Charles. "A Decade of CRB." Claremont Review of Book vol. XI, no. 1 & 2 (2011): 
pp. 6-7. 
Kesler, Charles R. "Harry V. Jaffa: Giving Us Lincoln." National Review vol. 57, no. 23 
(2005): pp. 108-9. 
Wilson, Francis G. "Politics and Literature." Modern Age vol. 10, no. 4 (1966): pp. 123-5. 
 
Modern Copperheads: An Anti-Lincoln Challenge 
Frank S. Meyer 
Brookhiser, Richard. Right Place, Right Time: Coming of Age with William F. Buckley Jr. 
And the Conservative Movement. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2009. 
Editorial. "In This Issue." National Review vol. xvii, no. 34 (1965): p. 705. 
Editorial. "In This Issue." National Review vol. xvii, no. 38 (1965): p. 793. 
Jaffa, Harry V. "The Achievement of Leo Strauss." National Review vol. xxv, no. 49 (1973): 
pp. 1353-5. 
Kendall, Willmoore. The Conservative Affirmation. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1963. 
Meyer, Frank S. "Collectivism Rebaptized (1955)." In In Defense of Freedom and Related 
Essays. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty fund, 1996. 
Meyer, Frank S. "In the Great Tradition." National Review vol. 3 (1957): pp. 527-8. 
Meyer, Frank S. National Review vol. 3 (1957): p. 528. 
Meyer, Frank S. "Freedom, Tradition, Conservatism (1960)." In In Defense of Freedom and 
Related Essays. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1996. 
Meyer, Frank S. "In Defense of Freedom (1962)." In In Defense of Freedom and Related 
Essays. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1996.  
Meyer, Frank S. "Why Freedom (1962)." In In Defense of Freedom and Related Essays. 
Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1996. 
Meyer, Frank S. In Defense of Freedom and Related Essays. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 
1962. 
Meyer, Frank S. "Freedom under Lincoln." National Review vol. 17, no. 24 (1965): p. 520. 
Meyer, Frank S. "Letter to the Editor: A Reply." National Review vol. 17., no. 40 (1965): p. 
888. 
Meyer, Frank S. "Lincoln without Rhetoric." National Review vol. 17, no. 38 (1965): p. 725. 
Meyer, Frank S. "Again on Lincoln." National Review vol. 17, no. 4 (1966): pp. 71, 85. 
Meyer, Frank S. The Conservative Mainstream. New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1969. 
Meyer, Frank S. "Richard M. Weaver: An Appreciation." Modern Age vol 14, no. 3-4 (1970): 
pp. 243-8. 
Parry, Stanley. "The Dilemmas of Equality." National Review vol. xvii, no. 35 (1965): pp. 
606-7. 
132 
Rothbard, Murray N. "The Communist as Bogey-Man." Left and Right vol. iii, no. 2 (1967): 
22-43. 
Scott V. Sandford, 393 (1856). 
"The Sniper." Time, 3/11 1967, p. 92. 
Sork, Lawrence, Jr. "Letter to the Editor: Meyer on Lincoln." National Review vol. 17, no. 30 
(1965): pp. 621-2. 
Various. "Letter to the Editor: Revisionism?" National Review vol. 17, no. 42 (1965): pp. 
900-1. 
———. "Letters to the Editor: Re Lincoln without Rhetoric." National Review vol. 17, no. 40 
(1965): pp. 850, 88. 
Wills, Garry. Confessions of a Conservative. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1979. 
Wilson, Edmund. Patriotic Gore: Studies in the Literature of the American Civil War. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1966. 
 
William F. Buckley 
Brookhiser, Richard. Right Place, Right Time: Coming of Age with William F. Buckley Jr. 
And the Conservative Movement. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2009. 
Buckley, William F. , Jr. "Why the South Must Prevail." National Review vol. 4 (1957): p. 
149. 
Buckley, William F. , Jr. "Letter to the Editor." National Review vol. 17, no. 30 (1965): p. 
661. 
Buckley, William F. , Jr. "Statement by Wm. F. Buckley Jr., Announcing His Candidacy for 
Mayor of New York, June 24, 1965." National Review vol. 17, no. 28 (1965): pp. 
587-9. 
Buckley, William F., Jr. The Unmaking of a Mayor. New York, NY: Viking, 1966. 
Buckley, William F. , Jr, ed. Did You Ever See a Dream Walking? American Conservative 
Thought in the Twentieth Century. Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 
1970. 
Button, Daniel E. Lindsay: A Man for Tomorrow. New York, NY: Random House, 1965. 
Wills, Garry. Confessions of a Conservative. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1979. 
 
 
Further Conservative Challenges 
Willmoore Kendall 
Hart, Jeffrey. "Willmoore Kendall: American." In Willmoore Kendall Contra Mundum, 
edited by Nellie D. Kendall. Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1971. 
Hart, Jeffrey. "Willmoore Kendall: The Unassimilable Man." National Review vol. 37, no 25, 
pp. 84-9. 
 
Kendall, Willmoore. "The "Open Society" and Its Fallacies." The American Political Science 
Review vol. 54, no. 4 (1960): pp. 972-9. 
Kendall, Willmoore. The Conservative Affirmation. Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery, 1963. 
133 
Kendall, WIllmoore. "The Civil Rights Movement and the Coming Constitutional Crisis." 
The Intercollegiate Review vol. 1, no. 2 (1965): 53-66. 
Kendall, Willmoore. John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority Rule. Reprint ed. Urbana, IL: 
University of Illinois Press, 1965. 
Kendall, Willmoore, and George W. Carey. The Basic Symbols of the American Political 
Tradition. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970. 
Kendall, Willmoore. "What Killed the Civil Rights Movement?" In Willmoore Kendall 
Contra Mundum, edited by Nellie D. Kendall. New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 
1971.  
Kendall, Willmoore. "Source of American Caesarism: Review of Crisis of the House 
Divided." National Review vol. 47,  no. 25, 123-4. 
Wilhelmsen, Frederick D., and Willmoore Kendall. "Cicero and the Politics of the Public 
Orthodoxy." Intercollegiate Review vol. 5 (1968-9): 84-100. 
Wills, Garry. Lincoln at Gettysburg: The Words That Remade America. New York, NY: 
Touchstone, 1992. 
 
M. E. Bradford 
Bradford, M. E. "Donald Davidson: 1893-1968." The Southern Review vol. 4, no. 4 (1968): 
pp. 1110-1. 
Bradford, M. E. "Dividing the House: The Gnosticism of Lincoln's Political Rhetoric." 
Modern Age vol. 23, no. 1 (1979): pp. 10-24. 
Bradford, M. E. "The Lincoln Legacy: A Long View." Modern Age vol. 24, no. 4 (1980): pp. 
355-63. 
Bradford, M. E. "Memories." Modern Age vol. 26, no. 3-4 (1982): pp. 242-4. 
Bradford, M E. "The Agrarian Tradition: An Affirmation." In Remembering Who We Are: 
Observations of a Southern Conservative. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 
1985. 
Bradford, M E. Remembering Who We Are: Observations of a Southern Conservative. 
Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1985. 
Bradford, M. E. "Against Lincoln: A Speech at Gettysburg." In The Reactionary Imperative: 
Essays Literary and Political. Peru, IL: Sherwood Sugden & Co, 1990. 
Bradford, M. E. "Rhetoric and Responsibility: Conservatives and the Problem of Language." 
In The Reactionary Imperative: Essays Literary and Political. Peru, IL: Sherwood 
Sugden & Co., 1990. 
Bradford, M. E. The Reactionary Imperative: Essays Literary and Political. Peru, IL: 
Sherwood Sugden & Co., 1990.  
Bradford, M. E. "Where We Were Born and Raised." In The Reactionary Imperative. Peru, 
IL: Sherwood Sugden & Co, 1990.  
Bradford, M. E. "How to Read the Declaration: Reconsidering the Kendall Thesis." The 
Intercollegiate Review vol. 28, no. 1 (1992): pp. 45-50. 
Bradford, M. E. "Lincoln and the Language of Hate and Fear: A View from the South." In 
Against the Barbarians and Other Reflections on Familiar Themes. Columbia, MO: 
University of Missouri Press, 1992. 
Bradford, M. E. "Lincoln, the Declaration, and Secular Puritanism: A Rhetoric for 
Continuing Revolution." In A Better Guide Than Reason: Federalists and Anti-  
Federalists. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishing, 1994. 
134 
Bradford, M. E. "The Heresy of Equality: A Reply to Harry Jaffa." In Lincoln's American 
Dream: Clashing Political Perspectives, edited by Kenneth L. Deutsch and Joseph L. 
Fornieri. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005. 
Cartwright, Gary. "Mr. Right." Texas Monthly, March 1992, 
http://www.texasmonthly.com/content/mr-right-0. 
Cribb, T. Kenneth, Jr. "Not in Memoriam, but in Affirmation." Modern Age vol. 36, no. 3 
(1994): pp. 3536. 
Davidson, Donald, ed. I'll Take My Stand: The South and the Agrarian Tradition, by 12 
Southerners. 1st Harper Torchbook ed. New York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1962. 
Fleming, Thomas. "Lincoln's Tragic Heroism." National Review vol. 41, no. 23 (1989): pp. 
380. 
Hart, Jeffrey. "Mel Bradford, RIP." National Review vol. 45, no. 6 (1993): pp. 19-20. 
Jaffa, Harry V. "Lincoln's Character Assassins." National Review vol. 40, no. 1 (1990): pp. 
34-8. 
Jaffa, Harry V. "In Abraham's Bosom." National Review vol. 45, no. 7 (1993): pp. 50-1.  
Lincoln, Abraham. Lincoln on Democracy. Edited by Mario M. Cuomo and Harold Holzer. 
1st Fordham University Press ed. New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2004. 
McClellan, James. "Defending the High Ground: The Legacy of M. E. Bradford." Modern 
Age vol. 36, no. 3 (1994): pp. 37-48. 
Owsley, Frank. "A Southerner's View of Abraham Lincoln." In The South: Old and New 
Frontiers, edited by Harriet Chappell Owsley. Athens, GA: University of Georgia 
Press, 1969. 
Simpson, Lewis P. "The Story of M. E. Bradford." The Southern Literary Journal vol. 26, no. 
2 (1994): pp. 102-8. 
Will, George F. "Bradford Nomination Would Be Gift to Dems." Syndicated Column, Dec 3 
1981. 
Will, George F. Statecraft as Soulcraft: What Government Does. New York, NY: Simon & 
Schuster, 1983. 
 
Getting Right With Lincoln 
Guelzo, Allen C. "Our Lincoln." National Review vol. 61, no. 3 (2009): pp. 25-8. 
Guelzo, Allen C. "Mr. Lincoln's Economics Primer." National Review vol. 62, no. 23 (2010): 
pp. 45-48. 
Hayward, Steven. "The Vindication of Harry Jaffa."  
http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2011/07/the-vindication-of-harry-jaffa.php. 
Jaffa, Harry V. A New Birth of Freedom: Abraham Lincoln and the Coming of the Civil War. 
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. 
Lowry, Rich. Lincoln Unbound: How an Ambitious Young Railsplitter Saved the American 
Dream - and How We Can Do It Again. New York, NY: Broadside Books, 2013. 
Miller, John J. "The House of Jaffa: The Remarkable Career of a Scholar Still at Work." 
National Review vol. LXV, no. 12 (2013): pp.32-5. 
Ponnuru, Ramesh, and Jonah Goldberg. "Sam's Smear: Preposterous History from the New 
Republic." National Review vol. LXV, no. 5 (2013): pp. 36-38. 
Shain, Barry Alan. "The Americanization of Conservatism." Modern Age vol 42, no. 1 
(2000): pp. 118-27. 
Sobran, M. J. "Saving the Declaration." National Review vol. 30, no. 52 (1978): pp. 1601-3. 
 
135 
Works Consulted 
Allitt, Patrick. Catholic Intellectuals & Conservative Politics in America: 1950-1985. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1993. 
Allitt, Patrick. The Conservatives: Ideas and Personalities Throughout American History. 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009. 
Bailey, Fred Arthur. "M. E. Bradford, the Reagan Right, and the Resurgence of Confederate 
Nationalism." In Painting Dixie Red, edited by Glenn Feldman. Gainseville, FL.: 
University Press of Florida, 2011. 
Benson, Eric. "The Goldwater Campaign; Catching up with Harry Jaffa, the 94-Year-Old 
Historian Who Wrote, 'Extremism in the Defense of Liberty Is No Vice.'." New York, 
22 October 2012. 
Bork, Robert H. A Time to Speak: Selected Writings and Arguments. Wilmington, DE: ISI 
Books, 2008. 
Carey, George W. "Willmoore Kendall: 1909-1967." The Western Political Quarterly vol. 
20, no. 3 (1967): p. 799. 
Carey, George W. "Bradford Meets the Barbarians." Modern Age vol. 36, no. 3 (1994): pp. 
49-52. 
Clinton, Catherine. "Abraham Lincoln: The Family That Made Him and the Family He 
Made." In Our Lincoln: New Perspectives on Lincoln and His World, edited by Eric 
Foner. New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Co., 2008. 
Deutsch, Kenneth L. "Leo Strauss's Friendly Criticism of American Liberal Democracy." In 
The Dilemmas of American Conservatism, edited by Kenneth L. Deutsch and Ethan 
Fishman. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2010. 
Dennis, William C.  “Foreword” in Meyer, Frank S. In Defense of Freedom and Related Essays. 
Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1962. 
DiLorenzo, Thomas. Lincoln Unmasked: What You're Not Supposed to Know About 
Dishonest Abe. Reprint ed. New York, NY: Three Rivers Press, 2007. 
Donald, David. "Getting Right with Lincoln." In Lincoln Reconsidered: Essays on the Civil 
War Era. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, 1972. 
Drury, Shadia B. The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss. London, UK: Macmillan Press, 1988. 
East, John P. "Richard M. Weaver: The Conservatism of Affirmation." Modern Age vol. 19, 
no. 4 (1975): pp. 338-54. 
Felzenberg, Alvin. The Operator: The Political Legacy of William F. Buckley, Jr. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, Forthcoming. 
Flynt, Wayne. "The Transformation of Southern Politics, 1954 to the Present." In A 
Companion to the American South, edited by John B. Boles, pp. 494-503. Oxford, 
UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. 
Follette, Charles Kellogg. "A Weaverian Interpretation of Richard Weaver." PhD diss., 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1981. 
Frum, David. "The Legacy of Russell Kirk." The New Criterion vol. 13, no. 4 (1994): pp. 10-
16. 
Genovese, Eugene D. The Southern Tradition: The Achievement and Limitations of an 
American Conservatism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993. 
Gottfried, Paul Edward. Conservatism in America: Making Sense of the American Right. New 
York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007. 
Gottfried, Paul Edward. Leo Strauss and the Conservative Movement: A Critical Appraisal. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
136 
Hart, Jeffrey. The Making of the Conservative Mind: National Review and Its Times. 
Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2005. 
Johannesen, Richard L. "A Reconsideration of Richard M. Weaver's Platonic Idealism." 
Rhetoric Society Quarterly vol. 21, no. 2 (1991): pp. 1-10. 
Kraynak, Robert P. "Moral Order in the Western Tradition: Harry Jaffa's Grand Synthesis of 
Athens, Jerusalem, and Peoria." The Review of Politics vol. 71, no. 2 (2009): 181-206. 
Malvasi, Mark G. The Unregenerate South: The Agrarian Thought of John Crowe Ransom, 
Allen Tate, and Donald Davidson. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1997. 
Mattson, Kevin. Rebels All! A Short History of the Conservative Mind in Post-War America. 
New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2008. 
McAllister, Ted V. Revolt against Modernity: Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin, and the Search for 
a Post Liberal Order. Lawrence, KN: University Press of Kansas, 1996. 
McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1988. 
Miller, Gary, and Norman Schofield. "The Transformation of the Republican and Democratic 
Party Coalitions in the U.S." Perspectives on Politics vol. 6, no. 3 (2008): pp. 533-50. 
Minowitz, Peter. Straussophobia: Defending Leo Strauss and Straussians against Shadia 
Drury and Other Accusers. Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2009. 
Murphy, Paul V. The Rebuke of History: The Southern Agrarians and American Conservative 
Thought. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 
Nash, George H. "The Place of Willmoore Kendall in American Conservatism." In 
Willmoore Kendall: Maverick of American Conservatives, edited by John A. Murley and 
John E. Alvis. Lanham, MY: Lexington Books, 2002. 
Nash, George H. The Conservative Intellectual Movement in American since 1945. Thirtieth-
Anniversary ed. Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2006. 
Neely, Mark E., Jr. The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 1991. 
Neely, Mark E., Jr. "Abraham Lincoln Vs. Jefferson Davis." In Writing the Civil War: The 
Quest to Understand, edited by James M. McPherson and William J. Cooper, Jr., pp. 96-111. 
Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1998. 
Pafford, John M. Russell Kirk. Edited by John Meadowcroft, Major Conservative and 
Libertarian Thinkers. New York, NY: Continuum International Publishing, 2010. 
Peele, Gillian. "American Conservatism in Historical Perspective." In Crisis of 
Conservatism: The Republican Party, the Conservative Movement, & American Politics after 
Bush, edited by Joel D. Aberbach and Gillian Peele. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
2011. 
Peterson, Merrill D. Lincoln in American Memory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
1994. 
Pressly, Thomas J. Americans Interpret Their Civil War. First Collier Books ed. New York, 
NY: Collier Books, 1962. 
137 
Schwartz, Barry. "Collective Memory and History: How Abraham Lincoln Became a Symbol 
of Racial Equality." The Sociological Quarterly vol. 38, no. 3 (1997): 469-87. 
Schwartz, Barry. Abraham Lincoln in the Post-Heroic Era: History and Memory in Late 
Twentieth-Century America. Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press, 2009. 
Scotchie, Joseph. Barbarians in the Saddle: An  Intellectual Biography of Richard M. 
Weaver. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997. 
Skinner, Quentin. "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas." History and Theory 
vol. 8, no. 1 (1969): pp. 3-53. 
Smant, Kevin J. Principles and Heresies: Frank S. Meyer and the American Conservative 
Movement. Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2002. 
Smith, Steven B. "Philosophy as a Way of Life: The Case of Leo Strauss." In Political 
Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: Authors and Arguments, edited by Catherine 
Zuckert. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
 
Staloff, Darren. Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson : The Politics of Enlightenment and the 
American Founding New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 2005. 
Strauss, Leo. "The Three Waves of Modernity (1959)." In An Introduction to Political 
Philosophy: Ten Essays, edited by Hilail Gildin. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University 
Press, 1989. 
Sullivan, Timothy J. New York State and the Rise of Modern Conservatism: Redrawing Party 
Lines. Albany, NY: State University of New York, 2009. 
Voegelin, Eric. The New Science of Politics: An Introduction. Chicago, IL.: University of 
Chicago Press, 1952. 
Young, Fred Douglas. Richard M. Weaver, 1910-1963: A Life of the Mind. Columbia, MO: 
University of Missouri Press, 1995. 
Zuckert, Catherine, and Michael Zuckert. The Truth About Leo Strauss: Political Philosophy 
and American Democracy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2006. 
 
 
138 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
This thesis is the culmination of my time spent at the University of Canterbury and there are a 
great many to whom I owe a great deal for its completion. The first and most significant note 
of thanks and appreciation must go to my supervisor, Peter S. Field who suggested a study of 
the conservatives’ historical interpretations of Lincoln – an intersection of our interests, 
perhaps. I owe him much for his patience, knowledge, insight, and willingness to both 
challenge me and to read my early and disordered drafts. Although the final result of this 
project may have taken a shape dissimilar to what Peter may have envisioned, I hope it goes 
with his blessing. A great deal of thanks must also go to my secondary advisor, Michael 
Grimshaw. His advice has been instrumental in drawing out some of my key arguments and 
themes and I appreciate his enthusiasm for my project. Also at Canterbury I would like to 
thank my graduate colleagues, Judy Robertson, and the History Department. Thanks 
especially to Ivan Ignatov and Gregory Hynes for the ridiculous conversation and hijinks. 
Beyond Christchurch I would like to offer a note of appreciation to Ted V. McAllister of 
Pepperdine University, Paul V. Murphy of Grand Valley State University, and Russell 
Jenkins of National Review for providing advice and sources. Special thanks to Alvin S. 
Felzenberg – whose interest in my research, knowledge, and advice was both invaluable and 
gratifying – and to Harry V. Jaffa – whose personal friendliness and incredible recollection 
are justifiably praised.  
I would like to offer profound and humble thanks to my Mother and Father, who gifted me 
with a love of learning and a love of History and to whom I owe an incalculable amount. 
Finally, my deepest love and appreciation goes to Jamee Elder, who listened to me speak 
endlessly about old white men, read and proofed drafts, learned more about Lincoln than she 
ever cared to know, and responded with affection. Thank you.  
